Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessAuthenticate as RansomLook analyst
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DeliveryEmbed crafted file:// or http:// URI in analysis Markdown
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ExploitTrigger PDF export
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ExecutionWeasyPrint fetches arbitrary server-side resource
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ImpactDownload rendered PDF containing exfiltrated data
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V4 - API and Web Service URL allowlisting, SSRF prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Initial Access, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires an authenticated RansomLook session with privileges to create or modify an analysis - the vendor CVSS assigns PR:H, indicating high-privilege access, though the description's framing ('authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis') may correspond to an analyst role rather than an administrator in some deployments. The vulnerability is only reachable through the PDF export code path; if WeasyPrint is not installed (the dependency is marked optional in the commit diff) or PDF generation is administratively disabled, the attack surface does not exist. The file:// read impact is bounded by the OS-level permissions of the user account running the RansomLook process. The SSRF impact is bounded by the network reachability of the RansomLook server. External unauthenticated attackers cannot exploit this without first obtaining valid credentials. No special non-default configuration is required beyond having the PDF export feature active. |
| Impact | The vendor-assigned CVSS 4.0 score of 8.2 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N) accurately captures the dual-surface impact: VC:H reflects arbitrary file read on the vulnerable RansomLook host, and SC:H reflects SSRF reach into subsequent internal systems. PR:H is the most significant mitigating factor - exploitation requires an authenticated account with analysis creation or modification rights, ruling out mass unauthenticated scanning. No EPSS score was provided in the input data, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified. The absence of a CISA KEV listing and any POC code suggests this is not being exploited opportunistically. The realistic threat actor is a malicious insider or an adversary who has already compromised an analyst account, not an unauthenticated remote attacker. Despite these mitigations, the business impact is disproportionately high for affected deployments: RansomLook instances typically hold sensitive threat intelligence, API keys, and credentials, and may reside in privileged network segments with access to internal services or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). The SSRF vector is particularly dangerous if egress filtering is not in place. One signal uncertainty: the description says 'authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis,' which in some deployments may correspond to PR:L (analyst role) rather than PR:H (admin) - operators should verify the role model against the vendor's CVSS assignment. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A compromised analyst account authenticates to RansomLook and edits an existing analysis, embedding a Markdown image tag referencing file:///app/website/config/config.py or http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ as the image source. When the analyst (or any other user) exports the analysis as a PDF, the pre-patch WeasyPrint instance fetches and embeds the referenced resource into the rendered document; the attacker downloads the PDF and extracts the embedded sensitive data - credentials, configuration secrets, or cloud IAM tokens - without any server-side detection of the exfiltration. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Aug 24, 2026
PDF export in RansomLook allows authenticated analysts to read arbitrary server-side files and conduct server-side request forgery by embedding crafted resource references in analysis documents. Prior to the patch, WeasyPrint's default URL fetcher resolved any scheme - including file:// and http:// - using the privileges and network access of the RansomLook server process, enabling exfiltration of local configuration and credentials or enumeration of internal network services. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis; a fix is confirmed via GitHub commit 34dc0285583dae483b4d48c8e98fff942b755f5f, which introduces a strict URL allowlist restricting rendering to data: URIs, the report logo, and analysis asset files.
RemediationAI
Apply the fix from commit 34dc0285583dae483b4d48c8e98fff942b755f5f (https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook/commit/34dc0285583dae483b4d48c8e98fff942b755f5f), which replaces WeasyPrint's unrestricted default URL fetcher with a strict allowlist-based fetcher. No specific patched release tag was confirmed in available data - operators should pull and deploy from the patched commit directly. If immediate patching is not possible, disabling the PDF export route entirely eliminates the vulnerable code path without affecting core analysis functionality, though it removes PDF report generation capability. To mitigate the SSRF component specifically, enforce host-level or container-level outbound egress filtering to block the RansomLook process from reaching internal network ranges (RFC 1918) and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254); note that egress filtering alone does not address the file:// arbitrary file read path, which requires the code-level fix. Additionally, restrict analysis creation and modification privileges to the minimum necessary set of trusted accounts to reduce the privilege surface available to insider threats or compromised credentials.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
RansomLook is a Python-based (Flask) threat intelligence platform for tracking ransomware groups. Its analysis export pipeline converts Markdown content to HTML and passes it to WeasyPrint - a Python library that renders HTML/CSS to PDF via the Pango/Cairo stack - for PDF generation. CWE-918 (SSRF) applies here because user-controlled content flowed directly into a server-side rendering context without validating resource references: WeasyPrint's default_url_fetcher resolves any URI scheme the host OS supports, including file://, http://, and https://. The affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:ransomlook:ransomlook:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* (all versions prior to the patch commit). The fix adds a _pdf_url_fetcher closure that implements a positive allowlist: data: URIs pass through to the default fetcher, file:// URIs are path-normalized with os.path.realpath to prevent traversal and checked against an explicit set (report logo) or allowed directory (analysis assets), and all network schemes are rejected outright with a ValueError. The commit also separately patches a path traversal in logo deletion by enforcing basename-only canonicalization.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
Network-accessible PDF export triggered by an authenticated high-privilege user; scope changes to C because SSRF reaches subsequent internal systems; no integrity or availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (CIRCL).
CVSS VectorVendor: CIRCL
DescriptionCVE.org
RansomLook contains insufficient resource validation in the analysis PDF generation functionality. Analysis documents are converted from Markdown to HTML and passed to WeasyPrint for PDF rendering. Prior to the fix, WeasyPrint used its default URL fetcher, allowing resource references contained in an analysis to be resolved without restrictions.
An authenticated attacker able to create or modify an analysis could embed crafted resource references using schemes such as file:// or http://. When the analysis was subsequently rendered as PDF, WeasyPrint would process these references with the privileges and network access of the RansomLook server.
A malicious file:// reference could cause the renderer to access arbitrary files readable by the RansomLook process, potentially exposing sensitive configuration, credentials, or other local data through rendered resources. Network URLs could cause the server to initiate requests to localhost, internal network services, or external systems, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF) and potentially bypassing network-level access restrictions.
The patch introduces a dedicated WeasyPrint URL fetcher that permits only data: resources, the RansomLook report logo, and files contained within the analysis asset directory. Network resources and filesystem paths outside these explicitly permitted locations are rejected.
Executive ViewAI
RansomLook's PDF export feature contains a critical file access and server-side request forgery vulnerability affecting authenticated users, enabling theft of server credentials and reconnaissance of internal network infrastructure. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, though the vulnerability poses substantial risk to organizations using RansomLook, as legitimate user accounts can be leveraged to compromise sensitive data. Immediate patching is essential to prevent credential exposure and internal network compromise.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Server-Side Request Forgery exploits applications that fetch remote resources based on user-supplied URLs.
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EUVD-2026-64886
GHSA-mvv5-7c62-32xw
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB