EUVD-2026-57057
GHSA-hp26-rmxw-4cpv
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Hub-authenticated Application-create rights give PR:L over network with low complexity; the unvalidated annotation lets the controller cross into separately-managed spokes (S:C) for full C/I/A compromise.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in the multicloud-integrations component. The Application propagation controller processes the ocm-managed-cluster annotation from an Application Custom Resource (CR) without proper validation. A tenant with permissions to create Applications on the hub cluster can exploit this to target arbitrary managed clusters. This can force ArgoCD on the spoke clusters to synchronize attacker-controlled manifests, leading to arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation on those clusters.
AnalysisAI
Cross-cluster remote code execution in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2 (multicloud-integrations / ArgoCD pull-model integration) lets a low-privileged hub tenant who can create Application CRs redirect propagation to arbitrary managed spoke clusters. Because the Application propagation controller trusts the attacker-supplied ocm-managed-cluster annotation without validation, an attacker forces ArgoCD on targeted spokes to sync attacker-controlled manifests, yielding code execution or privilege escalation there. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that the attacker already hold permission to create Application Custom Resources on the RHACM hub cluster (CVSS PR:L - authenticated, low privilege) and that the environment uses the multicloud-integrations ArgoCD pull-model propagation, where the propagation controller consumes the `ocm-managed-cluster` annotation. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The signals align toward high priority: the CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C, C:H/I:H/A:H) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity attack needing only the low privilege of creating Applications on the hub - a routine tenant capability in multi-tenant GitOps setups - with a scope change reflecting that compromise crosses from the hub trust boundary into separately-managed spoke clusters, causing full confidentiality, integrity, and availability loss there. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | A tenant who legitimately holds permission to create Applications on the RHACM hub crafts an Application CR whose `ocm-managed-cluster` annotation names a production cluster they do not own, pointing its source at a repository/manifest they control. The propagation controller trusts the annotation and delivers the Application to that spoke, where ArgoCD synchronizes the malicious manifests - for example a privileged DaemonStanza or a workload with hostPath/privileged access - resulting in code execution or privilege escalation on the victim cluster. … |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch version is identified in the provided data, so apply the Red Hat erratum for your RHACM 2.x stream once published and monitor https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-72526 and Bugzilla 2514227 for the fixed z-stream build. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify all deployments of Red Hat ACM 2 using the multicloud-integrations ArgoCD pull-model feature and assess the blast radius across your managed spoke clusters; immediately restrict RBAC for Application CR creation to only trusted service accounts and implement network policies to segment hub-to-spoke communication. …
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