Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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ReconObtain victim attachment UUID via notification email or prior access
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DeliveryAuthenticate to Gitea as low-privilege user
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ExploitSubmit victim UUID in files[] of issue edit request
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InstallUpdateIssueAttachments re-links attachment to attacker repository
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C2Request /attachments/{uuid}
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ExecuteAccess check resolves against attacker's repository
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ImpactPrivate attachment file served to attacker
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Object-level authorization, IDOR prevention
|
| Exploitation Conditions | The attacker must be authenticated to the Gitea instance with at least issue-editing permissions in one repository they control or have write access to - any such repository suffices, including a public repository on the same instance. The attacker must separately know the UUID of a target attachment from a different, inaccessible repository; this UUID cannot be enumerated through the vulnerability itself and must be obtained via a secondary information-disclosure vector such as forwarded notification emails, browser history, shared attachment links, API response logs, or prior legitimate read access to the victim repository. The vulnerability affects the web issue/comment attachment update path and requires the Gitea instance to be running a version prior to 1.27.0. Limiting factors: AC:H reflects the UUID prerequisite; PR:L means fully anonymous exploitation is not possible; the victim repository must contain issue or comment attachments; and UUID exposure must have occurred through some prior channel for the attack to proceed. |
| Impact | The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N, score 5.9) accurately reflects the attack profile: network-reachable, requires a low-privilege authenticated session, and carries High confidentiality impact offset by High attack complexity. The AC:H rating is appropriate because the attacker must independently obtain the victim attachment UUID - it cannot be enumerated through this vulnerability alone and must arrive through a separate channel such as notification email, browser history, shared links, or log exposure. No EPSS data was provided in the available intelligence, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV, and no public exploit code has been identified, indicating it is not yet confirmed as widely or actively exploited. However, the GHSA advisory contains a complete E2E reproduction runbook that significantly lowers the barrier for capable adversaries. Organizations hosting private Gitea repositories with sensitive issue or comment attachments, particularly those with broad user bases that increase UUID exposure surface, should treat this as a medium-high remediation priority despite the moderate CVSS score. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker authenticated to a Gitea instance edits an issue in a repository they control and injects a victim attachment UUID - obtained, for example, from a notification email or a previously shared link - into the files[] form parameter of the issue update HTTP request. Gitea's UpdateIssueAttachments function accepts the UUID and re-links the attachment to the attacker's issue without validating repository ownership. The attacker then requests /attachments/{victim-uuid} and receives the private attachment file, because the access check now resolves against the attacker's own repository. No public exploit code has been identified, but the GHSA advisory provides a complete step-by-step HTTP-level runbook. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 21, 2026
Cross-repository attachment re-linking in Gitea exposes private issue and comment attachments to authenticated attackers who know a victim's attachment UUID. An attacker with issue-editing rights in any repository they can access can inject a victim UUID into the files[] parameter of an issue or comment edit request, causing Gitea to re-link that attachment into the attacker's authorization context; subsequent requests to /attachments/{uuid} then resolve access against the attacker's repository rather than the victim's, delivering the private file. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, but the GHSA advisory (GHSA-6c6r-5xr4-cr5m) includes a detailed step-by-step reproduction runbook. The vendor-released fix is Gitea v1.27.0.
RemediationAI
Upgrade Gitea to version 1.27.0, which incorporates fixes from pull requests https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406 and https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426, and commits de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31 and f69e15afe7496cc62e96dab244629c69eb31a7bf. The release is available at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0. If an immediate upgrade is not feasible, reduce exposure by restricting repository issue-editing permissions to the minimum necessary set of trusted users, since the attack requires an authenticated user with issue-edit rights - this limits the pool of potential attackers but does not eliminate the vulnerability and may affect collaboration workflows. Disabling attachment uploads entirely (if the Gitea configuration supports it) would prevent new UUIDs from being created but would not protect existing attachment UUIDs already in circulation. After upgrading, the advisory recommends running a database audit query to detect and remediate existing inconsistent rows where attachment.issue_id is non-zero but attachment.repo_id differs from the linked issue's repository, as these may represent prior exploitation or data integrity issues.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 3 packages in go, euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The vulnerability is an instance of CWE-639 (Authorization Through User-Controlled Key): attachment UUIDs supplied by the client are accepted as authoritative identifiers without ownership validation. In Gitea's Go codebase, UpdateIssueAttachments (models/issues/issue_update.go:267-278) and UpdateCommentAttachments (models/issues/comment.go:623-642) look up attachments by UUID and update their IssueID/CommentID linkage, but neither function asserts that the attachment's stored RepoID matches the repository of the target issue or comment, nor do they reject attachments already linked to a different issue or comment. The global /attachments/{uuid} route (routers/web/web.go:872-876) subsequently determines access permissions by calling GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoID, which derives the repository from the now-attacker-controlled IssueID field - not from the attachment's original RepoID. An equivalent guard was previously introduced for the release-attachment path (models/repo/release.go:179-215) as part of remediating CVE-2026-20736, demonstrating that the intended invariant is known to the project; the issue and comment paths were simply not covered by that fix. Affected package: Go module code.gitea.io/gitea (CPE: pkg:go/code.gitea.io_gitea).
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Network-exploitable by authenticated low-privilege users (PR:L); AC:H because victim UUID must be obtained independently; C:H for full private file disclosure; I:L for attachment linkage mutation; no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Gitea's issue and comment attachment update paths accept attachment UUIDs without verifying that each attachment belongs to the target issue/comment repository. If an authenticated attacker knows a victim attachment UUID, they can re-link that attachment to an attacker-controlled issue or comment, causing later attachment access checks to use the attacker's repository authorization context.
Affected
- Component: web issue/comment attachment handling.
- Confirmed version:
maincommita39b2775edcb3ba53def96794491b91335117d81(v1.27.0-dev-352-ga39b2775ed). - Fixed in: not fixed at the time of validation.
- Other versions: not exhaustively tested. The affected code path appears structurally similar to versions that contain the current issue/comment attachment update logic.
Description / Root Cause
files[] values from issue/comment edit flows are passed to updateAttachments in routers/web/repo/issue.go:589-629. That helper calls:
models/issues/issue_update.go:267-278(UpdateIssueAttachments)models/issues/comment.go:623-642(UpdateCommentAttachments)
Both functions load attachments by UUID and update the attachment linkage, but neither validates that the attachment row's RepoID matches the repository of the target issue/comment. They also do not reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment.
Attachment reads then use the linked issue/release repository to decide access:
services/repository/repository.go:185-207returns the repository ID fromIssueIDorReleaseID.routers/web/repo/attachment.go:153-184checks read permission on that linked repository.routers/web/repo/attachment.go:216-224opens and serves the file from the attachment's storage path after the linked-repository permission check succeeds.
For the global /attachments/{uuid} route in routers/web/web.go:872-876, there is no current repository context, so the early attach.RepoID mismatch check in ServeAttachment does not protect against this re-linking case.
A patched sibling path already demonstrates the intended invariant: models/repo/release.go:179-215 rejects release attachments whose RepoID differs from the release repository. That guard was introduced for CVE-2026-20736, but the issue/comment paths still lack an equivalent check.
Impact
An attacker who can edit an issue/comment in a repository they can read can move a known victim attachment UUID into that repository's authorization context. After the re-link, the attachment download path resolves access against the attacker-controlled repository while serving the original attachment file.
This can disclose private issue/comment attachments if the attacker has obtained the UUID through prior legitimate access, copied links, notification content, logs, browser history, or another exposure. The attack does not require write access to the victim repository.
Reproduction Summary
Full HTTP/E2E observation:
- A local Gitea server was started with an isolated SQLite database.
- A victim user created private repositories, private issues, and issue attachments containing unique marker strings.
- An attacker user first attempted to download each victim attachment through
/attachments/{uuid}and received404. - The attacker then submitted the victim UUID through the real issue edit route in an attacker-controlled public repository.
- The same attacker could then download the victim issue attachment through
/attachments/{uuid}and received200; the response body contained the unique issue marker. - The attacker repeated the flow through the real comment edit route and could download the second victim attachment with
200; the response body contained the unique comment marker.
Model-level issue-path behavior:
- A fixture attachment with
RepoID = 2andIssueID = 4was passed toUpdateIssueAttachmentsfor attacker issueID = 1, whoseRepoID = 1. - The call succeeded.
- The attachment row still had
RepoID = 2, but itsIssueIDwas changed to the attacker issue. GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoIDthen resolved the attachment to attacker repositoryRepoID = 1.
Model-level comment-path behavior:
- The same cross-repository attachment UUID was passed to
UpdateCommentAttachmentsfor attacker commentID = 1. - The call succeeded.
- The attachment row still had
RepoID = 2, but itsIssueIDandCommentIDwere changed to the attacker's issue/comment. - The linked repository used for access checks became attacker repository
RepoID = 1.
Negative control:
- Existing release test
TestAddReleaseAttachmentsRejectsDifferentRepopasses and confirms the release path rejects the same class of cross-repository attachment linkage.
Detailed verifier and step-by-step runbook are available on request.
Suggested Fix
Add repository and linkage validation before updating issue/comment attachments.
Recommended checks:
- Load the target issue for
UpdateIssueAttachmentsand derive itsRepoID. - Load the target comment's issue for
UpdateCommentAttachmentsand derive itsRepoID. - Reject any attachment whose
RepoIDdiffers from the target issue repository. - Reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment/release, except for attachments already linked to the same object being updated.
- If caller context is available at the web/service layer, also require new unlinked attachments to belong to the current actor or to have been uploaded in the current edit session.
- Preserve any legacy
RepoID = 0migration behavior only when it can be proven safe for the target repository.
Also consider a cleanup/audit query for existing inconsistent rows where attachment.issue_id != 0 and attachment.repo_id differs from the linked issue repository.
Regression Tests
Add tests that fail before the fix and pass after it:
UpdateIssueAttachmentsrejects an attachment whoseRepoIDdiffers from the target issue'sRepoID.UpdateCommentAttachmentsrejects an attachment whoseRepoIDdiffers from the target comment issue'sRepoID.- Same-repository unlinked attachment linking still works for normal issue/comment editing.
- Attachments already linked to a different issue/comment cannot be moved by passing their UUID in
files[]. - Existing release guard test remains passing.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Remote code execution in Gitea (self-hosted Git service) via a code-injection flaw (CWE-94) allows attackers to run arbi
Broken access control in Gitea's Composer package registry (versions up to and including 1.26.1) lets remote attackers r
Gitea before 1.16.7 does not escape git fetch remote. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exp
The git hook feature in Gitea 1.1.0 through 1.12.5 might allow for authenticated remote code execution in customer envir
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Gitea Gitea
Authenticated command injection in Dokploy (self-hostable PaaS) versions 0.29.3 through 0.29.12 lets a low-privileged us
Reverse-proxy authentication bypass in the official Gitea Docker image (versions up to and including 1.26.2) allows any
Path traversal in Gitea's Org-mode (`.org`) markup renderer allows an attacker who can get Org-mode content rendered by
Container escape in Gitea act_runner (Docker backend, through act 0.262.0) lets an authenticated user with workflow-exec
models/repo_mirror.go in Gitea before 1.7.6 and 1.8.x before 1.8-RC3 mishandles mirror repo URL settings, leading to rem
Server-side request forgery and internal repository exfiltration in Gitea before 1.27.0 lets a low-privileged authentica
Authorization bypass in Gitea versions 1.22.3 through 1.26.1 allows holders of `public-only` access tokens or OAuth gran
Same technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Moderate| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
EUVD-2026-58147
GHSA-6c6r-5xr4-cr5m
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB