What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-49997?

CVE-2026-49997 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.4 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.3%.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-49997?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-49997. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

SurrealDB CVE-2026-49997

EUVD-2026-44713 MEDIUM

Improper Authorization (CWE-285)

2026-07-01 https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb

GHSA-whwg-vh4f-pmmf

Authentication Bypass

5.4

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb) PRIMARY

5.4 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

vuln.today AI

5.4 MEDIUM

Network-accessible with low-privilege auth required; limited C/I from unauthorized edge observation and deletion; no availability impact or scope change.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

Low

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jul 01, 2026 - 20:51 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

In SurrealDB, records can be connected as a graph: a RELATE statement creates an edge record between two node records. If either endpoint node is deleted, SurrealDB automatically removes the edge row to keep the graph consistent.

A user with permission to delete a node could also delete the edges connected to that node, even when the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause should have stopped them.

The automatic edge removal (Document::purge_edges) ran with permissions disabled (opt.clone().with_perms(false)), so the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete and PERMISSIONS FOR select clauses were never consulted. The removal step could also observe edge state that the edge's SELECT clause should have hidden.

Impact

What an attacker can do:

Delete any edge connected to a node they can delete, regardless of the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause.
Observe edge contents that PERMISSIONS FOR select should have hidden, as a side effect of the same edge-removal step.

What it can't do:

Delete nodes on tables they do not hold DELETE on (the edge removal only runs from an authorised node delete).
Cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.
Escalate to root or operator-level privileges.

Patches

Document::purge_edges now propagates the caller's permission context into the edge removal. Each connected edge DELETE is evaluated against the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause, matching a direct DELETE.

Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

Restrict node DELETE permission to principals trusted to delete all connected edge records.
Use namespace or database isolation as the primary boundary where edge-level PERMISSIONS is load-bearing for multi-tenant separation.

AnalysisAI

SurrealDB's automatic graph edge cleanup mechanism bypasses edge-table permission clauses, allowing authenticated low-privilege users to delete edge records and observe hidden edge contents they are not authorized to access. When a node is deleted, the Document::purge_edges routine fires with permissions explicitly disabled (opt.clone().with_perms(false)), meaning the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete and PERMISSIONS FOR select clauses are never consulted. This is a confirmed authorization bypass (CWE-285) fixed in version 3.1.0; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

SurrealDB is a multi-model database written in Rust (pkg:rust/surrealdb) that supports graph relationships via RELATE statements, which create typed edge records linking two node records. To maintain graph consistency, SurrealDB automatically removes edge records when either endpoint node is deleted - this is handled by Document::purge_edges. The root cause (CWE-285: Improper Authorization) is that this cleanup routine propagated a permission-disabled execution context (opt.clone().with_perms(false)) rather than the calling user's permission context, effectively granting the edge-removal step unrestricted access to the edge table regardless of what PERMISSIONS FOR delete or PERMISSIONS FOR select clauses specified. SurrealDB's PERMISSIONS clauses are the primary access control mechanism for table-level authorization in multi-tenant or role-separated deployments, making this bypass particularly impactful in those architectures.

RemediationAI

Upgrade SurrealDB to version 3.1.0 or later, which patches Document::purge_edges to propagate the caller's permission context so that each connected edge DELETE is evaluated against the edge table's PERMISSIONS FOR delete clause. The upstream fix is available at https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/242 and commit a80d1784cf75358441978bbd77688855e95f4578; note that while these references point to a PR and commit rather than a tagged release, the advisory text explicitly states 3.1.0 as the resolved version. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict node-table DELETE permission exclusively to principals who are already trusted to delete all connected edge records - this eliminates the authorization gap, though it may be overly restrictive in role-separated deployments. Additionally, per vendor guidance, rely on namespace or database isolation rather than edge-level PERMISSIONS clauses as the primary security boundary for multi-tenant separation until the patch is applied; collapsing tenants to separate namespaces removes reliance on the bypassed permission layer.