GHSA-p3g5-3wm8-wh38
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessSupply attacker-controlled WSDL/XSD to Axis2
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DeliveryEmbed absolute import/schemaLocation URL
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ExploitAxis2 resolves URL with no scheme/host restriction
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ExecutionJVM fetches attacker-chosen internal host
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ImpactReach internal services or probe internal network
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V4 - API and Web Service URL allowlisting, SSRF prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that an Axis2/Java instance before 2.0.2 build a service description from a WSDL or schema whose content the attacker controls or influences, through one of the named paths: ServiceClient, AxisService.createClientSideAxisService, WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder, or the AAR/WAR deployment URI resolvers. The malicious WSDL/XSD must contain an absolute URL in a wsdl:import location or in an xsd:import/xsd:include schemaLocation; before 2.0.2 these were fetched with no scheme or host restriction (http/https/ftp/jar all followed). Limiting factors: the attacker must be able to get a crafted WSDL/schema processed - trivial where the application accepts untrusted WSDL URLs or documents, but operator-level where it requires deploying a crafted .aar/.war archive; exploitation is blocked on 2.0.2+, where remote schemes are refused and only local file/relative paths resolve unless a custom resolver is explicitly opted in. |
| Impact | No NVD CVSS vector or score is provided (CVSS: N/A); the only severity signal is the vendor's self-rating of 'moderate', and the vuln.today decision label is 'awaiting_data', meaning no SSVC exploitation/automatable/impact determination has been made. EPSS is not supplied, this CVE is not in CISA KEV, and no public exploit or working PoC is referenced - only the upstream fix commit and release notes, which are a patch, not exploit code. On balance this is a real but moderate-priority SSRF: exploitation is gated on the application processing an attacker-influenced WSDL or XSD schema, so it is not a mass-exploitable unauthenticated RCE. My own assessed 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N ≈ 6.4) is consistent with the vendor's 'moderate'. Key caveats to state explicitly: the real attack vector and privilege level depend on deployment mode - a classic ServiceClient/WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder flow that fetches an attacker-supplied WSDL is effectively remote and low-privilege, whereas the AAR/WAR deployment-resolver path requires deploying a crafted archive (operator-level), and the sources do not pin down which path dominates in practice. No EPSS and no KEV means there is no evidence of widespread or active exploitation; absence of those signals is not proof of safety, only that exploitation is unmeasured here. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An Axis2/Java application builds a service description from a WSDL or XSD that an attacker can supply or influence (for example a WSDL URL passed to ServiceClient or WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder, or a crafted .aar/.war schema). The WSDL/schema embeds an absolute wsdl:import location or xsd:import/xsd:include schemaLocation such as http://169.254.169.254/ or an internal host, and Axis2 fetches it with no scheme or host restriction, causing the JVM to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal or external systems. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis; only the vendor fix commit is available. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Nov 06, 2026
Server-side request forgery in Apache Axis2/Java through 2.0.1: when Axis2 builds a service description from a WSDL - via ServiceClient, AxisService.createClientSideAxisService, WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder, or the AAR/WAR deployment resolvers - it fetches absolute URLs found in wsdl:import locations and in xsd:import/xsd:include schemaLocation attributes with no scheme or host restriction, so an attacker who supplies or influences the WSDL/schema can make the JVM issue requests to arbitrary internal or external hosts. The assessed impact is limited to low confidentiality exposure with a scope change (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N), and the practical prerequisite is that the target application accept attacker-controlled WSDL or schema content - trivial where untrusted WSDL URLs are processed at runtime, but operator-level where it requires deploying a crafted .aar/.war. There is no KEV entry, no confirmed public exploit code, no NVD score (the only severity signal is the vendor's 'moderate' self-rating) and no EPSS estimate was supplied, so no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2, which refuses http, https, ftp and jar schema locations in the AAR and WAR URI resolvers (logging the block and returning an empty InputSource) and installs a restrictive schema resolver in WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder that throws on remote locations; the fix is commit 7ac84d8339ad80f8f7f7977cf0caaa28fc3b7b98 and the advisory is https://axis.apache.org/axis2/java/core/release-notes/2.0.2.html. No vendor-documented workaround for earlier branches is given, so deployments that cannot move to 2.0.2 should stop processing WSDL or schema documents whose import/include locations they do not control, since that precondition is what the exploit depends on; if a legitimate deployment genuinely needs remote schema resolution after upgrading, WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder exposes setCustomResolver to opt back in, accepting the SSRF exposure that entails. Plan the upgrade as more than a version bump: the 2.0.2 release notes list behaviour changes with one-line opt-outs in axis2.xml - decoupled WS-Addressing responses are refused (AXIS2-6108) unless allowNonAnonymousResponseEndpoints is set, service dispatch from the SOAP body namespace is off unless allowContentBasedServiceDispatch is enabled, the admin console ships with empty credentials so it is disabled until you set your own userName and password, exposeServiceMetadata is now honoured on every anonymous metadata route (WS-MEX, /services/ listing, ping module, .xsd/.wsdl routes), new request-size ceilings apply to multipart, form-urlencoded, MTOM, SOAP and multiref depths, axis2-spring no longer brings Spring transitively, and the JMS and mail transports are no longer bundled in axis2.war. Re-enabling decoupled WS-Addressing should be paired with setting httpFrontendHostUrl, because the generated reply address otherwise defaults to the local machine's IP.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Apache Axis2/Java is a SOAP/WSDL web services engine that constructs AxisService descriptions from WSDL documents and the XML schemas they reference. During that build, schema resolution is delegated to the xmlschema-core URIResolver machinery, and the stock DefaultURIResolver follows any absolute URI - http://, https://, ftp:// and jar:// - rather than confining lookups to co-packaged files. The same gap exists on the deployment side: AARFileBasedURIResolver and WarFileBasedURIResolver passed absolute schemaLocations straight on to the network, and WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder installed no restrictive resolver when collecting XML schemas from wsdl:import/xsd:import/xsd:include. The commit 7ac84d8339ad80f8f7f7977cf0caaa28fc3b7b98 hardens all three sites: the AAR and WAR resolvers now detect remote schemes case-insensitively, log a warning and return an empty InputSource instead of fetching, while WSDLToAxisServiceBuilder installs a resolver that throws on http/https/ftp/jar locations (with a setCustomResolver escape hatch), leaving file:// and relative paths working for schemas co-packaged inside .aar/.war archives. The root-cause class is SSRF through server-side XML external resource resolution; the CWE identifier was not supplied in the input and the trigger beyond the absolute-URL import/include vector is not described further in the available sources.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Network-reachable SSRF with no special complexity; PR:N for the ServiceClient/WSDL-fetch path, S:C because requests reach other internal systems, C:L and I/A:N as impact is limited internal access.
Primary rating from Vendor (CNA).
CVSS VectorVendor
Lifecycle Timeline
3Description PRE-NVD
Articles & Coverage 3
Executive ViewAI
A critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Axis2/Java (through 2.0.1) allows attackers to force the application server to make arbitrary outbound HTTP requests by supplying malicious WSDL or schema content. This could expose internal network services and sensitive metadata to unauthorized access, impacting any organization that processes untrusted WSDL at runtime or deploys third-party Axis2 artifacts. Leadership should prioritize remediation because the flaw enables internal reconnaissance and potential lateral movement, and no vendor patch is currently available.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations include: restricting outbound network access from Axis2 servers via firewall/egress policies, validating and allowlisting WSDL/schema import locations, disabling automatic WSDL fetching when not required, and deploying a web application firewall (WAF) with rules to block malicious WSDL content where feasible.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Server-Side Request Forgery exploits applications that fetch remote resources based on user-supplied URLs.
EUVD-2026-119929
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
Exploit-DB