What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-55798?

EUVD-2026-55798 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.9 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.6%.

Which versions of Dokploy are affected by EUVD-2026-55798?

Dokploy self-hosted PaaS versions before 0.29.13 contain a critical command-injection vulnerability in volume backup functions that allows low-privilege authenticated team members to execute…. A patch is available.

Dokploy EUVD-2026-55798

Q: How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-55798?

Within 24 hours: inventory all Dokploy deployments and versions, then immediately restrict volume backup permissions to infrastructure administrators only by removing low-privilege member access to volumeBackup endpoints. Within 7 days: deploy network segmentation isolating the Dokploy control plane, enable detailed audit logging for volumeBackup.create and volumeBackup.runManually endpoints, and implement monitoring for shell metacharacters in volumeName parameters. Within 30 days: monitor Dokploy project for patch availability; if no patch is released by then, prioritize either migration to alternative PaaS platforms or deployment of input-validation middleware that blocks command-injection patterns in volume names.

| CVE-2026-72901 CRITICAL

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

2026-08-10 GitHub_M

Docker Command Injection Dokploy

9.9

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

9.9 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

9.9 CRITICAL

Network-reachable tRPC API (AV:N) with trivial injection (AC:L) needs only a low-privilege member account (PR:L); Docker socket escalation to host root crosses a trust boundary (S:C) with full C/I/A impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Aug 10, 2026 - 21:05 EUVD

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 10, 2026 - 20:20 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 10, 2026 - 20:20 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 10, 2026 - 19:40 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.9

DescriptionCVE.org

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, Dokploy allows an authenticated low-privilege member to execute arbitrary commands on the control-plane host because the volumeName field accepted by volumeBackup.create and volumeBackup.runManually is interpolated without quoting in packages/server/src/utils/volume-backups/backup.ts and executed through child_process.exec, with Docker socket access making execution host/root-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

AnalysisAI

Command injection in Dokploy (self-hosted PaaS) before 0.29.13 lets an authenticated low-privilege member run arbitrary OS commands on the control-plane host. The volumeName field in the volumeBackup.create and volumeBackup.runManually tRPC endpoints is interpolated unquoted into a shell string passed to child_process.exec; because the process holds Docker socket access, injected commands run with host/root-equivalent privileges. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but the fix is a one-character-class change and the vulnerable code path is well documented in the published PR and advisory.

Technical ContextAI

Dokploy is a Node.js/TypeScript Heroku-style platform-as-a-service that orchestrates Docker containers and manages volume backups. The root cause is CWE-78 (OS Command Injection): in packages/server/src/utils/volume-backups/backup.ts the user-supplied volumeName is concatenated directly into a shell command and dispatched via Node's child_process.exec, which spawns /bin/sh and honors shell metacharacters (; | $() ` &). The affected component (cpe:2.3:a:dokploy:dokploy) runs with access to the Docker socket, so any command it executes can create privileged containers or mount the host filesystem, collapsing container isolation into full host root. The fix (PR #4873, commit d629faeb) introduces a VOLUME_NAME_REGEX (/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$/) input validator and adopts shell-quote's quote() across backup, destination, certificate, and mount code paths - indicating the same unquoted-interpolation pattern existed in several sibling functions, not just volume backups.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Dokploy 0.29.13 or later (release https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/releases/tag/v0.29.13), which enforces VOLUME_NAME_REGEX validation on volumeName and shell-quotes interpolated values. If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict who can reach the volume-backup functionality: audit and reduce project membership so only fully trusted operators hold accounts, since exploitation requires an authenticated low-privilege member, and place the Dokploy control-plane UI/API behind network access controls (VPN or IP allowlist) to shrink the attacker pool - the trade-off is reduced convenience for legitimate remote team members. Because the process's Docker socket access is what makes this host/root-equivalent, consider running Dokploy's control plane with a hardened or proxied Docker socket (e.g., a socket-proxy limiting available Docker API endpoints), accepting that some orchestration features may break. Review the advisory GHSA-w223-vw9m-4f9c and the PR #4873 diff, which also hardened destination, certificate, and mount code paths, before assuming volume backups are the only exposure.