Which versions of OpenClaw are affected by EUVD-2026-36320?

OpenClaw versions before 2026.5.20 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability allowing authenticated hook users to execute owner-level operations without proper authorization.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-36320?

Within 24 hours: Inventory all OpenClaw deployments and document current versions. Within 7 days: Upgrade all instances to OpenClaw 2026.5.20 or later. Within 30 days: Audit all hook token issuance, implement least-privilege token scoping, and review audit logs for unauthorized hook-triggered owner operations since deployment.

OpenClaw EUVD-2026-36320

Q: What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-36320?

EUVD-2026-36320 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.7 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

| CVE-2026-53814 HIGH

Incorrect Privilege Assignment (CWE-266)

2026-06-11 VulnCheck

GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4

Privilege Escalation Openclaw

8.7

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck

Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY

8.7 HIGH

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

8.3 HIGH

Network-reachable /hooks/agent endpoint, low complexity, requires a valid hook token (PR:L), no user interaction; owner-scope MCP access yields high C/I and limited availability impact via cron-state changes.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jun 11, 2026 - 21:24 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

1 npm packages depend on openclaw (1 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 2026.5.20.

DescriptionCVE.org

OpenClaw before 2026.5.20 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where hook-triggered agent runs incorrectly receive owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of hook-appropriate scope. Attackers with a valid hook token can exploit the /hooks/agent endpoint to cause spawned CLI runtimes to access or invoke owner-only MCP tools, potentially executing privileged actions like persistent cron state modifications.

AnalysisAI

Privilege escalation in OpenClaw before 2026.5.20 allows attackers holding a valid hook token to invoke owner-only MCP tools through the /hooks/agent endpoint, because hook-triggered agent runs are incorrectly granted owner-scoped MCP loopback authority. Successful exploitation lets a low-privileged hook caller execute privileged actions such as modifying persistent cron state, with no public exploit identified at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

OpenClaw exposes a hook-driven agent execution surface (/hooks/agent) that spawns CLI runtimes connected to MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools over a loopback channel. The defect is a CWE-266 (Incorrect Privilege Assignment): when a run is initiated via a hook token rather than by the owner, the spawned CLI runtime still inherits the owner's MCP loopback scope instead of a narrower hook-appropriate scope, so the privilege boundary between hook callers and the workspace owner collapses at the MCP authorization layer. The CPE 'cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*' indicates all versions prior to the fix release 2026.5.20 are in scope.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade OpenClaw to 2026.5.20 or later, per the GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4 advisory (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6fvr-66p3-3qj4). Until upgrade is possible, treat hook tokens as owner-equivalent: revoke or rotate any hook tokens issued to less-trusted principals, restrict network access to the /hooks/agent endpoint (for example via a reverse-proxy ACL or firewall rule limiting it to trusted automation sources), and where feasible disable hook-triggered agent runs entirely - accepting that this will break any automation that depends on hook-driven CLI execution. Monitor MCP tool invocations originating from hook-spawned runtimes (notably cron-state mutations) for anomalies as a detective control while the patch is rolled out.