mycli EUVD-2026-109471

Exploitation requires local access to the host and the ability to drive mycli's \source special command so that the source_special_command_is_safe whitelist safety check is bypassed (component: Whitelist); the attacker needs existing low-level privileges (PR:L) to operate the client. Limiting factors: the attack is local only (AV:L) - not remotely reachable over the network - and runs with the privileges of the invoking user, so impact is bounded to that user's context (VC:L/VI:L/VA:L). Affected builds are mycli 2.29.0-2.29.4 and 2.30.0-2.30.1 per EUVD; no fixed version is listed in the available sources, and no vendor mitigation was published (the vendor did not respond to the disclosure).

This is a low-to-moderate priority issue despite the OS command injection class (CWE-78). All signals point to constrained real-world risk: the CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) requires local access plus existing privileges, and the vendor-assigned impact is uniformly Low (VC:L/VI:L/VA:L), yielding a base score of only 4.8. The vuln.today decision label is 'this_month' - not act_now or emergency - which is consistent with a non-urgent, non-actively-exploited flaw. The E:P (Proof-of-Concept) exploit maturity and the description's claim that an exploit is public indicate a PoC exists, but there is no CISA KEV listing and no EPSS score was provided, so there is no evidence of widespread or active exploitation. The affected software (mycli) is a local interactive MySQL client, meaning a 'local' attacker in this context is typically a user who already has shell/CLI access, which substantially limits the marginal benefit of the exploit. Note a data gap: EPSS is absent, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be compared against the PoC signal; and the sole source is VulDB (the vendor did not respond), so affected/fixed versions and the precise trigger are not vendor-confirmed.

A local user (or a context where mycli processes attacker-influenced input) invokes the \source special command such that the source_special_command_is_safe whitelist check is bypassed, allowing an OS command to be injected and executed with the privileges of the mycli process. A public PoC reference is cited, but the trigger mechanism is not described in detail in the available sources. Because the attack vector is local and requires some privilege (PR:L), exploitation adds little beyond the access the attacker already has.