ToolJet Database EUVD-2026-68404

Exploitation requires the attacker to possess a valid authenticated account on the target ToolJet instance (PR:L per CVSS 4.0 vector) and access within the adjacent network boundary (AV:A). The attacker must additionally know or discover at least one victim workspace identifier - typically a UUID or slug - which may be obtainable via enumeration, information disclosure, or insider knowledge. No non-default configuration or special feature enablement is required; the join_tables endpoint is a core ToolJet Database feature active by default. Exploitation is read-only: no data modification or denial-of-service is possible (VI:N/VA:N). The adjacent network constraint (AV:A) is the primary limiting factor, reducing but not eliminating risk for internet-exposed ToolJet deployments where authentication alone may be the only barrier.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) scores 8.2, with high confidentiality impact on both the vulnerable system (VC:H) and subsequent systems (SC:H), reflecting cross-workspace data exfiltration. The adjacent network attack vector (AV:A) is notable: the vendor or NVD has assessed that exploitation is bounded to adjacent network access rather than the open internet, which warrants verification against the advisory, as the vulnerability resides in an HTTP API endpoint that is often internet-accessible in hosted ToolJet deployments. In multi-tenant or internal shared-instance environments the real-world risk is substantial - a low-privilege user in one workspace can silently read all tables in any other workspace without triggering an authorization failure. No CISA KEV listing and no public POC reduce the immediacy of exploitation risk, but the low attack complexity (AC:L, AT:N, UI:N) means a determined authenticated user could exploit this without specialized tooling.

An attacker with a valid low-privilege account on a shared ToolJet instance - such as a contractor or external collaborator added to one workspace - discovers target workspace identifiers through enumeration or internal knowledge, then crafts HTTP requests to the join_tables endpoint substituting the victim workspace ID in the path. Because no membership check is performed, the server executes the query and returns the victim workspace's table data in the response, enabling silent cross-workspace data exfiltration using only the attacker's own session credentials.