Wallos EUVD-2026-28384

Requires authenticated access to Wallos with permissions to configure webhooks or AI integration URLs (Discord notifications, Ollama host settings). Specifically targets endpoints where users supply URLs: notification settings (cronjobs/sendcancellationnotifications.php processes Discord webhook_url), AI settings (ai/save_settings.php, ai/fetch_models.php accept aiOllamaHost parameter). Exploitation depends on deployment environment - maximum impact when Wallos runs in cloud infrastructure (AWS ECS, GKE, Azure Container Instances) with access to metadata endpoints or internal services. Requires attacker control of a DNS authoritative server to perform rebinding (can use public services like rbndr.us or custom domain). Attack succeeds within typical DNS TTL windows (100-500ms) which fall within PHP script execution time. Does NOT require admin privileges - PR:L in CVSS confirms low-privilege authenticated users suffice. Not exploitable against default installations in fully isolated networks with no internal services to target.

CVSS 7.7 (High) with network vector, low complexity, and Changed scope accurately reflects real-world risk for self-hosted deployments. The PR:L (low privilege required) means any authenticated user can exploit this, not just admins. Changed scope (S:C) is critical - attackers pivot from the Wallos application context into the internal network/cloud environment where it runs. High confidentiality impact (C:H) enables exfiltration of AWS/GCP metadata (IAM credentials at 169.254.169.254), internal API keys, database contents, and admin panel sessions. No integrity or availability impact per CVSS vector, but data exfiltration alone justifies priority remediation. No EPSS score yet (recent CVE-2026-* ID suggests 2026 disclosure). No CISA KEV listing - likely targeted at self-hosted environments rather than widespread exploitation. POC feasibility is HIGH: DNS rebinding toolkits (rbndr.us, rebinder.com) are publicly available; attacker only needs authenticated Wallos access and control of a DNS zone. SSVC assessment: Exploitation=POC, Automatable=No (requires auth + malicious DNS), Technical Impact=Total (internal network access). This is a HIGH priority for organizations running Wallos in cloud environments (AWS ECS, GKE, Azure Container Instances) where metadata endpoints expose powerful credentials. Lower priority if Wallos runs in isolated VLAN with no sensitive internal services. Key uncertainty: commit e87387f0 only patches 1 endpoint per diff evidence - 10 other endpoints may still be vulnerable in any released version.

Authenticated attacker with low-privilege Wallos account configures a malicious webhook URL (e.g., Discord notification or AI/Ollama host) pointing to attacker-controlled DNS domain rebind.attacker.com. Attacker's DNS server returns 1.2.3.4 (safe external IP) during Wallos's gethostbyname() validation check. Within 200ms, attacker flips DNS response to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata endpoint). Wallos's cURL request fetches http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/[role], exfiltrating temporary AWS credentials with full IAM role permissions. Attacker uses leaked credentials to access S3 buckets, RDS databases, or pivot into AWS account. Publicly available DNS rebinding toolkits make this attack straightforward for authenticated users.