EUVD-2026-50370
GHSA-cg9x-g3gm-h5h6
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
PDF submitted remotely without auth triggers XXE; I:L reflects SSRF potential for indirect internal-state modification; A:N as parsing does not crash the service.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
veraPDF-validation has an XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in two PDF parsing paths (validate and GFPDAcroForm.getdynamicRender()). A malicious/crafted PDF supplied to a veraPDF consumer can lead to the expansion of external entities while parsing rich-text annotation/form-field values or XFA configurations, allowing local file disclosure and potentially outbound network requests depending on the runtime (host) environment.
Details
Consumers that utilise either the PDFAValidator.validate(...) or GFPDAcroForm(acroForm).getdynamicRender() APIs to process untrusted PDFs are vulnerable to XXE exploits.
Both vulnerable paths share the same root cause: the underlying source binds a default DocumentBuilderFactory and immediately calls newDocumentBuilder() which does not disable parsing of DTDs, external entities, XInclude, or external resource access directives in XML schemas.
This is an XXE vulnerability affecting applications that use veraPDF's affected APIs to parse or validate untrusted PDFs.
An attacker could craft a PDF that includes crafted XML external entities that when processed by vulnerable consumers could lead to local file disclosure and server-side outbound requests to attacker-controlled endpoints, depending on JVM XML parser behavior and network controls on the host.
AnalysisAI
XML External Entity injection in veraPDF-validation's PDF parsing layer allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary local files from the server or trigger outbound server-side requests to attacker-controlled endpoints by supplying crafted PDF documents. The two vulnerable code paths - PDFAValidator.validate() and GFPDAcroForm.getdynamicRender() - both use an unconfigured DocumentBuilderFactory that permits full DTD and external entity expansion. Patches are confirmed in versions 1.30.2 and 1.31.71; no public exploit or CISA KEV listing was identified at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
veraPDF is an open-source Java-based PDF/A validator distributed as Maven artifacts org.verapdf:validation-model and org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta. The root cause (CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference) manifests in two distinct Java source files: GFPDAcroForm.java processes XFA form configurations, while DictionaryKeysHelper.java processes rich-text annotation and form-field values. Both call DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder() without applying any hardening - they fail to disable DOCTYPE/DTD processing, external entity expansion, XInclude, or external schema access. Java's default DocumentBuilder is fully permissive in these respects. The confirmed fix (PR #730, commits 94caa46c and cacd9436) replaces both insecure factory calls with SecureXML.newSafeDocumentBuilder() from org.verapdf.xmp.tools.SecureXML, a utility that configures the factory with standard security features. The vulnerability surfaces specifically when the parser encounters XML-formatted content within PDF structures such as XFA forms or rich-text annotation values that contain external entity declarations.
RemediationAI
Upgrade org.verapdf:validation-model or org.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta to version 1.30.2 if running on the 1.17.35-1.30.x branch, or to version 1.31.71 if on the 1.31.x branch; these are the vendor-released patched versions confirmed by the GitHub Security Advisory at https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/security/advisories/GHSA-cg9x-g3gm-h5h6 and implemented in PR #730 (https://github.com/veraPDF/veraPDF-validation/pull/730). If immediate upgrade is not feasible, two compensating controls reduce impact without eliminating the flaw: first, apply network egress restrictions on the JVM process to block outbound HTTP/HTTPS, which prevents SSRF exfiltration but does not stop local file disclosure; second, run the veraPDF process under an OS user with minimal filesystem permissions, limiting the scope of any file read to non-sensitive paths. Disabling XFA form processing or rich-text annotation handling at the application configuration level, if those features are not required, removes the affected parsing surface entirely. None of these workarounds substitute for patching, as they address impact rather than the root cause.
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External POC / Exploit Code
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