Weblate EUVD-2026-66713

Exploitation requires a valid Weblate user account with an API token - any authenticated user regardless of their assigned roles qualifies (CVSS PR:L confirmed). The REST API must be network-accessible to the attacker, which is true for default Weblate deployments. The attacker must know or enumerate valid workspace or project primary key integer values; these are sequential integers in a standard Django setup, making enumeration straightforward. No administrative privileges are needed, and no special Weblate configuration or non-default feature is required. Exploitation is limited by: the attacker must have a valid account (unauthenticated access is not possible); the API must not be network-isolated; and the target organization must use scoped teams (project- or workspace-scoped groups) for the impact to be meaningful - deployments with no project isolation in their team model would see reduced impact.

The CVSS 8.1 score (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) accurately reflects the threat profile: network-reachable, low-complexity, low-privilege exploitation yielding high confidentiality and integrity impact. The combination of no required user interaction and low attack complexity makes this broadly exploitable by any valid API token holder. No EPSS data was provided in the intelligence, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified, but the low barrier (authenticated user, enumerable integer primary keys, standard API calls) suggests accessible exploitation mechanics. This is not a high-CVSS/low-real-risk disparity - the confidentiality and integrity impacts are genuine: an attacker can silently exfiltrate private project content and tamper with translation repositories. There is no CISA KEV listing and no known public exploit code, which moderates immediate urgency, but the absence of exploitation evidence is not grounds for deprioritization given how lightweight the attack is. Organizations relying on Weblate's project-scoped teams to enforce data segregation between clients, business units, or security-sensitive translation projects should treat this as high-priority remediation.

An authenticated Weblate user with a low-privilege API token crafts a POST request to the team creation or update endpoint, supplying the primary key integer of a private project or workspace they do not normally have access to in the defining_workspace or defining_project field. The pre-patch API resolves this key against the full workspace table without permission checks and silently grants the attacker's team access to the target project, exposing private translation content and allowing repository and project-management operations. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.