What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-33349?

EUVD-2026-33349 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.2%.

Which versions of Dokploy are affected by EUVD-2026-33349?

Dokploy versions 0.29.0 and earlier contain a command injection vulnerability in the registry deletion function that allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary operating system commands on…

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-33349?

Within 24 hours: Audit all Dokploy deployments to identify affected versions (0.29.0 and earlier); restrict registry management permissions to administrators only. Within 7 days: Implement host-level command execution logging for all Dokploy instances; disable the deleteRegistry function if not operationally critical. Within 30 days: Monitor vendor security advisories for patch availability (target version to be determined upon release); prepare immediate patching procedure.

Dokploy EUVD-2026-33349

| CVE-2026-45662 HIGH

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

2026-05-29 security-advisories@github.com

Docker Command Injection

8.8

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

8.8 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

May 29, 2026 - 16:50 vuln.today

CVE Published

May 29, 2026 - 16:16 nvd

HIGH 8.8

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.0 and earlier, the deleteRegistry function in Dokploy (packages/server/src/services/registry.ts) executes docker logout ${response.registryUrl} without shell escaping. In the same file, the docker login command correctly uses shEscape() to prevent command injection. This inconsistency creates a command injection vulnerability when deleting a registry with a crafted registryUrl.

AnalysisAI

Command injection in Dokploy 0.29.0 and earlier allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands on the host by deleting a Docker registry whose registryUrl contains shell metacharacters. The deleteRegistry function in packages/server/src/services/registry.ts passes registryUrl unescaped into docker logout, while the adjacent docker login call correctly uses shEscape() - making this a clear regression. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the root cause is documented in the vendor's GHSA advisory.

Technical ContextAI

Dokploy is a self-hostable Platform-as-a-Service that orchestrates Docker containers for application deployment. The flaw is a classic CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) where user-supplied input is concatenated into a shell command string - specifically docker logout ${response.registryUrl} - without first being passed through the project's existing shEscape() helper. Because Dokploy typically runs with privileges sufficient to control Docker (often root or a docker-group user), commands injected here execute in that highly privileged context. The bug is particularly notable because the sibling docker login codepath in the same file already uses shEscape(), confirming the developer knew the escaping primitive existed but failed to apply it consistently to the delete path.

RemediationAI

Upgrade Dokploy to a version newer than 0.29.0 that incorporates the upstream fix; the GitHub Security Advisory at https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/security/advisories/GHSA-827c-7x62-29jq is authoritative for the patched release number, which was not independently confirmed in the input data, so administrators should consult the advisory directly. As a compensating control until patched, restrict registry-management permissions to the smallest possible set of trusted administrator accounts and audit existing registry entries for suspicious registryUrl values - note that this only narrows the attacker pool and does not eliminate the vulnerability. Where feasible, run the Dokploy server under a least-privileged user account scoped only to the Docker socket (accepting that Docker-socket access is still effectively root-equivalent on the host) and monitor for unexpected child processes spawned by the Dokploy server process.