CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
9DescriptionNVD
The LabOne Q serialization framework uses a class-loading mechanism (import_cls) to dynamically import and instantiate Python classes during deserialization. Prior to the fix, this mechanism accepted arbitrary fully-qualified class names from the serialized data without any validation of the target class or restriction on which modules could be imported. An attacker can craft a serialized experiment file that causes the deserialization engine to import and instantiate arbitrary Python classes with attacker-controlled constructor arguments, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the Python process. Exploitation requires the victim to load a malicious file using LabOne Q's deserialization functions, for example a compromised experiment file shared for collaboration or support purposes.
AnalysisAI
Unsafe deserialization in Zurich Instruments LabOne Q enables arbitrary code execution when users load malicious experiment files. The import_cls mechanism accepts unvalidated class names from serialized data, allowing attackers to instantiate arbitrary Python classes with controlled constructor arguments. …
Sign in for full analysis, threat intelligence, and remediation guidance.
RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all LabOne Q installations across the organization and notify users to avoid opening experiment files from untrusted sources; disable file sharing via email and unsecured channels. Within 7 days: Implement file validation procedures requiring experiment files to be scanned/reviewed before loading; consider air-gapping critical LabOne Q systems used for sensitive research. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps.
Share
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-26483