Which versions of OpenChamber are affected by CVE-2026-53976?

OpenChamber 1.11.7 has a critical vulnerability allowing unauthenticated attackers to extract credentials and secrets without any login requirement, then forge valid sessions to access the entire…. A patch is available.

Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2026-53976?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2026-53976. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.7%.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-53976?

Within 24 hours: Identify all OpenChamber 1.11.7 instances and immediately apply the patch available per vendor advisory; review access logs for the /api/fs/read, /api/fs/stat, and /api/fs/raw endpoints with allowOutsideWorkspace=true for evidence of exploitation. Within 7 days: Complete patching across all environments, rotate all JWT signing secrets, SSH private keys, and API credentials that may have been exposed, and revoke all active sessions to force re-authentication. Within 30 days: Audit all systems exposed during the vulnerability window for unauthorized access or lateral movement, implement continuous monitoring for exploitation attempts, and document remediation activities for compliance records.

OpenChamber CVE-2026-53976

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-53976?

CVE-2026-53976 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.7%.

EUVD-2026-53936 CRITICAL

Path Traversal (CWE-22)

2026-08-06 VulnCheck

GHSA-9wgq-4cmq-jhvv

Authentication Bypass Path Traversal Openchamber Bohdan Triapitsyn

9.3

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck

Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY

9.3 CRITICAL

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

9.1 CRITICAL

Unauthenticated network file read (C:H) whose stolen signing secret realistically enables cookie forgery and account takeover (I:H); no availability impact and scope unchanged within the app.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Threat Model Generated

Aug 31, 2026 - 11:44 vuln.today

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 06, 2026 - 15:17 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 06, 2026 - 15:17 vuln.today

CVE Published

Aug 06, 2026 - 14:24 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.3

DescriptionCVE.org

OpenChamber 1.11.7 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the file-serving endpoints /api/fs/read, /api/fs/stat, and /api/fs/raw that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying the allowOutsideWorkspace=true query parameter alongside an absolute path, bypassing the workspace boundary check in resolveReadPathFromContext. Attackers can exploit the vacuous isPathWithinRoot guard to read sensitive files such as the JWT signing secret, SSH private keys, API credentials, and environment variables, enabling full authentication bypass by forging session cookies on password-protected deployments.

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated arbitrary file read in OpenChamber 1.11.7 lets remote attackers pull any file off the host by setting the allowOutsideWorkspace=true query parameter with an absolute path against the /api/fs/read, /api/fs/stat, and /api/fs/raw endpoints. Because the workspace boundary check in resolveReadPathFromContext relies on a vacuous isPathWithinRoot guard, attackers can harvest the JWT signing secret, SSH private keys, and API credentials, then forge session cookies to fully bypass authentication on password-protected deployments. Reported by VulnCheck with an upstream fix committed; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.

Technical ContextAI

OpenChamber is a self-hosted Node.js/Electron workspace application whose web server exposes file-serving endpoints intended to stay confined to a project workspace directory. The root cause is CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory / path traversal): the resolveReadPathFromContext logic is supposed to reject paths outside the workspace root, but the isPathWithinRoot guard is effectively vacuous - when the client supplies allowOutsideWorkspace=true together with an absolute path, the boundary check is skipped entirely rather than validating the resolved path against the root. The fix (commit f1b9506) replaces implicit trust of the allowOutsideWorkspace flag with an explicit, cryptographically minted 'outside file grant' (mintOutsideFileGrant) scoped to stat/read/raw operations, and hardens the Docker/desktop deployment path so LAN exposure requires a UI password. The affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:bohdan_triapitsyn:openchamber:*, indicating a single-vendor application rather than a widely embedded library.

RemediationAI

Upstream fix available (PR/commit); released patched version not independently confirmed - apply the vendor fix from commit f1b9506132faf6c564a2694c7f33b94421a49b4a (https://github.com/openchamber/openchamber/commit/f1b9506132faf6c564a2694c7f33b94421a49b4a), which replaces the allowOutsideWorkspace trust path with signed, scope-limited outside-file grants, or upgrade to the first tagged release that incorporates it once published. Until you can deploy the fixed build, do not expose OpenChamber to untrusted networks: bind the service to loopback (127.0.0.1) instead of 0.0.0.0 and place any remote access behind a VPN or an authenticating reverse proxy, accepting the trade-off that legitimate LAN/remote users lose direct access. Set a strong OPENCHAMBER_UI_PASSWORD (the hardened docker-compose now refuses to start Docker exposure without one) - note this raises the bar but does NOT by itself stop the file read, since the endpoints are reachable pre-authentication, so network restriction is the primary control. After patching, rotate any secrets that may have been exposed (JWT signing secret, SSH keys, API credentials) and invalidate existing sessions, since stolen signing material remains usable regardless of the code fix.