Severity by source
AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Adjacent network required (AV:A), no auth or interaction with a known static password (AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), full desktop control gives high C and I but no direct availability loss (A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A provisioning script used when installing HIPASE-250 (formerly 250 SCALA) engineering workstations sets a fixed, hard-coded x11vnc password. Because the same credential is applied to every workstation provisioned this way, an attacker with adjacent-network access who knows the password can gain VNC access to affected workstations.
AnalysisAI
Hard-coded credential exposure in Andritz HIPASE-250 (formerly 250 SCALA) engineering workstations lets an adjacent-network attacker log in over VNC using a fixed x11vnc password baked into the provisioning script. Because every workstation provisioned with that script shares the identical credential, one leaked or reverse-engineered password unlocks remote graphical control of all affected units across a site. Rated CVSS 8.1; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is x11vnc, a VNC server that exports an existing X11 display for remote control. During installation, a provisioning script hard-codes the VNC authentication password rather than generating a per-host secret, so the credential is a static value embedded in the deployment tooling. This is a textbook CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) issue: the secret is shared identically across all installations and cannot be assumed private, since anyone with access to the script, an image, or a single device can recover it. The CPE data identifies two labels for the same platform - cpe:2.3:a:andritz:hipase-250 and cpe:2.3:a:andritz:250_scala - indicating a rebranded industrial/OT engineering workstation used to configure Andritz protection and automation equipment.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is identified at time of analysis, and the only reference is the general vendor site https://www.andritz.com/ - contact Andritz for a security advisory and a corrected provisioning process that generates a unique per-host VNC password. As specific compensating controls: immediately change the x11vnc password on every provisioned workstation to a unique strong value (side effect: any automation or documentation relying on the shared password breaks and must be updated); restrict x11vnc to listen only on localhost or disable the VNC service where remote graphical access is not operationally required (side effect: loss of remote maintenance capability); and enforce network segmentation and firewall rules limiting the VNC port (default 5900) to an isolated management VLAN or jump host, since AV:A means confining the adjacent segment directly cuts off the attack path (side effect: field engineers must route through the approved management path). Prefer tunneling VNC over an authenticated VPN/SSH rather than exposing it on the OT LAN.
More in Hipase 250
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Same weakness CWE-798 – Use of Hard-coded Credentials
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-51502
GHSA-jjwc-g6g3-rhhx