Apache Atlas EUVD-2025-210296

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated session on the Apache Atlas instance - at minimum a low-privilege account capable of creating entities (the default for most non-guest users). The vulnerable surface is specifically the Create Entity page. A second victim user must subsequently view the affected entity for the stored payload to execute; exploitation is not self-triggering. Limiting factors include: the need for an active account on the target Atlas instance, victim browse action required (UI:R), and the fact that Atlas is typically an internal enterprise tool not exposed to the public internet. No special non-default configuration or specific plugin is described as required.

No CVSS vector was supplied in the input data, so quantitative scoring relies on independent assessment. The severity is rated 'important' by the Apache security team, consistent with Stored XSS carrying meaningful organizational risk when admin accounts may be targeted. Authentication is required - the description explicitly states 'an authenticated user can perform XSS' - which reduces the attack surface compared to unauthenticated XSS; however, in Apache Atlas deployments, obtaining a low-privilege account may be feasible in environments with self-service or federated identity. Stored XSS is more dangerous than Reflected XSS because payload persistence means attackers do not need to trick victims into clicking crafted links. The attack requires victim interaction (viewing the entity), which limits automated mass exploitation. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC code was present in the provided data, so exploitation probability signals are unavailable. Real-world risk is moderate-to-high in deployments where untrusted users share the platform with privileged administrators.

An attacker with a valid Apache Atlas account navigates to the Create Entity page and submits a crafted entity name or attribute containing a JavaScript payload (e.g., a script that exfiltrates the current user's session cookie to an attacker-controlled server). The payload is stored in Atlas's metadata store. When an administrator or data steward later browses the entity catalog and views the poisoned entity, the script executes silently in their browser, delivering the admin's session token to the attacker and enabling full account takeover. No public POC code has been identified at time of analysis.