Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessAuthenticate with low-privilege Chat2DB account
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DeliveryEnumerate datasource IDs via API
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ExploitRequest GET /api/connection/datasource/{id}
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ExecutionRead decrypted plaintext credentials
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PersistConnect to victim backend database
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ImpactExfiltrate data
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Object-level authorization, IDOR prevention
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| Exploitation Conditions | Requires a valid authenticated Chat2DB account (PR:L) reachable over the network to the REST API - no admin role, no user interaction, and no non-default feature toggle is needed, since the vulnerable code path is the standard GET /api/connection/datasource/{id} handler. Exploitation is limited to deployments where more than one user shares an instance and where victim datasources store credentials, because the leak only exposes OTHER users' records; a single-user local-first install (the documented default) has nothing for an attacker to enumerate. Practical exploitation also depends on datasource IDs being enumerable/guessable, which the description confirms ('enumerate datasource IDs'). |
| Impact | The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N, base 7.1) is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable API, low complexity, one low-privilege authenticated account, high confidentiality impact and no integrity or availability impact. EPSS and KEV status were not provided in the input, so real-world exploitation frequency is unknown - do NOT assume active exploitation. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis. Real-world priority is elevated by the nature of the leaked asset: plaintext database credentials enable lateral movement into the backend databases themselves, so a confidentiality-only CVSS understates downstream impact. The main limiting factor is that an attacker must already hold a valid (even unprivileged) Chat2DB account, making this most acute in shared/multi-user or hosted deployments rather than the documented single-user local-first install. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A low-privileged user with a valid Chat2DB account scripts sequential requests to GET /api/connection/datasource/1, /2, /3 … and reads the decrypted password field returned for each datasource owned by other users. Using the harvested plaintext credentials, the attacker connects directly to those backend databases and exfiltrates data. No exploit code is publicly identified, but the attack requires only a standard authenticated session and a loop over integer IDs. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 17, 2026
Insecure direct object reference in Chat2DB before 5.3.0 lets any authenticated non-admin user read the decrypted database credentials of datasources belonging to other users by enumerating IDs against GET /api/connection/datasource/{id}. Because the handler returns the plaintext password field and omits an ownership check, a single low-privileged account can harvest every other tenant's stored connection secrets. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but exploitation is trivial and the EPSS/KEV signals were not supplied in the input.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Chat2DB 5.3.0 or later (release https://github.com/OtterMind/Chat2DB/releases/tag/v5.3.0, or Docker image chat2db/chat2db:5.3.0); note that 5.3.0 is not an in-place upgrade from 0.3.x, so back up and migrate data before installing. If immediate patching is not possible in a multi-user deployment, restrict network access to the /api/connection/datasource/ endpoints to trusted administrators (for example via a reverse-proxy allow-list), limit accounts to a single trusted user since the local-first design assumes no multi-tenancy, and rotate any database credentials that were stored in shared instances because they may already have been readable by other users - the trade-off of the proxy restriction is that legitimate low-privilege users lose datasource read access via the API until the upgrade is applied.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Chat2DB is an AI-assisted database client and management tool (vendor 'ottermind', CPE cpe:2.3:a:ottermind:chat2db) that stores connection profiles ('datasources') including encrypted credentials for backend databases. The flaw is CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key): the REST endpoint GET /api/connection/datasource/{id} passes the caller-supplied {id} straight into dataSourceService.queryExistent(id, ...) with no check that the requesting user owns the record, and the response serializes the decrypted password field. Because datasource IDs are enumerable and the server itself decrypts the secret before returning it, at-rest encryption provides no protection against an authenticated API caller.
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- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Network API reachable by any authenticated low-privilege user (PR:L, AV:N, AC:L, UI:N) with high confidentiality impact from leaked credentials and no integrity or availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Chat2DB before 5.3.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the GET /api/connection/datasource/{id} endpoint. The handler calls dataSourceService.queryExistent(id, ...) without an ownership check and returns the decrypted password field, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to enumerate datasource IDs and read the plaintext database credentials of datasources owned by other users.
Executive ViewAI
Chat2DB versions before 5.3.0 contain an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows users to retrieve plaintext database credentials belonging to other users' datasources. No public exploit identified at time of analysis. This directly compromises the security of all connected databases and enables unauthorized access. Organizations using Chat2DB face immediate risk of credential theft and potential breach of sensitive data.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) immediately restrict Chat2DB network access to authorized administrative personnel only; (2) monitor all database access logs for unauthorized connection attempts; (3) rotate all database credentials stored in Chat2DB immediately; (4) disable Chat2DB datasource features until vendor patch becomes available; (5) implement network segmentation to isolate Chat2DB from production database systems.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
An unrestricted file upload vulnerability exists in CodePhiliaX Chat2DB versions up to 0.3.7 in the JDBC Driver Upload f
CodePhiliaX Chat2DB versions up to 0.3.7 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the Database Export Handler component
Path traversal in OtterMind Chat2DB 5.3.0 through 5.3.8 allows remote attackers to manipulate the tableName argument in
EUVD-2026-45212
GHSA-6h56-q7r6-j7xg
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB