Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/cefsharp/CefSharp) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/cefsharp/CefSharp
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
FolderSchemeHandlerFactory was intended to restrict served files to a configured rootFolder, but its path validation used a raw string prefix check. A request could escape to a sibling directory whose full path starts with the root folder path, allowing files outside the configured root to be served.
Details
In affected versions, FolderSchemeHandlerFactory canonicalized rootFolder, decoded the request path, combined it with the root, and then allowed the file when:
filePath.StartsWith(rootFolder, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)This does not enforce a directory boundary. For example, /tmp/app/www2/secret.txt starts with /tmp/app/www, but www2 is a sibling of www, not a child. The same issue applies on Windows, for example C:\app\www2\secret.txt starts with C:\app\www.
The affected code was reviewed at commit b5fef3bb4bc58798c95170078c41de92cfe9066e, assembly version 147.0.100.
PoC
Set rootFolder to a directory named www and create a sibling directory named www2:
<temp>/www/index.html
<temp>/www2/secret.txtRegister FolderSchemeHandlerFactory for <temp>/www, then request:
https://folderschemehandlerfactory.test/..%2fwww2/secret.txtThe request path is URL-decoded to ../www2/secret.txt, combined with <temp>/www, and canonicalized to:
<temp>/www2/secret.txtBecause <temp>/www2/secret.txt starts with <temp>/www as a string prefix, the affected check passes and secret.txt is served from outside rootFolder.
Expected vulnerable result: HTTP 200 with the contents of <temp>/www2/secret.txt.
Expected fixed result: 404 or equivalent not-found response because the resolved file is outside rootFolder.
Impact
Applications using FolderSchemeHandlerFactory for a custom scheme or registered HTTP/HTTPS scheme may expose local files outside the intended served directory. This is most relevant when sensitive sibling directories share the root path prefix, such as www/www2, public/public_backup, or static/static-secrets.
An attacker must be able to cause the embedded browser to request URLs handled by the affected scheme registration.
AnalysisAI
Path traversal in CefSharp's FolderSchemeHandlerFactory (NuGet: cefsharp.common, assembly version 147.0.100) allows an embedded browser to serve local files from outside the configured rootFolder when sibling directories share a common name prefix. The root cause is a raw C
string prefix check (filePath.StartsWith(rootFolder, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) that does not enforce directory boundaries, meaning a canonicalized path into a sibling directory such as www2 passes validation intended to restrict access to www. A detailed proof-of-concept with exact request paths is publicly documented in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-85jm-cwp2-mvpv; no CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis, indicating no confirmed active exploitation.
Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Path Traversal
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-62186
GHSA-85jm-cwp2-mvpv