What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-55742?

EUVD-2026-55742 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.6 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.4%.

Which versions of Dokploy are affected by EUVD-2026-55742?

Dokploy versions prior to 0.29.13 contain a critical command injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users with application management permissions to execute arbitrary commands on build…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-55742?

Within 24 hours, inventory all Dokploy instances and document current versions; immediately restrict application creation and update permissions to essential personnel only and audit recent users with these permissions for suspicious activity. Within 7 days, evaluate upgrade paths to version 0.29.13 or later; implement network segmentation to isolate build hosts from general network access and disable self-hosted build execution if feasible, routing builds through external hardened services instead. Within 30 days, deploy Dokploy 0.29.13 or later once released and verified, or implement persistent compensating controls with enhanced logging and monitoring of all build operations.

Dokploy EUVD-2026-55742

| CVE-2026-72877 CRITICAL

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

2026-08-10 GitHub_M

Docker Command Injection Dokploy

9.6

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

9.6 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

vuln.today AI

9.9 CRITICAL

Network-facing app UI/API (AV:N), trivial injection (AC:L), needs a create/update account (PR:L), no interaction (UI:N); commands escape to the host affecting other tenants (S:C) with full C/I/A from arbitrary execution.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Aug 10, 2026 - 20:04 EUVD

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 10, 2026 - 19:50 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 10, 2026 - 19:50 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 10, 2026 - 19:02 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.6

DescriptionCVE.org

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the dockerImage field is interpolated without quoting into shell commands in buildRemoteDocker() in packages/server/src/utils/providers/docker.ts and is validated only as an optional string. An authenticated user with application create or update permission can use shell command substitution in dockerImage to execute arbitrary commands on the local build host or a remote SSH build target, exposing host secrets and other projects. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

AnalysisAI

OS command injection in Dokploy self-hostable PaaS versions prior to 0.29.13 lets an authenticated user with application create or update permission achieve arbitrary command execution on the build host. The dockerImage field is interpolated unquoted into shell commands in buildRemoteDocker() (packages/server/src/utils/providers/docker.ts) and validated only as an optional string, so shell command substitution such as $(...) or backticks runs on the local build host or a remote SSH build target. The upstream fix and its regression test publicly demonstrate working injection payloads, so publicly available exploit code exists, though there is no public exploit identified as weaponized and no CISA KEV listing; EPSS was not provided.

Technical ContextAI

Dokploy is an open-source Heroku/Vercel-style Platform as a Service that orchestrates Docker-based application deploys, including pulling prebuilt images and building via Dockerfile and Nixpacks. The affected code path (CPE cpe:2.3:a:dokploy:dokploy:*) constructs shell command strings by template-interpolating user-controlled application fields - dockerImage in buildRemoteDocker(), and related sinks dockerContextPath (docker-file.ts) and publishDirectory (nixpacks.ts) - then executes them through /bin/sh either locally or over SSH to a remote build node. This is a textbook CWE-78 OS Command Injection: because the values are placed into a command line rather than passed as isolated arguments, shell metacharacters ($(), backticks, ;, &&, |) are honored. The fix wraps each value with shell-quote's quote() so the payload is preserved as a single literal token, as shown by the added docker-build-injection.test.ts that asserts payloads like $(touch ...) and touch ... no longer fire.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: 0.29.13 - upgrade all Dokploy control-plane and build nodes to v0.29.13 or later, which quotes user-controlled fields via shell-quote at the docker pull/build/cp sinks (release https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/releases/tag/v0.29.13, advisory GHSA-jxxj-gmpx-h5rj). If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict who holds application create/update permission to fully trusted operators, since that role is the only prerequisite; audit existing applications for suspicious dockerImage, dockerContextPath, or publishDirectory values containing shell metacharacters ($, backtick, ;, &&, |); and isolate build hosts so a compromised build cannot reach production secrets or other tenants - for example run builds on ephemeral, network-segmented, credential-minimized workers, accepting the trade-off of added build-infrastructure complexity. These compensating controls reduce blast radius but do not close the injection, so patching remains the only complete fix.