Which versions of Wazuh are affected by EUVD-2026-51853?

Wazuh GitHub Actions workflows (versions before commit 44bf114) contain a critical command injection vulnerability (CVSS 9.3) that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands and…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-51853?

Within 24 hours: Identify all Wazuh deployments and their GitHub Actions workflow configurations, and determine if any are running versions before commit 44bf114 or on self-hosted CI/CD runners. Within 7 days: Apply the vendor-released patch by updating Wazuh to post-commit 44bf114 releases and validating that workflow changes eliminate the VERSION.json injection vector. Within 30 days: Rotate all CI/CD secrets that had access during vulnerable workflow periods (AWS credentials, GITHUB_TOKENs, deployment keys), audit GitHub Actions execution logs for suspicious fork pull request submissions, and implement mandatory code review approval requirements for external fork contributions.

Wazuh EUVD-2026-51853

Q: What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-51853?

EUVD-2026-51853 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.6%.

| CVE-2026-67308 CRITICAL

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

2026-08-01 VulnCheck

GHSA-9chj-cp8j-3c5f

Command Injection Wazuh

9.3

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck

Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY

9.3 MEDIUM

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

9.6 CRITICAL

Anyone can submit a fork PR (AV:N/PR:N/AC:L) but a maintainer must run the workflow (UI:R); runner and cloud-secret compromise crosses the security boundary, so S:C with full C:H/I:H/A:H.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Updated

Aug 02, 2026 - 12:28 vuln.today

v2 (cvss_changed)

Re-analysis Queued

Aug 02, 2026 - 12:22 vuln.today

cvss_changed

Severity Changed

Aug 02, 2026 - 12:22 NVD

MEDIUM CRITICAL

CVSS changed

Aug 02, 2026 - 12:22 NVD

5.3 (MEDIUM) 9.3 (CRITICAL)

Analysis Generated

Aug 01, 2026 - 13:30 vuln.today

Patch available

Aug 01, 2026 - 13:01 EUVD

DescriptionCVE.org

Wazuh workflows before 44bf114 contain a shell injection vulnerability in GitHub Actions that allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands by submitting pull requests with crafted VERSION.json files. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters into environment variables that are directly interpolated into run steps, enabling command execution and exfiltration of secrets including GITHUB_TOKEN and AWS credentials on self-hosted runners.

AnalysisAI

Poisoned-pipeline command injection in Wazuh's GitHub Actions CI/CD workflows (all revisions before commit 44bf114) lets an unauthenticated external attacker run arbitrary shell commands on the project's self-hosted runners by submitting a fork pull request containing a crafted VERSION.json. Because the JSON is read into environment variables that are interpolated verbatim into workflow run steps, shell metacharacters break out into command execution, permitting theft of CI secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN and AWS credentials. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the technique (untrusted fork input on self-hosted runners) is well-understood and the vendor has already merged a fix.

Technical ContextAI

This is a classic CI/CD supply-chain weakness known as Poisoned Pipeline Execution, rooted in CWE-78 (OS Command Injection). GitHub Actions workflows that trigger on the pull_request (or pull_request_target) event process content from forked branches; here a VERSION.json file supplied by the attacker is parsed and its values are placed into environment variables that are then substituted directly into a run: shell step using GitHub's ${{ }} template expansion. Because template expansion happens before the shell executes, any shell metacharacters (;, $( ), backticks, &&) in the attacker-controlled value are interpreted by the runner's shell rather than treated as data. The affected asset per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:wazuh:wazuh (the Wazuh project repository/build tooling), and the exposure is amplified by the use of self-hosted runners, which - unlike GitHub-hosted ephemeral VMs - persist state, sit inside the maintainer's network, and typically hold long-lived cloud credentials.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available (PR/commit 44bf114); a released/tagged patched version was not independently confirmed from the provided data, so update the workflow files by pulling changes at or after commit 44bf114 as described in advisory GHSA-95w2-gpvr-q4jh (https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-95w2-gpvr-q4jh). The correct structural fix is to stop interpolating untrusted values directly into run: steps: pass attacker-controllable data through an intermediate env: variable and reference it as a quoted shell variable ("$VAR") instead of ${{ ... }}, so the shell treats it as data. As compensating controls before or alongside patching: require the 'Require approval for all outside collaborators' setting so fork PR workflows never auto-run (trade-off: adds maintainer friction to every external contribution); move CI off self-hosted runners onto ephemeral GitHub-hosted runners where feasible (trade-off: loses custom build environment/network access); and scope down runner credentials by removing standing AWS keys in favor of short-lived OIDC-federated tokens and setting permissions: to the minimum, ideally read-only GITHUB_TOKEN (trade-off: workflows that push artifacts or comment on PRs must be granted narrower explicit permissions).