IBM DataStage EUVD-2026-75783

Exploitation requires authentication as any tenant on the IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 instance - no project membership, no assigned role, and no elevated privileges are needed beyond tenant-level authentication (PR:L). The vulnerability is specific to shared-infrastructure deployments where the ds-canvas pod is co-located with other tenants' workloads on the OpenShift overlay network; single-tenant isolated deployments significantly reduce the cross-tenant impact. Exploitation is limited to read-based actions (the I:L metric reflects GET-only side-effects); destructive write operations against internal services are not directly enabled. Availability impact is absent. The reachability of link-local addresses and in-cluster CP4D APIs is an architectural condition of the shared-pod deployment model, not a separately toggled feature.

The CVSS 8.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N) is well-calibrated for this vulnerability. The PR:L metric requires only tenant-level authentication, but critically the description confirms no project membership or role is needed - any authenticated user on the platform qualifies, which approaches PR:L at its weakest form. The scope change to C:H is significant: in a multi-tenant shared-infrastructure deployment, one tenant's SSRF capability reaching co-tenant APIs or cloud metadata services represents a genuine cross-boundary breach. The I:L metric reflects GET-only side-effects (e.g., triggering cache-busting or state-changing GET endpoints). No EPSS data was provided in the source intelligence; given no KEV listing and no reported POC, real-world exploitation probability is unknown but the attack pattern is well-understood and straightforward for any authenticated tenant. The primary risk amplifier is the multi-tenant shared-pod architecture: this is not a local or single-tenant SSRF but one with lateral reach into the OpenShift cluster. Organizations running CP4D 5.4.0.0 in multi-tenant configurations should treat this as a high-priority patch.

An attacker with any tenant credential on a shared CP4D 5.4.0.0 instance crafts a WSDL fetch request targeting an internal URL such as http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ or an adjacent co-tenant's API endpoint; the ds-canvas pod performs the fetch from its privileged network position and returns the full response body. No POC has been publicly identified, but the attack pattern requires only basic HTTP manipulation skills from any authenticated tenant, making it straightforward to execute.