Monthly
Integrity-protection bypass in libssh builds compiled against the OpenSSL crypto backend, caused by incorrect AES-GCM finalization checks that fail to verify the authentication tag. An in-path (man-in-the-middle) attacker positioned on an SSH session can silently alter plaintext bytes on the wire without triggering a MAC/integrity failure, defeating a core guarantee of the SSH transport layer. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, EPSS risk is low (0.28%, 20th percentile), and CISA SSVC rates exploitation as 'none' though 'automatable: yes'.
Improper encryption configuration across thirteen Hikvision video door station and intercom models enables physical-proximity attackers to forge MIFARE Classic (M1) access cards, bypassing the card-based authentication enforced by these devices. The vulnerability stems from weak or misconfigured Crypto-1 sector key handling in the card reader subsystem, allowing an attacker with commodity NFC tools to clone or synthesize valid credentials. With a forged card, an attacker can gain unauthorized physical entry to premises protected by these intercoms. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is present, but MIFARE Classic attack tooling (Proxmark, libnfc) is mature and widely available.
Integrity-protection bypass in libssh builds compiled against the OpenSSL crypto backend, caused by incorrect AES-GCM finalization checks that fail to verify the authentication tag. An in-path (man-in-the-middle) attacker positioned on an SSH session can silently alter plaintext bytes on the wire without triggering a MAC/integrity failure, defeating a core guarantee of the SSH transport layer. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, EPSS risk is low (0.28%, 20th percentile), and CISA SSVC rates exploitation as 'none' though 'automatable: yes'.
Improper encryption configuration across thirteen Hikvision video door station and intercom models enables physical-proximity attackers to forge MIFARE Classic (M1) access cards, bypassing the card-based authentication enforced by these devices. The vulnerability stems from weak or misconfigured Crypto-1 sector key handling in the card reader subsystem, allowing an attacker with commodity NFC tools to clone or synthesize valid credentials. With a forged card, an attacker can gain unauthorized physical entry to premises protected by these intercoms. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is present, but MIFARE Classic attack tooling (Proxmark, libnfc) is mature and widely available.