Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
Attacker-controlled path input is joined with a trusted base path prior to sanitization, allowing traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended shared directory. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker possessing a valid public share hash with delete permissions enabled can delete arbitrary files outside the shared directory within the share owner’s configured storage scope.
Affected Components
Two distinct vulnerable code paths:
- Stable versions (e.g., gtstef/filebrowser:stable)
DELETE /public/api/resources?hash=<hash>&path=../victim Root cause: middleware.go:111 Issue: path query parameter is joined before SanitizeUserPath()
- Development / HEAD (e.g., commit eabdfd9)
DELETE /public/api/resources/bulk?hash=<hash> Body: [{"path":"../victim"}] Root cause: resource.go:274 Issue: item.Path is joined before SanitizeUserPath()
Steps to reproduce (Stable Version)
1. Create a directory structure:
/folder/shared_subdir/ (shared)
/folder/protected.txt (outside shared directory)2. Create a public share:
Path: /shared_subdir
AllowDelete=true3. Send request:
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost/public/api/resources?hash=<HASH>&path=../protected.txt"
#Observe:
#protected.txt is deleted despite being outside the shared directoryProof of Concept (HEAD / bulk endpoint)
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost/public/api/resources/bulk?hash=<HASH>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[{"path":"../protected.txt"}]'Alternative PoC Scripts:
poc_v3.sh (If the script fails due to environment differences, the manual PoC above reliably reproduces the issue.)
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with access to a public share link configured with delete permissions enabled can delete attacker-chosen files outside the shared directory, anywhere within the share owner’s storage scope. This results in unauthorized data loss and potential service disruption.
AnalysisAI
Path traversal in FileBrowser allows unauthenticated attackers possessing a valid public share hash with delete permissions to delete arbitrary files anywhere within the share owner's storage scope. The vulnerability exists in both stable and development versions due to user-controlled path input being joined with trusted base paths before sanitization in middleware.go:111 and resource.go:274. Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available via GitHub advisory GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673. Vendor-released patch available in commit 112740bdd41de7d5eb01e13ba49d406bfc463f69.
Technical ContextAI
FileBrowser is a Go-based web file management application (github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser) that provides public sharing capabilities. The vulnerability stems from CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory). Two distinct code paths are affected: the stable version's DELETE /public/api/resources endpoint processes the 'path' query parameter, while the development branch's DELETE /public/api/resources/bulk endpoint processes JSON body path arrays. In both cases, the code joins user-supplied path strings containing traversal sequences (../) with the intended share directory base path before invoking SanitizeUserPath(), rendering the sanitization ineffective. The vulnerability occurs in the request processing middleware and resource deletion handlers, allowing attackers to construct paths that escape the share's intended directory boundary while remaining within the filesystem scope accessible to the share owner's account.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to FileBrowser commit 112740bdd41de7d5eb01e13ba49d406bfc463f69 or later (pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260501183844-112740bdd41d for Go module resolution), which relocates SanitizeUserPath() calls to execute before path joining operations in both middleware.go and resource.go. Patch commit available at https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/112740bdd41de7d5eb01e13ba49d406bfc463f69. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement these compensating controls with noted trade-offs: (1) Disable delete permissions on all public shares via AllowDelete=false in share configuration - this fully mitigates the vulnerability but removes legitimate delete functionality for authorized share users. (2) Revoke and regenerate all existing public share hashes to invalidate potential attacker access - this requires redistributing new share links to legitimate users, causing operational disruption. (3) Implement network-level access controls restricting public share endpoints to trusted IP ranges - this reduces exposure but contradicts the intended public sharing use case and may not be viable for internet-facing deployments. No application-layer workaround exists to filter path traversal sequences without code modification, as the vulnerability occurs in core request handling logic. Organizations should audit logs for suspicious DELETE requests to /public/api/resources or /public/api/resources/bulk endpoints containing ../ sequences as potential exploitation indicators.
Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Path Traversal
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-30344
GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673