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Sylius CVE-2026-53639

MEDIUM
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639)
2026-07-09 https://github.com/Sylius/Sylius GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r
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Severity by source

vuln.today AI
6.5 MEDIUM

Network-exploitable with no credentials but requires out-of-band UUID acquisition (AC:H); confidentiality high due to full order PII exposure, integrity low for redirect manipulation only, no availability impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Estimated by vuln.today — no official severity rating has been published for this CVE yet.

Lifecycle Timeline

1
Analysis Generated
Jul 09, 2026 - 22:11 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Impact

The GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash} and PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash} endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.

An attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:

  • read the payment request and, through the payment IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's tokenValue (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);
  • update the payment request payload (e.g. target_path, after_path). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.

The hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.

The creation endpoint POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the tokenValue in the URL without verifying that the caller owns the order.

Patches

The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6.

Workarounds

Until you can upgrade, apply the following workaround. It enforces ownership on the existing endpoints, so that:

  • an authenticated shop user may only access payment requests of their own orders;
  • an anonymous caller may only access payment requests of guest orders (the order's customer has no associated user account);
  • everyone else receives 404 Not Found.
Step 1. Add a query extension that filters the GET operation

Create file src/ApiPlatform/QueryExtension/PaymentRequestOwnershipExtension.php:

php
<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\ApiPlatform\QueryExtension;

use ApiPlatform\Doctrine\Orm\Extension\QueryItemExtensionInterface;
use ApiPlatform\Doctrine\Orm\Util\QueryNameGeneratorInterface;
use ApiPlatform\Metadata\Operation;
use Doctrine\ORM\QueryBuilder;
use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Context\UserContextInterface;
use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\SectionResolver\ShopApiSection;
use Sylius\Bundle\CoreBundle\SectionResolver\SectionProviderInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\ShopUserInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Payment\Model\PaymentRequestInterface;

final readonly class PaymentRequestOwnershipExtension implements QueryItemExtensionInterface
{
    public function __construct(
        private SectionProviderInterface $sectionProvider,
        private UserContextInterface $userContext,
    ) {
    }

    public function applyToItem(
        QueryBuilder $queryBuilder,
        QueryNameGeneratorInterface $queryNameGenerator,
        string $resourceClass,
        array $identifiers,
        ?Operation $operation = null,
        array $context = [],
    ): void {
        if (!is_a($resourceClass, PaymentRequestInterface::class, true)) {
            return;
        }

        if (!$this->sectionProvider->getSection() instanceof ShopApiSection) {
            return;
        }

        $rootAlias = $queryBuilder->getRootAliases()[0];
        $paymentJoin = $queryNameGenerator->generateJoinAlias('payment');
        $orderJoin = $queryNameGenerator->generateJoinAlias('order');
        $customerJoin = $queryNameGenerator->generateJoinAlias('customer');
        $userJoin = $queryNameGenerator->generateJoinAlias('user');
        $createdByGuestParameterName = $queryNameGenerator->generateParameterName('createdByGuest');

        $queryBuilder
            ->innerJoin(sprintf('%s.payment', $rootAlias), $paymentJoin)
            ->innerJoin(sprintf('%s.order', $paymentJoin), $orderJoin)
            ->leftJoin(sprintf('%s.customer', $orderJoin), $customerJoin)
            ->leftJoin(sprintf('%s.user', $customerJoin), $userJoin)
        ;

        $user = $this->userContext->getUser();

        if ($user instanceof ShopUserInterface) {
            $customerParam = $queryNameGenerator->generateParameterName('customer');

            $queryBuilder
                ->andWhere($queryBuilder->expr()->eq(sprintf('%s.customer', $orderJoin), sprintf(':%s', $customerParam)))
                ->setParameter($customerParam, $user->getCustomer())
            ;

            return;
        }

        $queryBuilder
            ->andWhere(
                $queryBuilder->expr()->orX(
                    $queryBuilder->expr()->isNull($userJoin),
                    $queryBuilder->expr()->isNull(sprintf('%s.customer', $orderJoin)),
                    $queryBuilder->expr()->andX(
                        $queryBuilder->expr()->isNotNull($userJoin),
                        $queryBuilder->expr()->eq(sprintf('%s.createdByGuest', $orderJoin), sprintf(':%s', $createdByGuestParameterName)),
                    ),
                ),
            )
            ->setParameter($createdByGuestParameterName, true)
        ;
    }
}
Step 2. Decorate the PUT state provider

Create file src/ApiPlatform/StateProvider/PaymentRequestOwnershipProvider.php:

php
<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\ApiPlatform\StateProvider;

use ApiPlatform\Metadata\Operation;
use ApiPlatform\State\ProviderInterface;
use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Context\UserContextInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\CustomerInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\PaymentInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\ShopUserInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Payment\Model\PaymentRequestInterface;

/** @implements ProviderInterface<PaymentRequestInterface> */
final readonly class PaymentRequestOwnershipProvider implements ProviderInterface
{
    /** @param ProviderInterface<PaymentRequestInterface> $inner */
    public function __construct(
        private ProviderInterface $inner,
        private UserContextInterface $userContext,
    ) {
    }

    public function provide(Operation $operation, array $uriVariables = [], array $context = []): array|object|null
    {
        $paymentRequest = $this->inner->provide($operation, $uriVariables, $context);
        if (!$paymentRequest instanceof PaymentRequestInterface) {
            return $paymentRequest;
        }

        if (!$this->isAccessible($paymentRequest)) {
            return null;
        }

        return $paymentRequest;
    }

    private function isAccessible(PaymentRequestInterface $paymentRequest): bool
    {
        $payment = $paymentRequest->getPayment();
        if (!$payment instanceof PaymentInterface) {
            return false;
        }

        $order = $payment->getOrder();
        if (!$order instanceof OrderInterface) {
            return false;
        }

        $user = $this->userContext->getUser();

        if ($user instanceof ShopUserInterface) {
            $customer = $user->getCustomer();

            return $customer instanceof CustomerInterface && $order->getCustomer() === $customer;
        }

        $customer = $order->getCustomer();

        return null === $customer
               || null === $customer->getUser()
               || $order->isCreatedByGuest();
    }
}
Step 3. Guard the POST creation endpoint with a command-bus middleware

The POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests operation is a messenger: input operation: it dispatches a Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Command\Payment\AddPaymentRequest command whose orderTokenValue comes straight from the URL, so no query extension or state provider runs. Add a middleware on the Sylius command bus that loads the order, applies the same ownership rule, and aborts with 404 before the handler runs.

Create file src/Messenger/Middleware/PaymentRequestOwnershipMiddleware.php:

php
<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Messenger\Middleware;

use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Command\Payment\AddPaymentRequest;
use Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Context\UserContextInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\CustomerInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\ShopUserInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface;
use Symfony\Component\HttpKernel\Exception\NotFoundHttpException;
use Symfony\Component\Messenger\Envelope;
use Symfony\Component\Messenger\Middleware\MiddlewareInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Messenger\Middleware\StackInterface;

final readonly class PaymentRequestOwnershipMiddleware implements MiddlewareInterface
{
    /** @param OrderRepositoryInterface<OrderInterface> $orderRepository */
    public function __construct(
        private OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository,
        private UserContextInterface $userContext,
    ) {
    }

    public function handle(Envelope $envelope, StackInterface $stack): Envelope
    {
        $command = $envelope->getMessage();

        if ($command instanceof AddPaymentRequest && !$this->isOrderAccessible($command->orderTokenValue)) {
            throw new NotFoundHttpException('Not Found');
        }

        return $stack->next()->handle($envelope, $stack);
    }

    private function isOrderAccessible(string $orderTokenValue): bool
    {
        /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */
        $order = $this->orderRepository->findOneByTokenValue($orderTokenValue);
        if (null === $order) {
            // Unknown token - let the handler return its own 404 (PaymentNotFoundException).
            return true;
        }

        $user = $this->userContext->getUser();

        if ($user instanceof ShopUserInterface) {
            $customer = $user->getCustomer();

            return $customer instanceof CustomerInterface && $order->getCustomer() === $customer;
        }

        $customer = $order->getCustomer();

        return null === $customer
            || null === $customer->getUser()
            || $order->isCreatedByGuest();
    }
}
Step 4. Wire the services

Append to config/services.yaml:

yaml
services:
    App\ApiPlatform\QueryExtension\PaymentRequestOwnershipExtension:
        arguments:
            - '@sylius.section_resolver.uri_based'
            - '@sylius_api.context.user.token_based'
        tags:
            - { name: api_platform.doctrine.orm.query_extension.item }

    App\ApiPlatform\StateProvider\PaymentRequestOwnershipProvider:
        decorates: sylius_api.state_provider.shop.payment.payment_request.item
        arguments:
            $inner: '@.inner'
            $userContext: '@sylius_api.context.user.token_based'

    App\Messenger\Middleware\PaymentRequestOwnershipMiddleware:
        arguments:
            - '@sylius.repository.order'
            - '@sylius_api.context.user.token_based'

With the default Sylius-Standard services.yaml (autowire: true, autoconfigure: true) the two classes are already autoloaded, the block above only adds the tag and the decoration, which cannot be derived from the constructor signatures.

Step 5. Register the middleware on the Sylius command bus

Add to config/packages/messenger.yaml:

yaml
framework:
    messenger:
        buses:
            sylius.command_bus:
                middleware:
                    - 'App\Messenger\Middleware\PaymentRequestOwnershipMiddleware'
                    - 'validation'
                    - 'doctrine_transaction'
Step 6. Clear the cache
bash
bin/console cache:clear

Reporters

We would like to extend our gratitude to the following individuals for their detailed reporting and responsible disclosure of this vulnerability:

  • Fase Rais Baradika (@baradika)
  • Anshu Chimala (@achimala)

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

  • Open an issue in Sylius issues
  • Email us at [security@sylius.com](mailto:security@sylius.com)

AnalysisAI

Missing ownership enforcement on Sylius Shop API payment request endpoints allows any caller who possesses a valid payment request UUID hash to read sensitive order data - including customer email, shipping addresses, and order totals - or manipulate post-payment redirect URLs to an attacker-controlled domain. Affected versions span the 2.0.x, 2.1.x, and 2.2.x release lines, with fixes available in 2.0.18, 2.1.15, and 2.2.6 per the vendor advisory GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Obtain payment request UUID hash via logs, referrer header, or shared link
Delivery
Send unauthenticated GET to /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}
Exploit
Extract payment IRI and resolve order tokenValue from response
Execution
Read full order PII including customer email, addresses, and totals
Persist
Send unauthenticated PUT to modify target_path to attacker-controlled URL
Impact
Legitimate buyer redirected to phishing site upon payment completion

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires prior acquisition of the payment request UUID hash through an out-of-band channel such as application or web server access logs, HTTP Referrer headers (when a checkout URL containing the hash is followed by a cross-origin navigation), shared or bookmarked checkout links, or access to a co-located client application that stores or logs the hash. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment No vendor-provided or NVD CVSS vector is available; the assessed vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N reflects that the endpoints are network-accessible and require no credentials but impose a concrete precondition - possession of the UUID hash - that elevates attack complexity. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker who has read a Sylius application log entry containing a payment request URL - or intercepted a Referrer header when a buyer navigated away from the checkout page - sends an unauthenticated GET to /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}, receives the payment IRI in the response, follows it to recover the order tokenValue, and reads the victim's name, shipping address, email, and order totals. The attacker then issues a PUT to the same endpoint setting target_path to an attacker-controlled phishing domain, so that when the legitimate buyer completes payment the front-end controller silently redirects them to the malicious site. …
Remediation Upgrade to Sylius 2.0.18, 2.1.15, or 2.2.6 as appropriate for the installed release branch; these versions introduce ownership enforcement directly into the affected endpoints. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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CVE-2026-53639 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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