EUVD-2026-65319
GHSA-g7r6-9fmr-hmhc
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:A reflects the explicit internal vessel network requirement; PR:N because hard-coded credentials are uniformly discoverable, providing no real authentication barrier; C:N as no data disclosure is described.
Primary rating from Vendor (jpcert).
CVSS VectorVendor: jpcert
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
FA-50 all versions contain hard-coded credentials. An attacker, who knows the credentials and has access to the vessel's internal network, can operate the settings screen using that credentials to alter the identification number.
AnalysisAI
Hard-coded credentials in all versions of the Furuno FA-50 maritime AIS transponder allow any attacker with knowledge of the static credentials and access to the vessel's internal network to authenticate to the device's settings screen and alter the vessel's identification number. Modification of the AIS identification number (MMSI) carries serious maritime safety implications, enabling vessel impersonation or disruption of AIS-based collision avoidance and vessel tracking systems. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires two specific, cumulative conditions: first, knowledge of the hard-coded credentials embedded in all FA-50 firmware versions - these credentials are static and identical across every unit, making them discoverable through firmware reverse engineering, vendor communications, or coordinated disclosure artifacts; and second, network-level access to the vessel's internal network, meaning the attacker must be physically present aboard the vessel or must have compromised another device that is already connected to the shipboard LAN. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The official CVSS 4.0 score of 8.8 uses AV:N (network-reachable), but the CVE description explicitly requires 'access to the vessel's internal network,' which more accurately corresponds to AV:A (adjacent network). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Consult the Furuno vendor advisory at https://www.furuno.co.jp/en/news/notice/notice_category.html?itemid=1857&dispmid=965 for firmware update availability; no specific patched firmware version number is independently confirmed from the available data, so the advisory must be consulted directly for the exact fix version. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify all Furuno FA-50 transponders in the fleet and document baseline MMSI values; immediately restrict network access to the device management interface and review configuration logs for unauthorized modifications. …
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Same weakness CWE-798 – Use of Hard-coded Credentials
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today