Floci EUVD-2026-119770

Exploitation requires a disk-backed deployment: the source evidence states the escape occurs only 'on the persistent and hybrid backends,' so an in-memory/non-persistent configuration is not affected. The trigger is a crafted bucket name supplied through the BucketARN - specifically one of Floci's reserved storage directory names ('.accounts', '.versions', '.annotations'), a name containing a path separator, or '.'/'..'/empty - which pre-patch bypassed validation and resolved outside the owning account's storage directory. Limiting factor: the escape is described relative to 'the owning account's directory,' implying the attacker already acts within an account context, so the CVSS PR:N (unauthenticated) claim is not confirmed by the mechanism and should be verified with the vendor. Impact is bounded to crossing the per-account storage boundary (reading/colliding with another account's object version and annotation data), not arbitrary host filesystem access.

This is a moderate-severity path traversal (vendor CVSS 4.0 base 6.9) with the attack-maturity extension E:P (proof-of-concept). The 4.0 vector claims network, low-complexity, no-privilege, no-interaction access (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N), but all impacts are rated Low (VC:L/VI:L/VA:L) with no subsequent-system impact (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N), so the ceiling is constrained to limited cross-account read/overwrite rather than full compromise. No EPSS score and no KEV listing are provided, and the vuln.today Decision label is 'this_month' - not act_now or emergency - so the decision signals point to routine patching rather than crisis response. The PR:N claim is questionable: the source evidence shows the flaw lets a crafted bucket name climb out of 'the owning account's directory,' which implies the attacker is already operating within an account context, so verify the real authentication requirement with the vendor rather than treating this as fully unauthenticated. Combined with a niche product footprint, this reads as a genuine but non-urgent, lower-priority issue - a real bug with low blast radius, not a high-CVSS-but-overrated finding nor an emergency.

An attacker interacting with Floci's S3 API supplies a bucket name (via the BucketARN) set to a reserved storage directory such as '.versions' or '.annotations', or a name containing a path separator, which on the disk-backed (persistent or hybrid) backends resolves outside the attacker's own account storage root. This lets them collide with or overwrite another account's object version/annotation data, or escape the account boundary. A public proof-of-concept is claimed by VulDB (and reflected in CVSS E:P), but it is not verified as working exploit code.