Wazuh Manager EUVD-2026-44630

Exploitation requires the attacker to control a Wazuh agent that is already enrolled with the target manager, and the manager must process that agent's inventory through the inventory-sync path that builds OpenSearch _bulk (NDJSON) requests - the concrete injection point is the unescaped DataValue.index field. The affected deployment is any Wazuh Manager before 5.0.0-beta3 backed by an OpenSearch/Elasticsearch indexer (the default store for alert/inventory data). Limiting factors: the vendor CVSS marks PR:N, but the description's 'enrolled agents' requirement means an attacker needs a valid enrollment key or must compromise an existing agent host, so this is not exploitable by a wholly unauthenticated external party against a hardened enrollment configuration; no user interaction and no non-default feature toggle beyond normal inventory syncing are required.

The reporter's CVSS 4.0 score is a maximal 10.0 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N with high vulnerable- and subsequent-system C/I/A), reflecting network reach, low complexity, and total compromise of SIEM data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The key nuance the vector understates is PR:N: exploitation is not truly anonymous - the attacker must control an agent that has already completed enrollment with the manager, so the realistic precondition is one compromised or malicious enrolled endpoint, not an arbitrary internet host. Other signals are absent: there is no EPSS score, no SSVC decision, no CISA KEV listing, and no evidence of a public POC, so exploitation is currently reported/theoretical rather than observed. Net assessment: genuinely high priority for environments where agents run on untrusted or internet-exposed hosts, because the flaw undermines the integrity of the security monitoring system itself (attackers can erase their own alerts), but the enrollment prerequisite means it is not mass-exploitable against a default install by unauthenticated outsiders. With EPSS and KEV data missing, treat the 'unauthenticated' framing with caution and verify the enrollment trust model against your deployment.

An attacker compromises or maliciously deploys a single endpoint running an enrolled Wazuh agent and crafts inventory data whose DataValue.index field contains embedded NDJSON newlines and action lines. When the manager syncs that inventory to OpenSearch under its admin credentials, the smuggled delete/update operations execute, letting the attacker erase their own intrusion alerts and tamper with other agents' SIEM records. No user interaction or public exploit is required, and the low attack complexity means a working payload is straightforward once the NDJSON structure is understood.