oc-mirror CVE-2026-96577

Exploitation requires that an oc-mirror mirroring operation be actively running, because the vulnerable embedded local cache registry only exists during that operation and binds to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) with no authentication and no TLS. The attacker must have adjacent-network access (AV:A) - a foothold on the same local/L2 segment as the host running oc-mirror - not arbitrary remote internet access. No user interaction or credentials are needed (PR:N/UI:N) once reachable. Limiting factors: the exposure window is transient (only while mirroring runs), the attacker needs local-segment position, and environments that run oc-mirror on isolated/host-only networks or restrict the bind address are not exposed.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N, 7.1 High) is the primary signal, and it is internally consistent with the CWE-306 (Missing Authentication) description: the embedded oc-mirror cache registry listens on all interfaces (0.0.0.0) with no authentication or TLS, so any host on the adjacent network can read, overwrite, or delete cached container images. The I:H rating is the dominant driver - an attacker who pushes tampered images into the cache can poison the artifacts that are subsequently mirrored into a disconnected OpenShift environment, a meaningful supply-chain integrity risk. The AV:A (adjacent, not network) metric is the key limiter: the attacker must already have a foothold on the same L2/broadcast segment as the machine running the mirror, not arbitrary internet reach. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit were provided, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. No SSVC decision data was supplied. The signals do not conflict, but the practical risk is moderated by two factors not reflected in the base score: exposure exists only transiently while an oc-mirror operation is actually running, and the attacker needs adjacent-network position. This is a legitimate integrity concern for air-gapped/disconnected OpenShift mirroring workflows rather than a mass-exploitable internet-facing flaw.

While an operator runs an oc-mirror mirroring job, the tool's embedded local cache registry binds to all interfaces with no authentication or encryption. An attacker sharing the adjacent network segment connects directly to the exposed registry port and pushes a tampered container image (or deletes/reads cached content), so that poisoned artifacts flow into the mirrored OpenShift content set. No public exploit code was provided, and the attack requires adjacent-network access during the mirroring window.