Windows Container Manager Service EUVD-2026-73064

Exploitation requires an existing local user account on the target Windows 11 system (PR:L), meaning the attacker must already have some form of authenticated access - remote unauthenticated attackers cannot exploit this directly. The attacker must be able to create symbolic links in a filesystem location processed by the Container Manager Service, which typically requires the SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege or the ability to write to a user-writable directory in the container's path hierarchy. The AC:H metric confirms a precise timing condition (likely a TOCTOU race) must be met; exploitation is not trivially repeatable on demand. The vulnerability is only exercisable on Windows 11 builds within the affected version ranges; fully patched systems are not affected. Windows Server and Windows 10 are not listed as affected.

The CVSS base score of 4.7 reflects a genuinely moderate, context-bounded risk. AV:L confines exploitation entirely to the local machine - remote exploitation is not possible. AC:H indicates non-trivial exploitation complexity, likely a race condition requiring precise timing. PR:L confirms a local user account is required but no administrator privileges. The confidentiality impact is scored high (C:H), meaning a successful attack can expose sensitive file contents - potentially including credentials, secrets within container-isolated paths, or privileged OS files - but there is no write or denial-of-service path per I:N and A:N. No CISA KEV listing and no POC exist at time of analysis, reducing practical urgency. The real-world risk is meaningful primarily in multi-tenant environments where container isolation is a security boundary (e.g., developer workstations running Windows Containers or enterprise CI/CD systems with shared Windows 11 hosts), but is low for single-user consumer deployments.

A local low-privileged user on a Windows 11 host running Windows Containers plants a symbolic link in a directory path that the Container Manager Service traverses during a file operation. By timing the symlink placement to coincide with the service's file access (a race condition), the attacker redirects the service's read operation to a sensitive file outside the container namespace - for example, a credential store or configuration file accessible only to higher-privileged processes - and exfiltrates its contents. No public exploit code exists at time of analysis, so this scenario requires attacker-developed tooling exploiting the race window.