OnePlus OxygenOS EUVD-2026-107149

Requires the attacker to get an unprivileged Android application installed and launched on a device running an affected OxygenOS build (16.1.0 before 16.1.10.500, 16.0.0 before 16.0.5.1200, or 15.0.0 before 15.0.0.2000). The app needs NO declared Android permissions and NO user interaction beyond being started, because the atlasservice binder's setEvent interface performs no authorization check and the audiodumpinfo init service runs as root. Limiting factors: exploitation is strictly local (AV:L) - it cannot be triggered remotely over a network; it requires code execution on the device via a malicious/trojanized app, and only the listed OxygenOS version ranges carry the vulnerable atlasservice/audiodumpinfo path. No non-default configuration is required - the vulnerable services are present by default.

This is a genuine high-priority local privilege escalation, not a high-CVSS paper risk. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) confirms local, low-complexity exploitation with no user interaction, and the impact is maximal - full root (uid 0) code execution in the u:r:dumpstate:s0 SELinux domain, i.e. VC:H/VI:H/VA:H. The standout signal is the combination of Missing Authorization (any caller reaches atlasservice setEvent) with OS command injection, meaning ANY installed app with ZERO declared permissions can silently escalate to root - an exceptionally attractive primitive for malware and for chaining with other app-level compromises. One signal tension to verify: the vendor vector sets PR:L, but the description states the malicious app needs 'no permissions declared and no user interaction beyond launching it,' which arguably supports PR:N (the attacker fully controls the app and needs no pre-existing privilege) - this would raise the score, so treat PR:L as a conservative floor. No CISA KEV listing and no EPSS score were provided, so there is no evidence of active or widespread exploitation yet; however, a detailed public technical writeup exists, lowering the barrier to weaponization. Because the attack vector is strictly local (AV:L), mass remote exploitation is not possible - risk materializes through malicious or trojanized apps reaching the device.

A user installs a seemingly harmless app that requests no Android permissions. On launch, the app calls the unauthenticated atlasservice setEvent(String8 name, String8 value) binder interface with event name atlas_event_multimedia_audio_dumpsys and a value containing shell metacharacters; this value is copied into the oplus.audio.dumpinfo.type system property and passed unsanitized to system() by the root init service audiodumpinfo, yielding arbitrary command execution as uid 0. A detailed public writeup of the technique exists at the referenced research blog, so exploitation knowledge is already available.