Capgo CVE-2026-56247

Exploitation requires an authenticated account holding org-admin privileges within a Capgo organization (PR:L), and the specific abuse path is assigning an org-scoped RBAC role at app scope - the missing scope-compatibility check is the enabling condition. The pre-seeding variant additionally requires targeting a pending (not-yet-accepted) invitee so the malformed binding survives invite acceptance. Limiting factors: the attacker must already control an org-admin role, the affected instance must be running a version before 12.128.2, and the elevated privileges are confined to app-level actions within the tenant (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - no impact to other systems). No end-user interaction is needed for the assignment itself (UI:N).

The CVSS 4.0 base score is 8.7 (High) with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact to the vulnerable system but no subsequent-system impact (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). The PR:L metric correctly reflects that exploitation requires an authenticated account with org-admin privileges - a meaningful trust prerequisite, so this is an insider/abuse-of-privilege or compromised-admin scenario rather than anonymous internet exploitation. No EPSS score, SSVC decision, KEV listing, or public POC was provided, so there is no signal of active or automatable exploitation; the real-world urgency is therefore driven by the high impact and low attack complexity rather than by exploitation evidence. Net: a genuine authorization-design weakness worth prompt patching for any multi-tenant Capgo deployment, but the org-admin precondition meaningfully narrows the realistic threat compared to the raw High score.

A malicious or compromised org admin assigns an org-scoped high-privilege RBAC role at app scope to a pending invitee whose intended role is low-privilege. When that invitee later accepts the invitation, the over-privileged binding persists, and the now-active low-privilege user can perform privileged app actions (e.g., managing app updates or channels) they were never meant to have. No public exploit code is known, and the attack requires existing org-admin access.