Microsoft Teams EUVD-2026-56774

Exploitation requires the attacker to hold at minimum a low-privileged Teams account (PR:L) within the target environment - either as an internal user or a guest - sufficient to deliver a message or content to the victim. The victim must actively view or interact with the malicious content (UI:R), meaning passive delivery alone is insufficient; the victim must open or render the attacker-crafted message in the Android Teams client. The vulnerability is limited to the Android platform as identified by the CPE string; Teams clients on iOS, Windows, macOS, or web are not implicated by this CVE. Non-default configurations such as disabling external guest access or restricting inbound message senders would limit the attacker pool. The SSVC 'automatable: no' determination confirms that bulk or worm-like exploitation is not feasible given the required user interaction step.

The CVSS 7.6 score is driven by network reachability (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), scope change (S:C), and high confidentiality impact (C:H) - a combination that correctly signals meaningful potential harm. However, real-world prioritization should be modulated by several converging signals: EPSS is 0.72% at the 51st percentile, indicating this vulnerability does not stand out statistically as a likely exploitation target relative to the broader CVE population. SSVC classifies exploitation as 'none,' automatable as 'no' (requiring targeted interaction with a specific victim), and technical impact as 'total' - an internally inconsistent profile that reflects the theoretical severity ceiling (total impact) against the practical barrier of requiring user interaction and no observed exploitation activity. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV. The PR:L requirement means an attacker must already hold a valid Teams account and be capable of sending content to the victim, limiting opportunistic mass exploitation. The most realistic threat profile is insider or spear-phishing scenarios within organizational Teams tenants. This is a real priority for organizations where Teams handles sensitive communications, but not an emergency patch for those with layered controls.

An attacker with a valid Teams account (or guest access to the target tenant) crafts a message or adaptive card containing a malicious script payload and delivers it to a target user. When the victim opens or previews the message in Teams for Android, the injected script executes within the WebView context, potentially harvesting authentication tokens, session cookies, or other cross-context data that are then exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled endpoint. No public proof-of-concept exploit has been identified, so exploitation would currently require attacker-developed tooling.