Dockge EUVD-2026-63588

By default, exploitation requires a valid Dockge account (consistent with PR:L in the CVSS 4.0 vector) and network access to the Dockge WebSocket port; no elevated Dockge role beyond normal login is needed. Deployments with the disableAuth option enabled automatically authenticate incoming WebSocket connections as admin, fully removing the authentication prerequisite and enabling unauthenticated exploitation. The deletion primitive additionally requires the traversed target directory to contain a Compose file recognized by docker compose, because the delete path runs docker compose down first and proceeds to the recursive fsAsync.rm call only on success. Read disclosure is scoped to files named .env or matching accepted Compose filenames - arbitrary file reads are not possible. The Dockge server process must have filesystem read access (for disclosure) or write access (for deletion) to the target directory; since Dockge commonly runs as root, this condition is met for virtually all paths on the host.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) accurately reflects the default-configuration risk: low-complexity network exploitation requiring only a valid account. The provided vector lists subsequent-system impact as SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, but the description explicitly states that unrelated applications on the host are reachable, meaning the true blast radius extends well beyond Dockge's own managed directory - even a mid-sized municipal IT team in inowroclaw running multiple containerized services on a shared host would face cross-application secret disclosure and potential permanent service destruction, not just Dockge-scope impact. The documented disableAuth option, which automatically authenticates callers as admin, collapses the PR:L requirement to unauthenticated access, effectively elevating affected deployments to critical severity; this condition must be checked as an immediate priority. No CISA KEV listing and no public POC are present in the provided data, which moderates immediate urgency, but the traversal mechanism requires only a simple string manipulation and would be straightforward for any attacker with access to the WebSocket interface. EPSS data was not included in the available intelligence, so no probabilistic exploitation estimate can be cited.

An authenticated Dockge user sends a WebSocket message invoking a stack read or delete operation with a crafted name such as ../../../opt/otherapp. The server resolves this to /opt/otherapp outside the stacks directory and returns the contents of that directory's .env or Compose file, exposing database credentials or API keys. If the target directory contains a valid Compose file, the attacker can additionally trigger docker compose down followed by a recursive forced removal of the directory, permanently destroying that application's data. No public POC has been identified at time of analysis, but the traversal requires only a string manipulation in the WebSocket request body.