What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-55225?

EUVD-2026-55225 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.6 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.4%.

Which versions of xiaoai-patch are affected by EUVD-2026-55225?

Xiaomi XiaoAI smart speakers contain a critical unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2026-72581, CVSS 8.6) that allows any remote attacker to force the device's API…

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-55225?

Within 24 hours, inventory all XiaoAI smart speaker deployments in your environment and document their network locations and dependencies. Within 7 days, implement network segmentation to isolate XiaoAI devices to a restricted VLAN with minimal internal network access, disable external internet connectivity where operationally feasible, and configure firewall rules to restrict or block the /auth endpoint if accessible from untrusted networks. Within 30 days, establish continuous monitoring for vendor security advisories, conduct a network risk assessment to identify potential lateral movement paths from compromised devices to critical systems, evaluate alternative smart speaker solutions, and develop a device replacement or decommissioning plan.

xiaoai-patch EUVD-2026-55225

| CVE-2026-72581 HIGH

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918)

2026-08-10 TuranSec

GHSA-mxx3-r9xg-4hf6

SSRF Xiaoai Patch

8.6

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: TuranSec

Severity by source

Vendor (TuranSec) PRIMARY

8.6 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

vuln.today AI

8.6 HIGH

PR:N confirmed by unauthenticated POST; S:C because the server proxies to internal targets beyond its trust boundary; no integrity or availability impact applies.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (TuranSec).

CVSS VectorVendor: TuranSec

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Aug 10, 2026 - 11:23 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 10, 2026 - 10:41 cve.org

HIGH 8.6

DescriptionCVE.org

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in duhow/xiaoai-patch through commit fb07049 allows a remote attacker to make the Xiaomi smart speaker perform HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external URLs. The /auth endpoint in api/main.py uses the user-supplied url POST parameter to redirect to a Home Assistant instance without validating the destination URL, enabling internal network scanning and access to internal services.

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated SSRF in duhow/xiaoai-patch (all versions through commit fb07049) allows any remote attacker to force the Xiaomi XiaoAI smart speaker's API server to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external URLs. The /auth endpoint in api/main.py blindly accepts a user-supplied url POST parameter to redirect toward a Home Assistant instance without destination validation, enabling internal network scanning and access to internal services from the speaker's network vantage point. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and this CVE is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog.

Technical ContextAI

xiaoai-patch is an open-source firmware patch project (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:duhow:xiaoai-patch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) that installs a lightweight HTTP API on Xiaomi XiaoAI smart speakers to enable Home Assistant integration. The vulnerability sits in the /auth route of api/main.py, which is intended to redirect the speaker to a local Home Assistant instance. CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) describes the root cause precisely: the application treats user-controlled input as a trusted destination for outbound HTTP requests without applying allowlisting, host validation, or scheme restrictions. Because smart speakers typically reside on internal home or SOHO networks with direct access to routers, NAS appliances, and other IoT devices, the SSRF proxy capability can reach network segments that are otherwise unreachable from the internet.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis; no fixed version or tagged release is referenced in the available data. Users should monitor https://github.com/duhow/xiaoai-patch for upstream commits addressing URL validation in api/main.py. As a primary compensating control, restrict network access to the xiaoai-patch API port using host-based firewall rules or router ACLs so the API is reachable only from the local Home Assistant host (e.g., bind to 127.0.0.1 or allow only the specific HA IP); this eliminates remote exploitation while preserving local integration functionality, with the trade-off that the API becomes inaccessible from other network hosts. As a code-level mitigation for self-hosters, implement an allowlist in the url parameter handler to accept only the configured Home Assistant hostname or IP, rejecting all other destinations including RFC-1918 ranges - this prevents SSRF pivoting even if the port is network-accessible.