Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
PR:L because any valid GitHub OAuth token suffices; I:H and A:H reflect permanent cross-tenant project deletion; C:L for readable project metadata exposure.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Taubyte Tau v1.1.10 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the services/auth HTTP service that allows any authenticated user to read or permanently delete another tenant's project by supplying an arbitrary project ID to the GET and DELETE /projects/{id} endpoints. The GitHubTokenHTTPAuth middleware only validates that a caller presents a valid GitHub OAuth token without verifying ownership or access rights to the target project, enabling attackers with any valid GitHub token to invoke bare KV-store operations such as projects.Fetch and project.Delete against any project ID to achieve cross-tenant project takeover.
AnalysisAI
Cross-tenant project takeover in Taubyte Tau v1.1.10 enables any authenticated GitHub user to read or permanently delete projects belonging to other tenants by supplying arbitrary project IDs to the GET and DELETE /projects/{id} HTTP endpoints. The GitHubTokenHTTPAuth middleware performs only token validity checks, exposing bare KV-store operations (projects.Fetch and project.Delete) to any caller holding a valid GitHub OAuth token without verifying project ownership. No public exploit exists and SSVC confirms no observed exploitation, but the low-privilege requirement (any GitHub account) combined with permanent data destruction capability makes this a critical multi-tenant isolation failure for any exposed Tau deployment.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the services/auth HTTP service in Taubyte Tau (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:taubyte:tau:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), an open-source cloud-native computing platform. The root cause is CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key), a classic IDOR variant where access control relies on user-supplied object identifiers without ownership verification. The GitHubTokenHTTPAuth middleware confirmed a caller's GitHub OAuth token was valid but did not check whether that caller owned or had any rights to the project ID supplied in the URL path. Handlers for GET /projects/{id} and DELETE /projects/{id} passed the caller-controlled {id} directly to KV-store operations (projects.Fetch and project.Delete). The patch at commit f5c9c9c311a1ff156814e0c81f186bfd101ec237 introduces an authorizeProject() function that checks the caller's GitHub permissions (admin, maintain, or push) on the project's linked repositories via the GitHub API before allowing any project-level operation, and deliberately returns a generic 'project not found' error to unauthorized callers to prevent the endpoint from becoming a project-existence oracle.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to a Taubyte Tau build that incorporates commit f5c9c9c311a1ff156814e0c81f186bfd101ec237 (https://github.com/taubyte/tau/commit/f5c9c9c311a1ff156814e0c81f186bfd101ec237), which adds ownership enforcement to GET /projects/{id} and DELETE /projects/{id} via the new authorizeProject() function. The exact fixed release tag is not independently confirmed from available data - verify against the GitHub release page (https://github.com/taubyte/tau) or the VulnCheck advisory before deploying. As a compensating control pending patch deployment, restrict network access to the Tau auth service HTTP API so that the /projects/{id} endpoints are reachable only from trusted internal networks or authenticated administrative sessions, preventing arbitrary GitHub OAuth token holders from reaching the vulnerable routes. Note that this network restriction may disrupt legitimate multi-tenant workflows that rely on external token-based project access, so test against your deployment topology before applying. If running in development mode (devMode enabled), note that the patch explicitly skips authorization checks in that mode - production deployments must ensure devMode is disabled.
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-56903
GHSA-gq8x-2577-rmx8