Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Any authenticated tenant (PR:L) reads across a tenant boundary, so scope changes (S:C) with high confidentiality only; read-only disclosure means I:N and A:N, unlike the input's VI:H.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Julep contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the get_execution_details endpoint that allows authenticated tenants to read another tenant's execution data. Attackers can supply arbitrary execution_id values to retrieve sensitive execution records including task inputs, outputs, metadata, and temporal task tokens from other tenants.
AnalysisAI
Cross-tenant data disclosure in Julep's get_execution_details endpoint allows any authenticated tenant to read other tenants' execution records by supplying arbitrary execution_id values. Exposed data includes task inputs, outputs, metadata, and temporal task tokens, breaking multi-tenant isolation. Publicly available exploit code exists (VulnCheck-reported), though the flaw is not listed in CISA KEV - no public exploit identified as actively exploited at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
Julep is an AI agents/workflow orchestration platform (julep-ai:julep) that runs tenant-scoped 'executions' of tasks, backed by Temporal for durable workflow execution. The root cause is CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key): the get_execution_details endpoint uses a client-supplied execution_id as a direct object reference without verifying that the requesting tenant actually owns that execution. Because the identifier is trusted for lookup but not for authorization, tenant boundaries collapse. The leaked temporal task tokens are especially notable - these are Temporal workflow/activity identifiers that can be sensitive for interacting with or signalling running workflows, amplifying impact beyond passive data exposure.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is identified in the available data; the upstream issue (https://github.com/julep-ai/julep/issues/1615) tracks the fix, so monitor it and the VulnCheck advisory (https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/julep-insecure-direct-object-reference-via-get-executions-execution-id) for a tagged release and upgrade as soon as one ships. As a compensating control until then, enforce tenant-scoped authorization at the get_execution_details endpoint so that execution_id lookups are filtered by the caller's tenant/developer ID (add an ownership check in the query rather than trusting the ID), which is the correct fix and has no functional side effect for legitimate users. If code changes are not immediately possible, restrict or rate-limit access to the executions API and consider gating it behind an API gateway policy that ties requests to a tenant identity, accepting that this adds request-path latency and does not fully close the gap. Additionally rotate any exposed temporal task tokens, since disclosed tokens may remain valid.
Same technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-51151
GHSA-42mr-mcg5-367r