Is there a patch available for EUVD-2026-38240?

Yes, a patch is available for EUVD-2026-38240. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Canarytokens EUVD-2026-38240

Q: What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-38240?

EUVD-2026-38240 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 2.0 (Low). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:N/R:X/V:X/RE:L/U:Green. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.3%.

| CVE-2026-12888 LOW

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') (CWE-74)

2026-06-22 ThinkstAppliedResearch

Docker Google Code Injection Canarytokens Thinkst Applied Research

2.0

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: ThinkstAppliedResearch

Severity by source

Vendor (ThinkstAppliedResearch) PRIMARY

2.0 LOW

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:N/R:X/V:X/RE:L/U:Green

vuln.today AI

4.7 MEDIUM

Network-triggered, no privileges needed to fire a token, but active user interaction is required to view the injected Chat message; scope changes to the Google Chat subsequent system with low integrity impact only.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (ThinkstAppliedResearch).

CVSS VectorVendor: ThinkstAppliedResearch

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Jun 22, 2026 - 15:02 EUVD

Analysis Generated

Jun 22, 2026 - 14:42 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

An HTML injection vulnerability exists in the Google Chat webhook notification sent by Thinkst Applied Research Canarytokens, enabling Interface Manipulation in Google Chat. An attacker can insert limited HTML content including links.

This issue affects Canarytokens: from Docker tag sha-4aef1db90 before sha-8ab4dccd, from Git commit 4aef1db90 before 8ab4dccd.

AnalysisAI

HTML injection in Canarytokens' Google Chat webhook notifications allows an attacker who triggers a deployed canarytoken to embed limited HTML content - including crafted hyperlinks - inside the resulting alert message rendered in Google Chat. The vulnerable system is Canarytokens itself (Docker tag sha-4aef1db90 through sha-8ab4dccd), but the integrity impact lands on the subsequent system: the Google Chat interface where defenders receive their alerts. A proof of concept exists per CVSS 4.0 supplemental metric E:P; no confirmed active exploitation or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

Canarytokens is an open-source honeypot framework by Thinkst Applied Research that generates tripwire tokens across many delivery mechanisms. When a token is triggered, it fires webhook notifications to configured channels - in this case, Google Chat incoming webhooks. The root cause is CWE-74 (Injection): user-controlled input embedded in the token trigger (e.g., attacker-supplied HTTP headers, hostnames, or other token-activation metadata) is incorporated into the webhook payload without sufficient sanitisation before being sent to Google Chat. Google Chat's message renderer then interprets the injected HTML fragments, enabling interface manipulation. The affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:thinkst_applied_research:canarytokens:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* covering the Docker and Git commit range sha-4aef1db90 to (exclusive) sha-8ab4dccd.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available via Git commit sha-8ab4dccd; a formally released and independently versioned patched build is not confirmed from available data - only the fix commit boundary is identified. Operators running Canarytokens via Docker should pull an image built from commit sha-8ab4dccd or later, verifiable against the vendor advisory at https://github.com/thinkst/canarytokens/security/advisories/GHSA-vcfc-7466-8q65. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, a compensating control is to disable or reconfigure the Google Chat webhook notification channel until the patch is applied - this eliminates the injection surface entirely, with the trade-off of losing real-time Google Chat alerting. Alternatively, defenders can treat all Canarytokens Google Chat alerts with heightened skepticism regarding embedded links until the fix is deployed, avoiding clicking links within those notifications and validating alerts through the Canarytokens web dashboard directly.