EUVD-2026-36433
GHSA-285q-8jwv-fw98
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessObtain valid Yarbo MQTT credentials
-
DeliveryConnect to Yarbo cloud broker
-
ExploitSubscribe to wildcard telemetry topic
-
ExecutionHarvest robot serial numbers globally
-
PersistPublish commands to target robot's command topic
-
ImpactControl physical robot fleet remotely
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Authorization checks on every request
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Privilege Escalation The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires valid MQTT credentials to the Yarbo cloud broker - either a self-registered Yarbo app account (low-privilege user) or one of the shared hard-coded credentials previously embedded in older Yarbo Android/iOS app builds - and network reachability to the cloud MQTT endpoint. No per-device pairing, owner consent, user interaction, or knowledge of a target serial number is needed up front, because serials are disclosed in the wildcard telemetry stream once subscribed. The principal limiting factor is that the attacker must hold some valid credential; there is no anonymous-broker path described, so PR:L applies and pure unauthenticated exploitation against a current app version is not asserted. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N) accurately reflects a low-complexity, network-reachable issue requiring only low-privilege authentication, with high confidentiality and integrity impact but no direct availability impact on the broker itself - though an attacker could trivially disrupt physical robots. The 8.6 base score, combined with ICS-CERT involvement and the existence of a CISA ICS advisory (ICSA-26-162-01), elevates this above a paper-only finding: any holder of a Yarbo app account is effectively a fleet-wide operator. EPSS is not provided and the vulnerability is not on the CISA KEV list, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the trivial exploit path (subscribe to '#', read serials, publish to command topic) means weaponization requires only an MQTT client and stolen or self-registered credentials. The principal limiting factor is that exploitation needs valid credentials of some kind - but the description explicitly notes that hard-coded shared credentials were previously shipped in the mobile app, so historical exposure is broad. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker registers a free Yarbo account (or reuses previously leaked hard-coded MQTT credentials), connects to the Yarbo cloud broker, and subscribes to a wildcard topic such as '#' to receive telemetry from every robot worldwide. From that stream they harvest serial numbers, then publish movement, mowing, or configuration commands to each robot's command topic - operating other customers' machines remotely without ever interacting with the legitimate owner. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jun 12, 2026
Authorization bypass in Yarbo's cloud MQTT infrastructure allows any authenticated client to subscribe to wildcard topics covering the entire global robot fleet and to publish commands to any robot using only its serial number, which is itself disclosed in the telemetry stream. The flaw affects both the Yarbo Android/iOS mobile application and the backing cloud MQTT broker, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the design defect means a single compromised credential yields fleet-wide control.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis with an exact fixed version; the description confirms that hard-coded credentials were removed from the mobile app in a prior update but states that this change alone is insufficient because per-device authorization is still missing on the broker. Operators should consult ICSA-26-162-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-162-01) and the CSAF feed (https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-01.json) for vendor mitigation guidance, update to the latest mobile app release to eliminate the shared hard-coded credentials, and rotate any user account credentials that may have been exposed. Because the fundamental fix must occur cloud-side (per-topic ACLs binding credentials to a robot serial), compensating controls available to end users are limited: deregister and reset robots after suspected credential exposure, restrict robot operation to times when the device is physically supervised, and where possible isolate the robot from sensitive areas until the vendor confirms broker-side ACL enforcement - accepting the trade-off that supervised-only use defeats much of the product's autonomous value.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Yarbo robots use an MQTT publish/subscribe broker for telemetry and command-and-control between the mobile app and the cloud. The broker is configured without topic-level Access Control Lists (ACLs) tying a credential to a specific device or user, which is the textbook manifestation of CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). Because MQTT supports wildcard subscriptions (e.g. '+' and '#'), any client that authenticates - historically via hard-coded credentials embedded in the app, and currently via any legitimate per-user account - receives the full telemetry firehose for every robot worldwide, harvests serial numbers from that stream, and can then publish to each robot's command topic. The CPE strings confirm both 'yarbo:yarbo_android/ios_mobile_application' and 'yarbo:yarbo_cloud_mqtt_infrastructure' as in-scope, indicating the root cause is broker-side rather than purely a client mis-implementation.
Know when Yarbo Android Ios Mobile Application gets its next vulnerability
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Network-reachable MQTT broker, low complexity, requires any valid credential (PR:L), no user interaction; scope changes from cloud auth context to physical robots, with high C/I and limited availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
The Yarbo cloud does not enforce per-device or per-user authorization. Any client possessing valid credentials, whether the shared hard-coded credentials or legitimate per-user credentials, can subscribe to wildcard topics covering all robots globally, and can publish to any robot's command topic using only the robot's serial number (disclosed in the telemetry stream). Even after removal of hard-coded credentials from the app, a single compromised credential could still provide fleet-wide access without per-device access controls.
Executive ViewAI
Yarbo's cloud MQTT infrastructure contains an authorization bypass that allows any authenticated user with valid credentials to gain full control over the entire global robot fleet, including subscribing to sensitive telemetry and issuing commands to any robot. The vulnerability is critical because robot serial numbers (sufficient to identify targets) are publicly disclosed in telemetry data, meaning a single compromised credential or insider account yields organization-wide fleet compromise. Organizations operating Yarbo robots must assume that credential theft exposes all deployed devices to unauthorized command injection and surveillance.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) Enforce mandatory credential rotation every 30 days and implement hardware-backed or multi-factor authentication for all Yarbo account access; (2) Network segmentation-isolate Yarbo robot MQTT traffic to separate VLANs with strict ingress/egress controls; (3) MQTT broker monitoring-log and alert on all wildcard topic subscriptions and cross-robot command publishes, with human review of exceptions; (4) Operational constraints-temporarily disable autonomous or safety-critical robot functions until patched, reverting to manual-only control; (5) Telemetry obfuscation-if technically feasible, mask or truncate robot serial numbers in non-essential telemetry outputs; (6) Access control hardening-limit MQTT broker credentials to service accounts with minimal privilege and rotate immediately if any team member leaves.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Exploit-DB