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motionEye EUVDEUVD-2026-38804

| CVE-2026-55488 HIGH
Path Traversal (CWE-22)
2026-06-23 https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh
7.7
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Reach motionEye web port 8765
  2. Delivery
    Request media handler with absolute path
  3. Exploit
    os.path.join discards target_dir
  4. Execution
    Overridden Tornado checks skip validation
  5. Persist
    Server returns arbitrary file
  6. Impact
    Disclose config/secrets (motion.conf)

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires sending an HTTP request to one of motionEye's media handlers (/movie/<id>/playback, /movie/<id>/download, /picture/<id>/download, /picture/<id>/preview) with the filename parameter set to an absolute filesystem path (e.g. //etc/motioneye/motion.conf); no '../' traversal sequences or special encoding are needed because os.path.join() honors the absolute path directly. A valid camera_id is required to route to a handler (the PoC uses 1). Limiting factors: files are only readable subject to the OS permissions of the motionEye process (a non-root deployment cannot read root-owned secrets), and although the CVSS vector states PR:N, deployments that enable motionEye's admin/normal-user authentication require valid credentials before the handler is reachable, reducing this to an authenticated read.

Impact

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N, base 7.7) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated read with high-confidentiality impact and no integrity or availability effect, consistent with the trivial single-request PoC. Exploit maturity is flagged Proof-of-Concept (E:P) and a working PoC is published in the GHSA advisory, so a usable exploit clearly exists; however there is no KEV listing and no EPSS score in the provided data, so active or widespread exploitation is not established. The key caveat is authentication: the vector asserts PR:N, but motionEye deployments frequently enable admin/normal-user passwords, in which case real-world exploitation would require valid credentials (effectively PR:L) - verify against the specific deployment's auth configuration. Net: a real, easily weaponized information-disclosure bug worth prompt patching, but its blast radius is bounded to file reads and limited by the OS permissions and authentication under which the motionEye process runs.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker who can reach the motionEye web port sends a single crafted request such as 'GET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf', causing the server to return the configuration file (which may contain credentials) instead of a camera recording. A public PoC for exactly this request is included in the vendor advisory, and the attack requires only network access and knowledge of a valid camera_id.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.6% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv3 – Jun 24, 2026

Arbitrary file read in motionEye versions before 0.44.0 lets remote attackers retrieve any file readable by the motionEye process by supplying an absolute path to the media playback, download, and preview handlers. The flaw stems from os.path.join() discarding the configured media directory when given an absolute path, compounded by MoviePlaybackHandler deliberately overriding Tornado's StaticFileHandler path-safety checks. A proof-of-concept exists and the CVSS 4.0 exploit-maturity is rated Proof-of-Concept, but there is no public evidence of active exploitation.

Earlier versions of this analysis (2)
v2 Jun 24, 2026 - 16:28 cvss changed CVSS 7.7

Arbitrary file read in motionEye (pip package 'motioneye', versions before 0.44.0) lets remote attackers retrieve any file readable by the motionEye process by supplying an absolute path to the media playback, movie/picture download, and picture preview handlers. The handlers build paths with os.path.join() - which silently discards the configured media directory when given an absolute path - and the MoviePlaybackHandler further neuters Tornado's StaticFileHandler safety checks by overriding get_absolute_path() and validate_absolute_path() to no-ops. Publicly available exploit code exists (PoC in the GitHub advisory); not listed in CISA KEV.

v1 Jun 23, 2026 - 19:01

Absolute path traversal in motionEye (pip package, versions < 0.44.0) allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files from the filesystem via crafted requests to movie playback, movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers. The handlers pass user-supplied filenames into os.path.join() and explicitly override Tornado's StaticFileHandler validation, so an absolute path such as /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is returned verbatim. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory as a one-line HTTP request, but no public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the GHSA PoC and no CISA KEV listing.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade motionEye to 0.44.0 or later (pip install --upgrade motioneye), which is the fixed release per the GHSA advisory at https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh. If you cannot upgrade immediately, place the motionEye web interface (default TCP 8765) behind a reverse proxy or firewall so only trusted, authenticated clients can reach the /movie/ and /picture/ endpoints, and ensure motionEye's admin and normal-user passwords are set so the handlers are not anonymously reachable - note this does not remove the traversal for authenticated users. As stronger containment, run the motionEye process under a dedicated low-privilege account whose filesystem access is confined to its media/target directories so a successful traversal cannot read sensitive files such as /etc/motioneye/motion.conf, accepting that overly tight permissions may break legitimate media playback.

Affected VersionsENISA

motioneye < 0.44.0

Affected Packages

pypi motioneye fix: 0.44.0

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in pypi

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

motionEye is a Python web frontend (built on the Tornado web framework) for the 'motion' surveillance daemon, distributed via PyPI as the 'motioneye' package (pkg:pip/motioneye). The root cause is CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory / path traversal), specifically the absolute-path-traversal variant: mediafiles.get_media_path() builds a path with os.path.join(target_dir, path), and Python's os.path.join() semantics cause an absolute 'path' argument to override and discard 'target_dir' entirely. Tornado's StaticFileHandler normally rejects such paths in validate_absolute_path()/get_absolute_path(), but motionEye's MoviePlaybackHandler overrides both methods to return the user-supplied path unchecked (movie_playback.py lines 111-115), defeating the framework's built-in containment.

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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye) PRIMARY 7.7 HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
vuln.today AI 7.5 HIGH

A single unauthenticated HTTP request reads arbitrary files (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) for high confidentiality loss with no integrity or availability impact; PR:N follows the credential-less PoC though auth-enabled deployments would be PR:L.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:N/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
None
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Vulnerable system: Confidentiality
High
Vulnerable system: Integrity
None
Vulnerable system: Availability
None
Subsequent system: Confidentiality
None
Subsequent system: Integrity
None
Subsequent system: Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Updated
Jun 24, 2026 - 16:28 vuln.today
v3 - CVSS changed
Analysis Updated
Jun 24, 2026 - 16:28 vuln.today
v2 - CVSS changed
CVSS changed
Jun 24, 2026 - 16:22 NVD
7.7 (HIGH)

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.

The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using os.path.join(). When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.

As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.

Details

The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.

The filename parameter is passed to mediafiles.get_media_path():

python
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
    target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir')
    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
    return full_path

When path is an absolute path (e.g. /etc/motioneye/motion.conf), Python's os.path.join() discards target_dir entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (movie_playback.py lines 111-115):

def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
    return path

def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
    return absolute_path

This allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.

The same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:

  • GET /movie/<camera_id>/download/<filename>
  • GET /picture/<camera_id>/download/<filename>
  • GET /picture/<camera_id>/preview/<filename>

PoC

GET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8765

Fix

Do not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.

Validate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.

Additionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

motionEye versions before 0.44.0 contain a remote arbitrary file read vulnerability with publicly available exploit code. The vulnerability allows attackers to retrieve any file accessible by the motionEye process through improper path validation in media playback, download, and preview handlers. Organizations running vulnerable versions must upgrade to version 0.44.0 or later to prevent potential disclosure of configuration files, credentials, and other sensitive data.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.6%
Top 55% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
open-source home/hobbyist surveillance frontend, limited enterprise footprint
Threat Intel
1
1 source
Social Media
1
Sightings
Data Quality
6 sources
Confidence: High

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.6%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision
Out-of-Cycle
Exploitation
Poc
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable
Yes
Human Impact
High
Technical Impact
Partial

Priority Score

39
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +1
CVSS: +38
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.

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