Apple macOS EUVD-2025-209938

Exploitation requires the attacker to already be running code locally on the Mac as a low-privilege user (CVSS PR:L) - typically a malicious or trojanized application that the user has installed and launched, or a previously compromised low-privilege process. No user interaction is needed at the moment of exploitation (UI:N), and no network access is involved (AV:L), so the attack cannot be performed remotely. The exploit is limited to systems running unpatched macOS Sonoma (<14.8), Sequoia (<15.7), or Tahoe (<26); patched builds enforce the missing checks. The practical limiting factor is the need to first deliver and execute an untrusted app on the target, which Gatekeeper, notarization, and App Store distribution controls are designed to impede.

The CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) describes a high-impact but locally-scoped issue: an attacker needs local access and must already hold low privileges (PR:L), but requires no user interaction (UI:N) and faces low attack complexity (AC:L), making exploitation reliable once a foothold exists. No EPSS probability was supplied, so statistical exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified here. No KEV listing and no POC were provided, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation - this is a defense-in-depth/local-escalation fix rather than a remotely-wormable emergency. The signals are internally consistent: a local-only vector with no remote reachability means this is a meaningful priority for multi-user or potentially-compromised endpoints (it turns an app-level foothold into full root) but a lower urgency than any network-facing flaw. SSVC-style framing: exploitation is 'none' (no evidence), automatable is effectively 'no' (requires local presence), but technical impact is 'total' (root). Note the input lacks EPSS data; treat the absence of an exploitation probability as missing data, not as confirmation of low risk.

An attacker convinces a user to install a seemingly benign app, or leverages an already-compromised low-privilege process on the Mac, then invokes the vulnerable privileged code path to escalate from a normal user context to root without any further user interaction. Given AV:L/AC:L, exploitation is straightforward once local code execution is achieved, though no public proof-of-concept has been identified at time of analysis.