GHSA-qvj4-xxw2-22gf
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Network-accessible proxy with no authentication per description; scope changes because the server reaches other systems; no integrity or availability impact on the vulnerable host itself.
Primary rating from Vendor (CNA).
CVSS VectorVendor
Lifecycle Timeline
3Description PRE-NVD
AnalysisAI
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and open-proxy behavior in Apache Kyuubi's Engine UI proxy exposes the Kyuubi server as a request forwarder to arbitrary internal or external hosts. Versions 1.8.0 through 1.11.x accept an attacker-controlled host and port from the HTTP request path and blindly proxy the request to that destination, enabling network pivoting into otherwise unreachable services behind the Kyuubi server. No active exploitation has been confirmed in CISA KEV, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis; however, the unauthenticated network vector and trivial exploitation conditions make this a credible internal reconnaissance risk in exposed deployments.
Technical ContextAI
Apache Kyuubi (org.apache.kyuubi:kyuubi-server) is a distributed, multi-tenant SQL gateway that sits in front of compute engines like Apache Spark and Flink, exposing a JDBC/ODBC/REST interface for lakehouse query workloads. Its Engine UI proxy feature passes a host and port supplied in the REST path directly to an HTTP client without validation or allowlisting, a textbook CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) pattern. The affected component is the REST frontend's engine.ui.proxy endpoint. The root cause is the absence of any destination restriction - the proxy accepted arbitrary user-supplied targets rather than a pre-configured allowlist. PR #7483 on the Apache Kyuubi GitHub repository represents the upstream fix. The fix in 1.12.0 disables the proxy entirely by default, requiring explicit opt-in and host allowlist configuration via kyuubi.frontend.rest.engine.ui.proxy.enabled and kyuubi.frontend.rest.engine.ui.proxy.hosts.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Apache Kyuubi 1.12.0, which is the vendor-confirmed fixed release. In 1.12.0, the Engine UI proxy is disabled by default, eliminating the attack surface without any configuration change required. If proxied Engine UI functionality is operationally required after upgrading, it can be re-enabled by setting kyuubi.frontend.rest.engine.ui.proxy.enabled=true and restricting targets to known safe hosts via kyuubi.frontend.rest.engine.ui.proxy.hosts - this allowlist configuration is the key control preventing SSRF. For organizations that cannot immediately upgrade, the most effective compensating control is to restrict network access to the Kyuubi REST frontend to trusted clients only via firewall or network segmentation, preventing untrusted requesters from reaching the proxy endpoint; note this does not fix the underlying flaw and any trusted-but-compromised client retains the ability to abuse the proxy. Additionally, blocking outbound HTTP from the Kyuubi server to RFC-1918 address ranges and cloud metadata service IPs (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254) limits the SSRF blast radius if patching is delayed. The advisory is available at the Apache Kyuubi project site https://kyuubi.apache.org.
Any client who can access to Apache Kyuubi Server via Kyuubi frontend protocols can bypass server-side config kyuubi.ses
Arbitrary file write in Apache Kyuubi (1.7.0 through 1.11.1) lets a remote attacker abuse the REST batch multipart uploa
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-50236